Opinion
2012-09-27
Kelly D. MacNeal, New York (Lauren L. Esposito of counsel), for appellant. Milman Labuda Law Group PLLC, Lake Success (Joseph M. Labuda of counsel), for respondent.
Kelly D. MacNeal, New York (Lauren L. Esposito of counsel), for appellant. Milman Labuda Law Group PLLC, Lake Success (Joseph M. Labuda of counsel), for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered January 10, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant's motion for dismissal of the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
It is well-settled that “[a] cause of action for breach of a construction contract accrues upon substantial completion of the *908work” (Superb Gen. Contr. Co. v. City of New York, 39 A.D.3d 204, 204, 833 N.Y.S.2d 64 [1st Dept. 2007],appeal dismissed10 N.Y.3d 800, 857 N.Y.S.2d 30, 886 N.E.2d 794 [2008], citing Phillips Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 61 N.Y.2d 949, 475 N.Y.S.2d 244, 463 N.E.2d 585 [1984] ). Plaintiff commenced this action more than six years after completing its work, and therefore the claim for breach of contract is untimely and should have been dismissed (CPLR 213 [a] ). Additionally, the existence of a valid and enforceable written contract between the parties covering the subject matter in dispute precludes recovery in quasi-contract
( see Clark–Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 [1987] ).