However, several courts in other jurisdictions have held that the Statute of Frauds does apply to claims for breach of oral partnership agreements predicated on the failure of a partner to convey real property to the partnership or another partner as allegedly required by the terms of the agreement. For example, in E. Piedmont 120 Assoc., L.P. v. Sheppard (Ga.App. 1993), 209 Ga. App. 664, 434 S.E.2d 101, the Court of Appeals of Georgia faced a factual situation very similar to that in the instant case. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff's claims for breach of an alleged oral agreement to form a joint venture to develop defendant's real property into a shopping center.

see Weatherby v. Barsk, 248 Ga. App. 848, 850-851 (1) ( 545 SE2d 701) (2001). see Shivers v. Barton Ludwig, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 490, 491-492 ( 296 SE2d 749) (1982) (agreement to enter into partnership for purpose of acquiring land must be in writing); East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 434 SE2d 101) (1993) (oral joint venture agreement which contained a promise to convey land violated Statute of Frauds and was unenforceable). Perry Golf argues that its substantial performance in reliance on the contract removes it from the purview of the Statute of Frauds.

However, as the Westbury group asserted in support of their motion for summary judgment, any such oral agreement necessarily included the Stokers' acquisition of an interest in the land to be developed and required a writing to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 434 SE2d 101) (1993); OCGA § 13-5-30 (4). The Stokers acknowledge this but contend there was a part performance of the oral agreement which satisfied the Statute of Frauds.

Because a contract to purchase or convey interests in land must be in writing, any agency regarding that purchase must also be in writing. Augusta Surgical Center v. Walton c. Venture, 235 Ga. App. 283, 285 (1) ( 508 S.E.2d 666) (1998); East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993). Therefore, summary judgment for Sears was appropriate.

Therefore, Augusta Surgical was entitled to summary judgment. See East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 666 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993). 3. Surgicare contends that the trial court failed to recognize that Walton-Heard's partnership never properly authorized any agent to execute the sales contract on its behalf.

Moreover, this purported "actual cost contract" which included the sale of realty fails as a matter of law because it does not identify that realty.Smith, 208 Ga. at 493 (2); East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993). OCGA § 13-5-30 (4).

In an earlier suit, various members of the Candler family, by their attorney Snellings, sued Sheppard and her husband. After the trial court's grant of Sheppard's motion for summary judgment was affirmed in East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993), she brought this action against the Candlers and their attorney Snellings for abusive litigation. OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq.

The statute of frauds requires that "[a]ny contract for sale of lands, or any interest in, or concerning lands" be in writing. OCGA § 13-5-30 (4); see East Piedmont 120 Assoc., L.P. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 666 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993). It is true that the statute of frauds does not extend to those cases "[w]here there has been such part performance of the contract as would render it a fraud of the party refusing to comply if the court did not compel a performance."

Before an agent may enter into an oral contract to procure a lease on land, as McDaniel alleges James Elliott did, the agent must possess his principal's written authority to do so. See East Piedmont 120 Assoc., L.P. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993). The Elliotts and J J contend that James Elliott had no written authority from Jerry Ann Elliott to enter into the lease.

OCGA § 13-5-30 (4)." East Piedmont 120 Assoc. v. Sheppard, 209 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 434 S.E.2d 101) (1993). Accordingly, there was no contractual relationship with which Smith and the corporation could interfere.