Opinion
Record No. 0582-92-4
November 23, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY JACK B. STEVENS, JUDGE.
Rodney G. Leffler (Odin, Feldman Pittleman, on briefs), for appellant.
Janet F. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Fitzpatrick.
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Appellant states the question on appeal as follows:
Whether, given the facts that the warrant of arrest charged Ronald L. Easley (hereinafter referred to as "Easley") with a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(ii), and that the Commonwealth never sought to amend the warrant at any time prior to the trial court's decision, the trial court erred in finding Easley guilty of a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(i)?
The warrant charging the defendant stated as follows:
"The Accused, within the city or county, on or about October 13, 1991, did unlawfully in violation of Section 18.2-266, Code of Virginia: Drive or Operate while under the Influence of Alcohol or Other Self-Administered Intoxicant, a Motor Vehicle to-wit: 1987 Jeep '93 VA SPC2"
The order of conviction entered February 25, 1992, states:
In consideration of the evidence heard and argument of counsel, the court found the defendant, Ronald L. Easley, guilty of DWI, as charged in the warrant.
"A court of record speaks only through its written orders." Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 578, 318 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1984). At the trial of February 20, 1992, the trial judge made statements indicating that he found appellant guilty of violation of Section 18.2-266(i) and not Section 18.2-266(ii). However, the judge clarified his remarks within the twenty-one day period following the trial.
Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court reads in pertinent part:
All final judgments, order, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry . . . .
The court's clarification came while the case was within the jurisdiction or in the breast of the trial court. Because the record establishes no variance between the offense charged in the warrant and the offense upon which appellant was convicted, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.