This Court, too, has recognized that "a reasonable explanation" for a sentencing disparity was "readily apparent" where there were "varying degrees of culpability and cooperation between the various defendants," and where, unlike the defendant-appellant in that case, all co-defendants "cooperated and pled guilty." United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274, 127 S.Ct. 1483, 167 L.Ed.2d 244 (2007); see also United States v. Gahagen, 44 F.4th 99, 113 (2d Cir. 2022) (same).

As we noted in Krys v. Butt, it is unclear whether a claim of aiding and abetting under New York law is sustainable on a basis not of actual knowledge but of conscious avoidance of knowledge. See486 Fed.Appx. at 157 n. 5.Here, as in Butt, however, we need not reach that question because the conscious-avoidance concept is used where a “defendant was aware of a high probability of the [relevant] fact ... and consciously avoided confirming that fact,” United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,549 U.S. 1274, 127 S.Ct. 1483, 167 L.Ed.2d 244 (2007). Most of the facts that plaintiffs deem so “suspicious” that the RTL Participants should be found to have known, “and/or” to have consciously avoided knowing, that Refco was engaged in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty ( e.g., Amended Complaint ¶ 1020(c)) are instead quite commonplace.