Opinion
Civil No. 03-6482 (RHK/AJB)
March 11, 2004
Chidi N. Anunka, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiff
C. Lynne Fundingsland, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Ebersen, Inc. ("Ebersen") has sued Defendant City Council of Minneapolis ("the City") in this pro se action alleging "discrimination, dubious practices, and eminent domain action." (Compl. at 1.) The City has moved to dismiss on a variety of grounds. Because the Court finds that Ebersen-as a corporation-must be represented by counsel, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.
Analysis
The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789), provided that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally. . . . " Recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 1654, this language now reads:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.Id. Courts have interpreted this language to mean that "[a] litigant may bring his own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of others." Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 318 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2003). "It is a well established principle that while a layman may represent himself with respect to his individual claims, he is not entitled to act as an attorney for others in a federal court." Lute v. Lavelle, 809 F. Supp. 323, 325 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
This principle applies to corporations. As Chief Justice Marshall noted, "A corporation . . . can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear for himself." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 830 (1824); accord Commercial Railroad Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards Co., 39 U.S. 60, 65 (1840) ("[A] corporation cannot appear but by attorney."). The closeness of the relationship between the corporation and the purported representative matters not. The corporation must be represented by counsel "regardless of whether the person seeking to represent the corporation is a director, officer or shareholder." Nicollet Restoration. Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Minn. 1992).
Here, Ebersen is represented by its president, Chidi N. Anunka. While Mr. Anunka has signed the District's Civil Cover Sheet as "attorney of record," there is nothing before the Court-such as an attorney registration number-to indicate that he is so licenced. Rather, his materials demonstrate the opposite. Such activity not only violates the well-settled principles articulated above, but also state law:
It shall be unlawful for any person or association of persons, except members of the bar of Minnesota admitted and licensed to practice as attorneys at law, to appear as attorney or counselor at law. . . .
Minn. Stat. § 481.02. As stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, "To permit a lay individual to appear on behalf of a corporation would be to permit that individual to practice law without a licence."Nicollet Restoration, 486 N.W.2d at 754.
While the City appears eager to take on Ebersen's claims, the Court cannot allow this matter to proceed. The Complaint is signed neither by Ebersen itself-a metaphysical impossibility-nor by an attorney of record. It therefore trips over the signature requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) at the first gate. Ebersen's papers regarding the present motion are subject to the same defect.
In some instances, the rule barring lay representation has harsh consequences. Many corporations, such as Ebersen, are closely associated with a single individual. Some corporations cannot afford counsel. Nonetheless,
Were it possible for corporations to prosecute or defend actions in person, through their own officers, men unfit by character and training, men whose credo is that the end justifies the means, disbarred lawyers or lawyers of other jurisdictions would soon create opportunities for themselves as officers of certain classes of corporations and then freely appear in our courts as a matter of pure business not subject to the ethics of our profession or the supervision of our bar association and the discipline of our courts.Strong Delivery Ministry Ass'n v. Board of Appeals, 542 F.2d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1976). This the Court cannot allow. Therefore, in accordance with well-settled law, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 4) is DENIED AS MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.