In my opinion, the trial court correctly held that Mrs. Crenshaw failed to show that she was entitled to relief under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) and that it lacked discretionary authority to grant her motion to set aside. See East India Co., Inc. v. Marsh McLennan, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 529, 530 (1) ( 287 S.E.2d 574) (1981). Therefore, I believe the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and I must respectfully dissent to the plurality's reversal of what I perceive to be a correct ruling by the trial court.
See id. See Davis v. Butler, 240 Ga. App. 72, 77-78(2) ( 522 S.E.2d 548) (1999); East India Co. v. Marsh McLennan, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 529, 530-531(1) ( 287 S.E.2d 574) (1981). RUFFIN, Presiding Judge.
When timely notice of the trial calendar, with the case style, case number, counsel of record, and pro se status is published in the legal organ of the county, such notice satisfies notice requirements and is adequate under OCGA § 9-11-40 (c). See OCGA § 9-11-60(d)(3); Brown v. C S Nat. Bank, supra at 517-519; Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate, 243 Ga. 518, 519 ( 255 S.E.2d 40) (1979); McNally v. Stonehenge, Inc., 242 Ga. 258 ( 248 S.E.2d 653) (1978); East India Co. v. Marsh McLennan, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 529, 531 (1) ( 287 S.E.2d 574) (1981); Martin v. Foxboro Co., 149 Ga. App. 719 ( 256 S.E.2d 34) (1979). Davis' name was listed in the published notice as part of the style of the case as plaintiff and as pro se, but not as "Attorney for plaintiff," because on the complaint, he did not indicate that he was attorney for plaintiff of record in the signature designation but "signed his pleading and stat[ed] his address" instead as pro se, although he indicated his status as a member of the bar by inclusion of his bar number.
Additionally, the record shows that notice by publication, which appeared in the local legal organ once a week for four weeks prior to the hearing, clearly and expressly states the time and date upon which the hearing would be held. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reinstate the petition on the ground that appellant had no notice of the hearing. See generally Havlik v. Tuftcraft, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 180 ( 290 S.E.2d 524) (1982); East India Co. v. Marsh McLennan, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 529 ( 287 S.E.2d 574) (1981). 3.
See Marshall v. York, supra; Hancock v. Oates, 244 Ga. 175 ( 259 S.E.2d 437) (1979). Compare Havlik v. Tuftcraft, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 180 ( 290 S.E.2d 524) (1982); East India Co. v. Marsh McLennan, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 529 ( 287 S.E.2d 574) (1981). 2.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment and appellant has failed to present any grounds for reversal. Accord, East India Co. v. Marsh McLennan, 160 Ga. App. 529 (1) ( 287 S.E.2d 574); Troy v. City of Atlanta, 158 Ga. App. 496 (2) ( 280 S.E.2d 892); Maolud v. Keller, 157 Ga. App. 430 (3) ( 278 S.E.2d 80). See also Cooper v. Mesh, 247 Ga. 82 ( 274 S.E.2d 335).