Moreover, as we discussed in Division 2, the police were entitled to seize the clothes, which were in his immediate possession, because he had already been lawfully arrested. Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602(2), 361 S.E.2d 821 (1987) (“[o]nce the appellant was lawfully arrested and in custody, the effects in his possession could be lawfully searched and seized without a warrant”) (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)). Thus, we find no merit in this claim.
The procedure did not deny Stokes impartial jurors. Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 601 (6) ( 361 SE2d 821) (1987). Moreover, Stokes received a sentence of life without parole, and when a death sentence is not imposed, the complaint that prospective jurors who were opposed to capital punishment were excluded from service is not a valid ground to set aside such sentence.
However, he did not object to this testimony at trial and has waived appellate review. Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602 (8) ( 361 SE2d 821) (1987). 6. During the course of the trial, a juror informed the court that she did not wish to continue to serve on the jury because she harbored certain fears.
3. Although Brown enumerates as error the admission of expert testimony by a witness for the State, he did not object at trial. Thus, this enumeration presents nothing for review. Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602 (8) ( 361 S.E.2d 821) (1987). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Under United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 ( 94 S.C. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771) (1974), no warrant was required for the subsequent search and seizure of these items, and this enumeration is without merit. See also Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602 (2) ( 361 S.E.2d 821) (1987). 3.
The Court has repeatedly held, however, that once a person is lawfully arrested and in custody, the effects in his possession may later be seized and searched without a warrant. Batton v. State, 260 Ga. 127, 129-130 (3) ( 391 S.E.2d 914) (1990) (victims blood found on arrestee's clothing); Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 80-81 (2) ( 365 S.E.2d 408) (1988) (jewelry later identified as belonging to the murder victim); Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602 (2) ( 361 S.E.2d 821) (1987) (blood and fiber evidence found on arrestee's clothing). See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 ( 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 LE2d 771) (1974).
Once a defendant has been placed under custodial arrest, police may conduct a search of his or her person. U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 ( 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427) (1973); Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602 (2) ( 361 S.E.2d 821) (1987); Causey v. State, 208 Ga. App. 389, 390 (3) ( 430 S.E.2d 594) (1993). "It is also plain that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention."
Once Carter was lawfully arrested and in custody, clothing worn by him at the time could be seized for use as evidence and searched without a warrant. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 ( 94 SC 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771) (1974); Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 80 (2) ( 365 S.E.2d 408) (1988); Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 601 (2) ( 361 S.E.2d 821) (1987); compare Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337 ( 270 S.E.2d 877) (1980). Therefore, the officers were not required to obtain a warrant in order to use the cap to investigate the crime.
We consequently hold that the ensuing search of the appellant's person was authorized as a search incident to a lawful arrest. See generally Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600 (2), 602 ( 361 S.E.2d 821) (1987); Paxton v. State, 160 Ga. App. 19, 20 ( 285 S.E.2d 741) (1981). 2.
LaFave, supra, cites several cases from other jurisdictions which have specifically addressed the evidentiary value of the arrestee's clothing. See State v. Brierly, 109 Ariz. 310, 509 P.2d 203 (1973) (bloody clothing); Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 361 S.E.2d 821 (1987) (defendant required to remove clothing on which police then discovered victim's blood); State v. Freeman, 297 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1980) (bloody shoes and trousers); State v. Pettle, 286 So.2d 625 (La. 1973) (t-shirt, pants, underwear); Commonwealth v. Gliniewicz, 398 Mass. 744, 500 N.E.2d 1324 (1986) (boots worn by defendant with tread similar to that of print at crime scene and with blood on them); State v. Smith, 295 Minn. 65, 203 N.W.2d 348 (1972) (boots); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974) (bloody clothing). In the case at bar, the seizure of Shell's tennis shoes is clearly within the intended scope of the above-cited principles of law.