Opinion
No. 567799
August 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Whether the court should grant the defendants' motions to strike counts three, four, ten, and twelve of the plaintiffs' amended complaint on the grounds that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for bystander emotional distress in the context of medical malpractice actions.
FACTS
This case arises out of events that occurred on February 25, 2002, when David Murphy, Daniel Dreesman and Heather Hayes, all employees of defendant Groton Ambulance Association, Inc. ("Groton Ambulance"), transported Karen Ebert from the Pequot Health Center in Groton, Connecticut, to the Lawrence Memorial Hospital in New London, Connecticut, in the presence of her husband John Ebert. Karen and John Ebert have brought this action against Groton Ambulance and the three employees.
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs claim that defendants Dreesman, Hayes and Murphy were negligent in transporting Karen Ebert because they failed to properly and safely move her from a bed onto a stretcher and into an ambulance. Moreover, defendant Groton Ambulance was allegedly negligent for its failure to arrange an adequate and safe transportation as well as for the actions of its employees. The plaintiffs claim that as a consequence of the defendants' actions, Karen Ebert suffered several injuries and emotional and physical pain.
Counts one, two, seven and eight are brought by Karen Ebert and allege that the defendants' negligence caused her injuries. Counts three, four, ten and twelve are brought by John Ebert for the bystander emotional distress which he allegedly suffered while witnessing the transport of his wife. Count five, six, nine and eleven are loss of consortium claims by John Ebert. Counts thirteen and fourteen are brought by Karen Ebert and allege the gross, willful or wanton negligence of Dreesman and Hayes.
On March 26, 2004, Dreesman, Groton Ambulance and Hayes filed a motion to strike counts three, ten and twelve of the amended complaint. On April 1, 2004, Murphy filed a motion to strike count four. The motions were accompanied by memoranda in support arguing that Connecticut does not recognize bystander emotional distress in the context of medical malpractice actions. On May 6, 2004, the plaintiffs filed objections to both motions together with memoranda in opposition. CT Page 11232-lm
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004).
"It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is the proper vehicle to test whether Connecticut is ready to recognize some newly emerging ground of liability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Izquierdo v. Ricitelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 566731 (March 15, 2004, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 36 Conn.L.Rptr. 698).
In their memoranda in support, the movants argue that Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392, 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), bans claims of bystander emotional distress in the context of medical malpractice actions. Consequently, counts three, four, ten and twelve of the amended complaint allegedly fail to state a valid cause of action. In opposition, the plaintiffs maintain that the court should deny the motions to strike because Connecticut precedents allow such a claim, which can be brought when a party properly pleads its elements as set forth in Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 675 A.2d 852 (1996).
"The Superior Court decisions are split on the issue of whether a bystander distress claim may be raised in a medical malpractice context." Cordero v. American Medical Response, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 020458609 (April 23, 2004, Devlin, J.) ( 35 Conn.L.Rptr. 645). This court has in the past addressed the interpretative dispute revolving around Clohessy and Maloney and taken the position in favor of recognizing the cause of action. While "there are instances where the rule in Maloney should apply; see, e.g., Colon v. Barczak, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 537729 (July 17, 1997, Hurley, J.) ( 20 Conn.L.Rptr. 121) (granting defendants summary judgment where plaintiff-bystander alleged he witnessed gradual deterioration of wife's condition over CT Page 11232-ln course of two weeks); this court agrees with the line of cases which hold that Clohessy has firmly established a cause of action for bystander emotional distress in Connecticut regardless of whether the action arises from medical malpractice. In this court's view, Connecticut now offers a remedy to any bystander in any context who can satisfy the four Clohessy factors." Drew v. William Backus Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 99 0550724 (September 30, 1999, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 25 Conn.L.Rptr. 534, 536), aff'd, 77 Conn.App. 645, 825 A.2d 810, cert. granted, 265 Conn. 909, 831 A.2d 249 (2003). The defendants have raised no arguments which would cause the court to alter its position.
See Desjardins v. William Backus Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 562748 (April 25, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 34 Conn.L.Rptr. 515); Vanase v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 00 0554764 (February 1, 2001, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 665); Drew v. William Backus Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 99 0550724 (September 30, 1999, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 25 Conn.L.Rptr. 534), aff'd, 77 Conn.App. 645, 825 A.2d 810, cert. granted, 265 Conn. 909, CT Page 11232-lo 831 A.2d 249 (2003).
The defendants' motions to strike raise no grounds other than the proposition that Connecticut does not recognize a bystander emotional distress cause of action in medical malpractice cases. "[G]rounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). Therefore, the court does not need to examine whether the challenged counts allege all the four Clohessy factors or otherwise fail to state a valid claim. See Desjardins v. William Backus Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 562748 (April 25, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 34 Conn.L.Rptr. 515, 517).
For the foregoing reasons court denies the defendants' motions to strike because Connecticut does recognize a claim for bystander emotional distress in the context of medical malpractice actions.