Opinion
D069258
01-05-2017
GRACE SYLVIA ADOKAILEY EATON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent.
Grace Sylvia Adokailey Eaton, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00018832-CU-PO-CTL) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy B. Taylor , Judge. Affirmed. Grace Sylvia Adokailey Eaton, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Grace Sylvia Adokailey Eaton (appellant), appearing in propria persona as she did in the trial court, appeals the September 11, 2015 order declaring her a vexatious litigant (see Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subds. (a) & (b)(1)) and prohibiting her from filing any new litigation in California without the approval of the presiding justice or judge of the court in which any new action is contemplated (§ 391.7, subd. (a)). Affirmed.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
OVERVIEW
This overview is taken in large measure from the March 4, 2016 settled statement.
The hearing determining appellant a vexatious litigant took place on September 11, 2015. The hearing came about on the court's own motion, by an order to show cause (OSC) issued on July 27, 2015. In response to the OSC, appellant filed an opposition on August 10, 2015.
The OSC noted that between August 24, 2014 and June 5, 2015, appellant had filed "39 separate actions in this court," and that 16 of those actions were "finally determined adversely against [appellant]" within the meaning of section 391, subdivision (b)(1). Attached to the OSC as appendix "A" was a list of those cases.
The OSC further noted that appellant also qualified as a vexatious litigant under subdivision (b)(2) of section 391, based on her "repeated relitigation of the alleged issues surrounding [her] stay(s) at The Peachtree Inn. On August 25, 2014, [appellant] filed suit against the San Diego Police Department [SDPD or department], seeking $200 million in damages based on the [d]epartment's purported failure to disclose the number of people that have been 'killed' at The Peachtree Inn. (Case No. 37-2014-00028651-CU-PO-CTL.) Shortly thereafter, [appellant] filed suit against The Peachtree Inn pertaining to the parking fees and the subsequent towing of [her] vehicle, which [she] allege[d] was prompted by the [SDPD]. (Case No. 37-2014-00033948-CU-PO-CTL.) Subsequently, [appellant] filed 12 additional cases in which [she] attempt[ed] to relitigate the same issues and any and all grievances [she] ha[s] with both entities pertaining to [her] stay(s) at The Peachtree Inn. Six of those cases were filed as unlawful detainer actions seeking to have either the [SDPD] or The Peachtree Inn removed from the premises of The Peachtree Inn, despite [her] lack of ownership of those premises." Attached as appendix B was a list of additional cases the court relied on in connection with the issuance of the OSC.
The OSC ordered appellant to appear at the OSC hearing. It also notified her that she was being considered a vexatious litigant under subdivision (b)(1) and (2) of section 391 and that she was subject to a prefiling order under subdivision (a) of section 391.7.
As noted, appellant filed an opposition to the OSC. Appellant argued that she was not a vexatious litigant; that she may "look like the hawk, but [she] do[es] not feed on chicks"; that the "issue" between her and the police was in "its tenth year"; that she suffered "torture and pain" from the "abuse" of the police; and that she needed "help" from the court because "if no one can kill and go away free should the [SDPD] do the same and go free because they are being protected by the court to do evil?"
At the unreported OSC hearing, SDPD was represented by a deputy city attorney, who made a special appearance because the department's position all along had been that it has not been properly served by appellant in the myriad lawsuits she has filed against it. Appellant argued that the lawsuits she "has filed to date were an attempt to seek justice for her and for her family, and she had nowhere else to turn." The court found the myriad suits filed by appellant did not adequately "la[y] out a legal theory of liability" against the SDPD, and, thus, the court confirmed appellant's status as a vexatious litigant.
In its September 11 order finding appellant a vexatious litigant, the court used two cases as representative of the "several dozen lawsuits" filed by appellant "in the last year." The court noted "[o]n some days, e.g. Oct. 14 and Oct. 16, 2014, [appellant] filed multiple lawsuits against different defendants. She has filed several lawsuits against the [SDPD]. [Appellant] has become a daily presence in the Civil Business Office of the Court."
The court also noted that after the issuance of the OSC, another superior court judge ordered the case of G.S.A. Eaton v. Police Department (Case No. 2014-41460) "dismissed for failure to properly effect service. This qualifies as another adverse determination beyond those described in the OSC."
In another case highlighted by the court, it noted appellant submitted what the court referred to as a "suspicious" proof of service of summons and complaint on an SDPD "[i]nternal [a]ffairs [d]etective." At a subsequent hearing, the deputy city attorney, who again was specially appearing on behalf of the department, argued service was improper and sought and obtained a continuance to investigate the proof of service.
After considering the papers, including appellant's August 10 response and September 8, 2015 supplemental response, to the OSC, the court in its September 11 order ruled in part as follows:
"The court remains mindful that plaintiff represents herself. However, her status as a party appearing in propria persona does not provide a basis for preferential consideration. . . . [¶] [Appellant's] perceived grievances apparently arise out of a homicide which occurred at a local SRO [i.e., single room occupancy], The Peachtree Inn, about 10 years ago. She apparently believes SDPD mistreated her when officers were [living] . . . at the Peachtree Inn. To say that the complaints and the responses to the OSCs are rambling and disjointed would be a fair appraisal. 'Fanciful stream of consciousness prose' would be another apt description. Nothing offered by [appellant] suggests that any of the claims she has advanced have any legal merit. She begs the court for protection and implores the court not to let the SDPD 'get away with it,' but never specifies what she needs protection from or what the police are sweeping under the rug. She disclaims an intent to harass the defendants, but that is the natural outgrowth of the fact that she has sued the police department at least 10 times (and the SDSO [i.e., San Diego County Sheriff's Department] several additional times), all apparently arising out of the same basic perceived slight. She has sued the Peachtree Inn at least [four] additional times, again raising more or less the same assertions. Regardless of her intent, harassment is the result. Further, the various defendants in this plethora of complaint filing are not the only players with a stake in the outcome. The Court and its staff must process the fusillade of filings generated by [appellant], answer her many demands and questions, and prepare minutes of her many appearances on the Friday OSC and motion calendars. In addition, she has sued the court and its staff twice (referring to the Court's Civil Business Office as the 'Civil Business Center'), alleging wrongdoing when the staff members were simply doing their jobs. [See Case Nos. 2014-38046 and 2014-40723.] Ms. Eaton has not successfully opposed the OSC, and the court finds that she should be added forthwith to the statewide listing of vexatious litigants. In so ordering, the court finds that she has repeatedly filed unmeritorious complaints on issues that have been determined against her [CCP section 391(a)], and [that] she has repeatedly relitigated the same issues without any valid reason for doing so [CCP section 391(b)]. The court also imposes the prefiling order requirement of . . . section 391.7, effective immediately."
The record shows after the September 11 order went into effect, appellant sought to file yet another lawsuit alleging the same basic allegations against the same entity or entities that were the subject of her other lawsuits. The court denied appellant's request, which is not the subject of this appeal.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
"The vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391-391.7) are designed to curb misuse of the court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system and other litigants." (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169 (Shalant).)
As pertinent here, subdivision (b)(1) of section 391 in part defines a vexatious litigant as a person who "[i]n the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been . . . finally determined adversely to the person." Subdivision (b)(2) of this statute separately defines a vexatious litigant as a person who, "[a]fter a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined."
Also relevant here is section 391.7. This statute " ' "operates beyond [a] pending case" and authorizes a court[, including on its own motion as was the case here,] to enter a "prefiling order" that prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in propria persona without first obtaining permission from the presiding judge. . . . [¶] Section 391.7 . . . added a powerful new tool designed to preclude the initiation of meritless lawsuits and their attendant expenditures of time and costs.' " (Shalant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1170.)
Subdivision (a) of section 391.7 provides in part that "the court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed." Subdivision (b) of this statute provides in part that the "presiding justice or presiding judge shall permit the filing of that litigation only if it appears that the litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. The presiding justice or presiding judge may condition the filing of the litigation upon the furnishing of security." --------
The trial court's determination that an individual is a vexatious litigant is an exercise of its discretion. We presume the order is correct and imply the findings necessary to support the judgment, upholding the ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 402, 407.) When reviewing for substantial evidence, we "view the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance, reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1100.)
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court relied on only two cases in finding she is a vexatious litigant. Appellant stated she brought these two, among other cases (perhaps all of them), to bring those "directly or indirectly involved" in the "wrongful attack of the Eaton Family" before the "throne of justice." She also contends that neither subdivision (b)(1) nor (b)(2) of section 391 apply to her because "all the cases [she filed] were meritorious"; and that when she dismissed many of the cases it was because certain documents were "unlawfully taken [or] stolen" by the SDPD, and, thus, she was prevented from going forward in these cases.
As to her first point, we note that the trial court used two cases as merely "representative" of the myriad lawsuits appellant has filed against the SDPD and/or The Peachtree Inn involving the same basic assertions. In fact, the OSC noted that appellant in less than a year had filed 39 separate actions in propria persona in the trial court, 16 of which were finally determined against appellant. Attached to the OSC was a list of such cases.
Thus, as to appellant's second point, we conclude there is ample evidence in the record to support the court's finding appellant is a vexatious litigant pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of section 391. Under this subdivision, all that was required to be shown was that appellant commenced "at least five litigations" over the "preceding seven-year period" while appearing in propria persona. Clearly, the record more than satisfies these requirements.
We further conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the court's separate finding appellant is a vexatious litigant pursuant to subdivision (b)(2) of section 391. As noted ante, petitioner has filed about 14 cases against the same two entities, the SDPD and/or The Peachtree Inn, in which appellant attempted to relitigate the same issues and grievances. (See § 391, subd. (b)(2)(i) & (ii).) As such, we conclude for this separate reason that the court properly exercised its discretion in determining appellant is a vexatious litigant.
Finally, in light of the myriad number of cases appellant has filed against the SDPD, The Peachtree Inn and other entities, including the trial court's Civil Business Office, within the last year or two, we also conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in entering a prefiling order prohibiting appellant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or judge. (See § 391.7, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The September 11 order finding appellant to be a vexatious litigant is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. IRION, J.