Opinion
Civil No. A1-02-43
March 15, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DISMISS THE CLAIM FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED DURING MINORITY
Summary:
The Court found that the plaintiff may bring a claim for minority medical expenses.
Before the Court is the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Claims for Medical Expenses Incurred During the Plaintiff's Minority (doc. #64) and the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss John Alden's Claim for Minority Medical Expenses (doc. #168). For the reasons outlined, the motions are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises out of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff, Paul Eberts, on April 30, 1996, when he was allegedly thrown from a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle (ATV) manufactured by the defendants. Eberts was 14 years of age at the time of the accident. He reached the age of majority on September 21, 1999.
On October 15, 2003, the defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Claims for Medical Expenses Incurred During the Plaintiff's Minority. The basis for the defendants' motion is that a claim for such expenses belongs to Eberts' parents and not to Eberts.
On February 2, 2004, the Court granted John Alden Life Insurance Company's ("John Alden") motion to intervene in the present case. At all times relevant to this matter, John Alden provided health insurance coverage for the plaintiff through his parents' policy. As a result, John Alden paid the medical bills associated with Eberts' care. John Alden intervenes in this action to recover the medical expenses it paid. The defendants submit that the parent's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, thus John Alden's claim is also barred.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is particularly appropriate where, as here, the issue for resolution is primarily legal rather than factual. Bell Lumber and Pole Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 437, 441 (8th Cir. 1995).
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
The question before the Court is whether Eberts, an unemancipated minor at the time of the accident, may bring a claim for medical expenses incurred during his minority. The common law rule is that the parents are the primary proprietors of a claim for the child's medical expenses.See e.g., Wilson v. Knight, 982 P.2d 400, 405 (Kan.App. 1999) (upholding trial court's dismissal of child's action to recover medical expenses incurred during his minority); Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 491 S.E.2d 843, 844 (Ga.App. 1997) (noting that parents are responsible for child's medical expenses, therefore the right to recover damages for medical expenses is vested exclusively in a minor child's parents).
While the parents are the primary holders of the claim for the child's medical expenses, the claim does not exclusively belong to the parents. The child may assume the claim through one of the four recognized exceptions to the common law rule. Garay v. Overholtzner, 631 A.2d 429, 442-43 (Md. 1993). The first exception to the common law rule is where a minor child has paid or agreed to pay the expenses.Id. There is also an exception where the minor child is legally responsible for payment, such as by reason of emancipation or the death or incapacity of his parents. Id. Another exception exists where the parents have waived or assigned their right to recovery in favor of the minor child. Id. A final exception exists where recovery of medical expenses is permitted by statute. Id.
Two of these exceptions apply to the present case. First, Eberts may assert a claim for medical expenses because Eberts paid for his medical care. The defendants contend that because he did not literally break open his piggy bank he did not pay for his care. The Court rejects this contention. As an insured under a health insurance policy purchased by his parents, John Alden paid for the medical services on Eberts' behalf. This payment by John Alden constitutes a payment by Eberts for purposes of exception to the common law rule.
Secondly, Eberts' parents waived their claim for medical expenses in favor of their son by choosing not to file within the statute of limitations. Myer v. Dyer, 643 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Del.Super.Ct. 1993); McNeill v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 283, 290-91 (D.S.C. 1981); Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465, 469-70 (E.D.S.C. 1960). The defendants argue that Eberts' parents cannot waive or assign their claim after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The parents, however, did not waive the claim after the limitations period expired. The plaintiff filed his complaint stating his claim for medical expenses on April 3, 2002. The statute of limitations period expired April 30, 2002. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16. By not filing their own complaint on or before April 30, 2002, knowing that the plaintiff made a claim for medical expenses, Eberts' parents waived their claim in favor of him. This event occurred before the statute of limitations period expired. Thus, Eberts may bring a claim for medical expenses occurred during his minority.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Claims for Medical Expenses Incurred During the Plaintiff's Minority (doc. #64) and the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss John Alden's Claim for Minority Medical Expenses (doc. #168) are DENIED.