Opinion
18-cv-7651 (AJN)
09-27-2019
EB Safe LLC, Petitioner, v. Mark P. Hurley, Respondent.
SEALED OPINION & ORDER :
Petitioner EB Safe LLC brings this action to confirm in part and vacate in part an arbitration award (the "Award") in a dispute between EB Safe and Respondent Mark Hurley. Mr. Hurley opposed and cross-moved to confirm the Award in part. For the reasons given below, EB Safe's petition to confirm in part is GRANTED, EB Safe's petition to vacate in part is DENIED, and Mr. Hurley's petition to confirm in part is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following undisputed facts from the parties' filings, attached evidence, and the underlying Award.
A. The Parties' Dispute and the Arbitration
There is a complex history underlying the disputes between the parties, which the Court only briefly summarizes as relevant.
Mr. Hurley is the CEO of Fiduciary Network. Award ¶ 5. EB Safe LLC is a Delaware limited liability company and majority shareholder of Fiduciary Network. Id. ¶ 4. A dispute over the control of Fiduciary Network led to the arbitration below, which took place before a three-arbitrator tribunal (the "Tribunal") of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Id. ¶ 7.
B. Mr. Hurley's Alleged Perjury
In addition to other claims not relevant here, Mr. Hurley brought counterclaims in the arbitration proceeding relating to an attempt by Fiduciary Network's Board to investigate allegations of misconduct by Mr. Hurley towards his former wife and to suspend him without pay pending the conclusion of that investigation. Award ¶¶ 159-61.
As background, on November 21, 2017, Mr. Hurley was arrested because of an alleged altercation with his former wife. Id. ¶ 74. The two divorced soon after and she signed an affidavit describing Mr. Hurley's alleged mistreatment. Id.
At an April 28, 2018 hearing, Mr. Hurley admitted that he had discussed his arrest and/or the allegations by his former wife with the founders and CEOs of twelve of Fiduciary Network's fourteen Portfolio Companies. April 28 Hearing Transcript, Steiner Affidavit, Ex. 11, at 1524:2 - 1525:21, 1604:6 - 1605:13. The first Portfolio Company that Mr. Hurley spoke to was Evensky & Katz. Id. 1524:7-18. At the hearing, Mr. Hurley testified that he spoke with Harold Evensky and Denna Katz "around the time, I don't remember the exact day" that counsel for EB Safe, Mr. Levander, communicated that EB Safe intended to use Mr. Hurley's personal situation "to gain advantage in a commercial dispute with [Mr. Hurley]." Id. 1524:7-18. Later, Mr. Hurley again testified that he had spoken with Evensky and Katz after Mr. Levander "had called my attorney and informed him . . . that [EB Safe] had gotten ahold of my former wife's affidavit and intend[ed] to use it to get an advantage in our ongoing dispute." Id. 1604:21 - 1605:6.
Subsequently, in June of 2018, Mr. Hurley's counsel requested that Fiduciary Network's internal investigator circulate a timeline of events. Steiner Aff. Ex. 23. The timeline showed that Mr. Hurley's conversation with Evensky and Katz occurred in early February of 2018, prior to Mr. Levander's communication with Mr. Hurley's counsel regarding the incident, which the timeline showed occurred on February 14, 2018. Steiner Aff. Ex. 24 at 4.
Not long after his arrest, Mr. Hurley resigned from his position on Santander Consumer USA's Board of Directors. March 5 Tribunal Hearing Transcript, Transcript, Steiner Affidavit, Ex. 9, at 950:20-23. Mr. Hurley testified that he told various individuals at Santander about the incident. Id. 953:2-8. At the March 5 Hearing, Mr. Hurley then had the following exchange with Mr. Levander regarding conversations with individuals at Santander:
Q. And they made it clear to you that if you stayed on the board, they may have an issue of disclosure?Id. 953:9-21. In later testimony, Mr. Hurley testified that he had asked a Santander executive as to whether there was a disclosure issue, and the executive said "absolutely not." April 28 Hearing at 1560:23-25. Finally, Mr. Hurley initially testified that the incident with his former wife was not the reason he resigned from the board of Santander, March 5 Hearing at 950:24 - 951:3, but later testified that the incident "was a factor" in his resignation, April 28 Hearing at 1572:19-25.
A. No.
Q. That never got discussed?
A. No.
Q. And you weren't concerned at all that that might happen as a member of a board of a public company that you might have an incident that had to be disclosed?
A. Well, your presumption that it requires disclosure, I don't agree with.
Ultimately, Mr. Hurley's counterclaims were denied by the Tribunal, which permitted the investigation to proceed. Award ¶ 217. Mr. Hurley also prevailed on other claims that are not issue here. Id.
C. The Fees Award
The relevant contract between the parties provided that, unless otherwise determined by the arbitrators, the losing party would pay the expenses of the parties involved. Award ¶ 210. The parties agreed on the level of detail they would include in their respective timesheets for fees and costs. Brown Decl. Exs. 5 & 6. EB Safe submitted an accounting of $2,157,818.76 in fees and expenses. Award ¶ 211. Mr. Hurley submitted an accounting showing $4,790,009.56 in fees and expenses. Id. Upon determining that Mr. Hurley was the substantially prevailing party, the Tribunal proceeded to calculate fees. Id. ¶ 213. First, the Tribunal concluded that fees incurred by Mr. Hurley's divorce lawyer were not sufficiently related to the proceeding. Id. ¶ 214. However, while EB Safe had argued that Mr. Hurley's claimed fees and costs were excessive, the Tribunal concluded that it "lack[ed] sufficient information from the parties to impugn the overall amount claimed." Id. Second, having determined that Mr. Hurley had only prevailed in part, the Tribunal cut the remaining fees by half. Id. ¶ 215. Finally, the Tribunal provided for the situation in which reimbursement of certain arbitration fees and expenses could result in overcompensation for Mr. Hurley. Id. ¶ 215. Having done all this, the Tribunal awarded Mr. Hurley $2,152,618.29 in fees and expenses. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"The confirmation of an arbitration award is a summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of the Court." Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1984)). In order "[t]o encourage and support the use of arbitration by consenting parties," courts apply "an extremely deferential standard of review" in reviewing arbitral awards. Porzigv. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, North Am. LLC, 497 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, "the burden of proof necessary to avoid confirmation of an arbitration award is very high." Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the parties agreed to submit an issue for arbitration, we will uphold a challenged award as long as the arbitrator offers a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached." ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat. Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, a court's conviction that the arbitrator has committed serious error in resolving the disputed issue does not suffice to overturn his decision." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Court may vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award "where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means." See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). The Supreme Court has cautioned that "review under § 10 focuses on misconduct rather than mistake." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 563 U.S. 333, 350-51 (2011). In addition, an arbitrator's award will not be confirmed if it is in "manifest disregard of the law" or "manifest disregard of the terms of the parties' relevant agreement." Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 665 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
III. EB SAFE'S PETITION TO VACATE IN PART
Petitioner does not challenge the substance of the Arbitrators' decision, but only the award of attorneys' fees to Respondent. Petitioner challenges these fees on two grounds: (A) Respondent procured the attorneys' fees through perjury and (B) the fee award was issued in manifest disregard of Delaware law. The Court addresses, and rejects, each argument in turn.
A. Petitioner Has Failed to Show that the Fee Award Was Procured by Perjury
Petitioner contends that the fee award must be set aside because Mr. Hurley perjured himself in his testimony both about when he disclosed the incident with his former wife to Evensky and Katz and about the nature of the discussions that he had with individuals at Santander. Petitioner however has failed to satisfy the demanding standard to show that an arbitral award was procured by perjury. To vacate an arbitral award because of perjury:
(1) the perjury must be established by clear and convincing evidence, (2) petitioner must establish that the allegedly perjured testimony materially related to an issue in the arbitration and was credited by the arbitrator, thus depriving him of a fair hearing, and (3) it must be shown that the fraud could not have been discovered upon the evidence of due diligence prior to or during the arbitration.Duffy v. Legal Aid Soc., No. 12-cv-2152 (PAC), 2013 WL 541521, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2013) (quoting Red Apple Supermarkets/Supermarkets Acquisitions v. Local 338, RWDSU, No. 98-cv-2303 (LMM), 1999 WL 596273, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1999)). The first prong is consistent with the general requirement in civil cases that perjury must be shown by "clear and convincing evidence." See Lorme v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 03-cv-5239 (GBD), 2005 WL 1653871, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2005), aff'd, 251 F. App'x 691 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Riccuiti v. New York City Transit Auth, 70 F.Supp.2d at 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) and ICN Pharm., Inc. v. Khan, 2 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1993)). For the reasons given below, the Court concludes that the first prong is not met and therefore it is unnecessary to reach the other prongs.
First, EB Safe has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hurley's testimony about his conversations with Evensky and Katz constitutes perjury. "A witness testifying under oath or affirmation" commits perjury if he "gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." Radecki v. GlaxoSmithKline, 375 F. App'x 46, 47 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). Willful intent is defined as "the specific purpose of obstructing justice." Id. (quoting United States v. Ben-Shimon, 249 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2001). In his testimony, Mr. Hurley expressed different levels of certainty as to whether he spoke with Evensky and Katz before Mr. Levander contacted Mr. Hurley's counsel. Mr. Hurley initially testified that the events occurred "around the [same] time" but that he "didn't remember the exact day." April 28 Hearing at 1524:7-18. Later in the same hearing, in response to Mr. Levander's questioning, Mr. Hurley said that he had only spoken to Evensky and Katz after Mr. Levander had allegedly communicated that this incident would be used against Mr. Hurley. Id. 1604:21 - 1605-6. While these statements are to a certain extent inconsistent—first Mr. Hurley said he was not sure, then he appeared to be sure—this inconsistency does not clearly and convincingly show that Mr. Hurley sought to obstruct justice. Indeed, viewed in context, Mr. Hurley's initial admission that he was uncertain about timing belies the idea that he was willfully attempting to mislead the Tribunal. His later testimony could have been the result of confusion or a mistake made during an adversarial exchange with Mr. Levander. Neither of these possibilities amount to intentional obstruction of justice. EB Safe has also not shown that at the time he gave this testimony, Mr. Hurley knew it to be false.
Nor does the timeline Mr. Hurley's counsel subsequently prepared show by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hurley committed perjury. The timeline indicates that the conversation with Evensky and Katz happened in "Early Feb. 2018," prior to the February 14, 2018 communication from Mr. Levander. Steiner Aff. Ex. 24 at 4. To be sure, this is inconsistent with Mr. Hurley's later testimony. However, it is consistent with his earlier testimony that the two events occurred around the same time. And for the same reasons as above, even if the later testimony was subsequently shown to be incorrect, EB Safe has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that at the time it was made, the testimony was known to be false and made with a willful intent to obstruct justice.
Second, EB Safe has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hurley's statements about his resignation from the Santander Board are inconsistent, much less that he willfully sought to obstruct justice in making them. As Mr. Hurley himself pointed out during questioning, it is entirely consistent to say that the incident with his former wife was "a factor" in his resignation while also saying that it was not the reason that he resigned. April 28 Hearing 1574:2 - 1577:23. At the March 5, 2018 hearing, Mr. Hurley denied that Santander had "made it clear to [him] that if [he] stayed on the board, they may have an issue of disclosure." March 5 Hearing at 953:9-12. When asked whether it "[ever] got discussed," Mr. Hurley again answered no. Id. at 953:13-14. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Mr. Hurley's testimony at the April 28, 2018 hearing that a Santander executive told him that there was not a disclosure issue. April 28 Hearing at 1560:23-25. Mr. Hurley's second denial at the March 5 Hearing can plausibly be read as meaning that he never discussed the possibility of him staying on the Board and thereby making disclosure an issue. Indeed, in his next answer at that hearing, Mr. Hurley challenged what he considered to be the presumption underlying Mr. Levander's questioning: that disclosure would be required if he stayed on the Board. Id. 953:20-21. It is not clear whether Mr. Levander was asking Mr. Hurley (1) whether he discussed disclosure or (2) whether he discussed if disclosure would become an issue if he remained a Board member. It is therefore not clear that Mr. Hurley's answers were inconsistent. Furthermore, Mr. Hurley could plausibly have been confused by the questioning, which is not perjury. See Radecki, 375 F. App'x at 47 (citing Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94); see also United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that in criminal context, "[p]recise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury" (quoting Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973)). Accordingly, EB Safe falls short of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hurley was intentionally and willfully attempting to obstruct justice. The Court therefore DENIES EB Safe's petition to vacate the attorneys' fees award as having been procured by perjury.
B. Petitioner Has Failed to Show that the Attorneys' Fees Award Was Issued in Manifest Disregard of the Law
The Court now turns to EB Safe's argument that the Tribunal manifestly disregarded the law in awarding $2.1 million in attorneys' fees to Mr. Hurley. EB Safe's argument focuses almost entirely on the Tribunal's statement that it "lacks sufficient information from the parties to impugn the overall amount claimed." Award ¶ 214. EB Safe characterizes this as both an explicit refusal to determine whether the fees were excessive and a failure to place the burden on Mr. Hurley, both in manifest disregard of Delaware law. For the reasons given below, the Court disagrees.
Delaware law applies pursuant to the relevant choice-of-law clause. Award ¶ 10. --------
To determine whether an arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, a court will consider three factors: (1) "whether the law that was allegedly ignored was clear, and in fact explicitly applicable to the matter before the arbitrators" as "[a]n arbitrator obviously cannot be said to disregard a law that is unclear or not clearly applicable"; (2) whether the law was "improperly applied, leading to an erroneous outcome" since "[e]ven where explanation for an award is deficient or non-existent" it should be confirmed "if a justifiable ground for the decision can be inferred from the facts of the case"; and (3) whether the arbitrator actually knew of the law, since "in order to intentionally disregard the law, the arbitrator must have known of its existence, and its applicability to the problem before [her]." T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)). This standard is satisfied only in "exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety of the arbitrators is apparent." Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003).
As an initial matter, EB Safe is not always clear as to whether it is challenging solely the Tribunal's failure to consider excessiveness or also the amount of fees itself. EB Safe Pet. Mem. at 18. However, since even deficient reasoning by an arbitrator will be upheld so long as there is a "barely colorable justification" for the decision reached, the Tribunal's failure to consider excessiveness would warrant vacatur only if there was no barely colorable basis in the record to conclude that the fees were not excessive. ReliaStar, 564 F.3d at 86. Accordingly, EB Safe's argument turns on whether it has made a sufficient showing that Mr. Hurley's fee award was so excessive that there was no barely colorable justification in the record to conclude otherwise.
The Court finds that EB Safe has not made such a showing. Under the barely colorable standard, "a court's conviction that the arbitrator has committed serious error in resolving the disputed issue does not suffice to overturn his decision." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Hurley submitted spreadsheets of attorney hours, non-attorney hours, and expenses. Brown Decl., Ex. 5. This documentation provides a barely colorable basis to conclude that these fees were "thought prudent and appropriate in the good faith professional judgment of competent counsel." Delphi Easter P'rs Ltd. P'ship v. Spectacular P'rs, Inc., 1993 WL 328079, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1993). Indeed, the very Delaware caselaw on which EB Safe relies cautions that "[f]or a Court to second-guess, on a hindsight basis, an attorney's judgment . . . is hazardous and should whenever possible be avoided." ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 446 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev'd on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013) (quoting Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1998 WL 155550, at *4 (Del.Ch. Mar. 30, 1998), aff'd, 720 A.2d 542 (Del.1998)). The nature of the litigation below confirms that a barely colorable basis existed for the Tribunal's decision. The arbitration here was complex and hard-fought, involving supplemental briefing, preparation by expert witnesses, five days of hearings before the Tribunal producing nearly two-thousand pages of transcripts, and resulting in a 71-page decision. See Brown. Decl., Exs. 5 & 6; Hearing Transcripts, Steiner Aff. Exs. 7-11, at 1:1 - 1795:24; Award. There is no question that the parties understood the stakes to be high for both sides. As a result, both parties brought significant legal resources to bear, with several partners working dozens of hours on both sides, including Ropes & Gray corporate partner Daniel Evans who billed at $1,520 per hour and Dechert Chairman Mr. Levander who billed at $1,385 per hour. Brown Decl. Exs. 5 & 6; Steiner Aff. Ex 17 at 5 n.5. The Tribunal was also familiar with the complexity of the litigation and directly observed the performance of counsel. Moreover, the Tribunal expressly discounted nearly $500,000 in fees to Mr. Hurley's divorce lawyer that it considered not relevant to the litigation. Award ¶¶ 214-15. Finally, the Tribunal also then cut the amount of recoverable fees in half because Mr. Hurley had not completely prevailed. All this is sufficient to provide a colorable basis for the Tribunal to conclude that Mr. Hurley's recoverable fees, once reduced, were not excessive.
EB Safe's arguments to the contrary fail to meet the exceptionally demanding standard for manifest disregard. EB Safe's primary argument boils down to comparing its own billings to those of Mr. Hurley. Yet once again, the very cases on which EB Safe relies indicate that such comparisons fail to prove excessiveness. See ASB, 50 A.3d at 446 ("That [losing party's] lawyers incurred fewer hours working on the case likewise does not undercut the reasonableness of [prevailing party's] request. Competent counsel may deem it prudent and appropriate to devote more or less hours to a task."). This point is particularly apt here, given that Mr. Hurley substantially prevailed in the Arbitration. Id. Furthermore, instead of marshalling binding authority to support its arguments—of the kind that would be necessary to show manifest disregard of clearly applicable law—EB Safe points only to one case in which a court in this circuit held that it was manifest error to find that fees of close to $3 million were reasonable for a longer arbitration than the one here. Szczepanek v. Dabek, No. 10-cv-2459 (SJF) (ARL), 2011 WL 846193, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011), aff'd, 465 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2012). Yet the court in Szczepanek noted that the litigation was not particularly complex, and the hourly rates of the attorneys in that case were far below those charged by counsel on both sides here. Id. at *7-8. Such an apples-to-oranges comparison with a single, non-binding case is insufficient to show that the Tribunal's attorneys' fees award was in manifest disregard of the law. Finally, EB Safe does not contend that it presented this case to the Tribunal and has offered no other showing that the Tribunal was aware of Szczepanek and its applicability, a prerequisite for manifest disregard. T.Co Metals, LLC, 592 F.3d at 339. Accordingly, EB Safe has failed to show that this is one of those "exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety of the arbitrators is apparent." Duferco Int'l Steel, 333 F.3d at 389.
Accordingly, EB Safe's petition to vacate the attorneys' fees award based on manifest disregard is DENIED. As an arbitration award must be confirmed if it is not vacated or modified, 9 U.S.C. § 9, Mr. Hurley's motion to confirm the award of attorneys' fees is GRANTED.
IV. EB SAFE'S MOTION TO CONFIRM
In addition to its petition to vacate, EB Safe asks the Court to confirm portions of the Award approving the suspension and investigation of Mr. Hurley, denying Mr. Hurley's request that the Tribunal retain jurisdiction, and dismissing the Tribunal's interim orders. Mr. Hurley opposes only on the grounds that these requests are moot.
EB Safe's petition is not moot. Mr. Hurley argues that because the internal investigation into him has concluded and his suspension as CEO was lifted, there is no remaining case or controversy. Hurley Opp. at 23-24. However, "[a] district court confirming an arbitration award does little more than give the award the force of a court order." Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2007). Thus, "[a]t the confirmation stage, the court is not required to consider the subsequent question of" whether the parties have complied with the award or not. Id.; see also Otis Elevator Co. v. Local 1, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, No. 03 CIV. 8862 (DAB), 2005 WL 2385849, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2005) (court had jurisdiction confirm arbitration award despite the fact that other party had already complied with the award). Hurley Mem. at 23, 23 n.14. Mr. Hurley's citation to district court cases outside of this circuit does not disturb this conclusion.
Accordingly, EB Safe's motion to confirm in part is GRANTED.
V. MR. HURLEY'S REQUEST FOR PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST IS DENIED
In passing, and without authority, Mr. Hurley requests post-Award, pre-judgment interest on his attorneys' fees and costs. This request is denied.
"In the absence of a statutory directive, the granting of post-award, pre-judgment interest rests with the discretion of the district court." Fitzgerald v. Bondfactor Co., LLC, No. 15-cv-6796 (CMFM), 2016 WL 4939082, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2016) (citing cases). Mr. Hurley offers no reason why he should be granted such interest when it was not awarded to him by the Tribunal. See Speidel v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2003 WL 21524694, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 3, 2003) ("the proper stage" for a post-award pre-judgment interest request "is at the proceeding before the arbitrator" (quoting Church Home Found., Inc. v. Victorine & Samuel Homsey, Inc., 1983 WL 3093, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 1983) (internal brackets omitted)). Having been given no reason to do so, the Court declines to exercise its discretion and award Mr. Hurley interest on his attorneys' fees and costs. See Fitzgerald, 2016 WL 4939082, at *2 (declining to award post-award, pre-judgment interest as "I do not believe I have ever awarded pre-judgment interest on an award of attorneys' fees in any fee-shifting case" and "[t]he Arbitrator certainly made no such award").
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Court hereby DENIES EB Safe's petition to vacate the award of attorneys' fees. The Court GRANTS Mr. Hurley's motion to confirm the award of attorneys' fees, but DENIES his request for pre-judgment interest. Finally, the Court GRANTS EB Safe's petition to confirm the Award in part.
As to the parties' motions for contempt and sealing, the Court notes Mr. Hurley's November 13, 2018 letter indicating that he no longer seeks to seal the entire docket, as well as EB Safe's February 27, 2019 letter indicating resolution of these issues in New York state court. The parties are ordered to submit a joint letter within two weeks of this opinion's filing advising the Court of the status of these two requests. The Court is hopeful that a mutual agreement by the parties resolving these motions is possible.
SO ORDERED. Dated: September 27, 2019
New York, New York
/s/_________
ALISON J. NATHAN
United States District Judge