Opinion
21-cv-00063-SPB
01-12-2022
WARREN EASLEY, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL, DERECK OPERLANDER, RENEE ADAMS, MONGILUZZO, JOHN BLICHA, CAPTAIN APODACA, AND KIM SMITH, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1. Recommendation
For the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed based on Plaintiffs failure to prosecute. It is further recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 28) then be denied as moot.
2. Background
Plaintiff Warren Easley ("Plaintiff) initiated this civil rights action by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a complaint, and a motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining on January 26, 2021. See ECF No. 1. After a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court adopted a report and recommendation as the opinion of the Court and denied the motion. See ECF Nos. 13, 23. Defendants, seven employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("Defendants"), then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 28. The Defendants argued that the Complaint failed to allege their personal involvement in actionable conduct of six of the Defendants and, as to all Defendants, that it failed to allege facts to support any viable cause of action. See ECF No. 29. The Court ordered the Plaintiff to respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss by June 2, 2021. See ECF No. 30. The Court transmitted its scheduling order to Plaintiff at his address of record. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' motion by the deadline set by the Court. On September 13, 2021, the Court issued an order to show cause directing Plaintiff, by September 27, 2021, to explain his failure to respond to the motion to dismiss as ordered by the Court or, in lieu of explaining his failure, simply to file a response to the Defendants' motion by that date. See ECF No. 32. That order warned the Plaintiff that his failure to respond within fourteen days "may result in the Court considering the Motions to Dismiss as unopposed and deciding them without a response from the Plaintiff." Id., p. 2 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has never notified the Clerk of the Court of any change in his address as he is required to do under the Court's Standing Practice Order, see ECF No. 4, and none of the Court's orders mailed to Plaintiff has been returned as undeliverable. Nevertheless, prior to mailing its show cause order, the Court investigated Plaintiffs whereabouts and discovered that, at some unknown date, he may have been transferred from SCI-Forest to SCI-Phoenix. Although it was not the Court's obligation to mail court documents to any address other than the address of record provided by the Plaintiff, the Court mailed its show cause order to Plaintiff at both SCI-Forest and SCI-Phoenix. See ECF No. 24, p. 2. Despite this added effort to ensure Plaintiffs receipt of the Court's show cause order, as of the current date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss or the Court's show cause order. Plaintiff likewise has never requested an extension of time to respond, notified the Clerk of the Court of a change of address, or otherwise communicated with the Court.
3. Standard of Decision
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states, in relevant part, that "if the plaintiff fails to prosecute ... a defendant may move to dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). A district court may also dismiss a case pursuant that Rule for a plaintiffs failure to comply with an order of court. Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429 (3d Cir. 1990). "Under our jurisprudence, the sanction of dismissal is reserved for those cases where the plaintiff has caused delay or engaged in contumacious conduct. Even then, it is also necessary for the district court to consider whether the ends of justice would be better served by a lesser sanction." Id.
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 1M F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set out six factors to be weighed when considering whether dismissal of a case as a sanction for failure to obey pre-trial orders and participate in discovery was proper: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. These factors must be balanced in determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction, although not all need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988).
There is no "magic formula" for balancing the Poulis factors and not all of the six factors need to be satisfied in order to warrant dismissal. See Karpiel v. Ogg, Cordes, Murphy & Ignelzi, L.L.P., 405 Fed.Appx. 592, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) and Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)).
4. Discussion
Because all six Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal, the Court should dismiss this matter without prejudice. Each factor is analyzed below.
(1) The extent of the party's personal responsibility.
The Plaintiff is representing himself in this matter. Therefore, he is the party responsible for failing to respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, despite being twice directed to do so. See, e.g., Williams-Bear den v. Clouser, 2021 WL 4743705, *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2021). There is no indication that he failed to receive the Defendants' motion, the Court's response order, or any of the Court's other orders (including the show cause order). Plaintiff has not updated his mailing address pursuant to the Court's Standing Practice Order for Pro Se Civil Rights Cases. ECF No. 3. Therefore, the Court has no reason to believe that Defendants' motion to dismiss or any of the Court's orders was directed to a stale address. Nevertheless, prior to mailing its show cause order, the Court took the precautionary step of investigating whether Plaintiff may have been transferred to a different correctional institution. Upon doing so, the Court learned that he may have been transferred from SCI-Forest to SCI-Phoenix. Despite Plaintiffs failure to notify the Clerk of the Court of any change of address as required by the Court's Standing Practice Order, the Court mailed the show cause order to Plaintiff at both SCI-Forest and SCI-Phoenix. As of the current date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendants' motion or any of the above-referenced orders, advised the Court of any change of address, requested an extension to respond to the motion or the Court's orders, or otherwise communicated with the Court. Plaintiff alone bears full responsibility for these failures to prosecute his claims. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2008) (a pro se plaintiff is personally responsible for the progress of his case and compliance with a court's orders); Ferguson v. Klock, 2021 WL 1293431, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2021).
(2) Prejudice to the adversary.
The second Poulis factor, the prejudice to Defendants caused by Plaintiffs failure to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss, also weighs in favor of dismissal. A finding of prejudice does not require "irremediable harm." Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994). Instead, "the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to [effectively prepare] a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial." Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. Plaintiffs failure to litigate this case by responding to Defendants' motion dismiss together with his failure to comply with this Court's orders, frustrates and delays the resolution of this matter. This failure prejudices the seven Defendants. As to most of these Defendants, Plaintiffs Complaint does not allege involvement in any actionable conduct. All Defendants seek a timely resolution of this case. See e.g., Parks v. Argueta, 2016 WL 7856413 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2016) (dismissing case where a pro se litigant failed to respond to a pending motion for summary judgment).
(3) A history of dilatoriness.
Plaintiffs protracted inattention to this litigation evidences that he does not intend to proceed with this case in a timely fashion. He has missed several court-mandated deadlines, possibly failed to update his address, and violated multiple Court orders. This weighs in favor of dismissal.
(4) Whether the party's conduct was willful or in bad faith.
Plaintiff has not sought to explain his repeated failures to abide by his obligations in prosecuting this case, and nothing in the record indicates that any of Plaintiff s failures were the result of "excusable neglect." Thus, the Court has no reason to conclude that his inaction and unresponsiveness represent anything other than a willful disregard of his obligations under applicable rules and the orders of this court. This factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.
(5) Alternative sanctions.
Imposition of costs or fees upon Plaintiff would likely be ineffective as a sanction because he is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis and is, thus, unlikely to have resources to pay a monetary sanction. He likewise has no attorney upon whom the Court could impose sanctions for failing to comply with the Court's prior orders. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002). The Plaintiffs complete failure to participate in his own litigation creates the potential for loss of evidence, including the erosion of memories and the unavailability of witnesses. This is particularly true in a case such as this one where the Plaintiff has sued seven individuals but failed to allege any personal involvement of six of them. Under the circumstances of this case, including Plaintiffs complete failure to communicate with the Court, dismissal is the only effective sanction.
(6) Meritoriousness of Easley's case.
The Court denied Easley's motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order because he had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claims, among other reasons. See ECF No. 13, pp. 9-12. See also ECF No. 23. The Court cannot readily determine the ultimate merit of these claims without a response from Easley to the motion to dismiss. However, the Court has reviewed Defendants' motion to dismiss and supporting brief and concluded that their arguments for dismissal of the Complaint appear valid. Accordingly, the Court holds that this factor also favors dismissal, although only slightly.
5. Conclusion
Accordingly, this action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. If dismissal is ordered, Defendants' pending motion to dismiss, ECF No. 28, should be denied as moot.