Opinion
3:22-cv-135 Johnstown
07-17-2023
WARREN EASLEY, Plaintiff v. CRNP BLOOM, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ECF NO. 39. MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 39] filed by Defendants Bloom and Renberg be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion should be denied as to Easley's deliberate indifference claim. Defendant's motion should be granted as to Easley's First Amendment retaliation claim, but Easley should be provided an opportunity to file a curative amendment within a reasonable time following the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Warren Easley, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), initiated this pro se civil rights action on August 23, 2022. See ECF No. 1. In his Amended Complaint - the operative pleading in this action - Easley alleges that prison officials and medical personnel at his former prison, SCI-Houtzdale, violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by deliberately ignoring his attempts to commit suicide and engaging in unlawful retaliation. See ECF No. 4 at ¶¶ 7-29. As Defendants, Easley named two DOC employees - Sean Bresnahan and Michelle Ivicic - and the moving Defendants, CNRP Bloom and Ingrid Renberg, each of whom is a mental health professional privately contracted to provide psychiatric services to DOC inmates. Id. ¶¶ 2-6. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Easley seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Id. ¶¶ 30-34.
Easley has since been transferred to SCI-Rockview.
The undersigned previously recommended that default judgment be entered against Bresnahan and Ivicic based on their failure to file a timely answer or respond to Court orders directing the same. See ECF No. 56.
In his pleading, Easley avers that he had a “mental health crisis” on August 4, 2022, and “began to attempt to kill himself by slitting his left wrist.” ECF No. 4 ¶ 7. His self-inflicted injury required stitches. Id. ¶ 8. Due to his self-injurious behavior, Easley was placed in a strip cage and approached by Bloom and Bresnahan. Id. ¶ 9. When he explained to Bloom and Bresnahan that he “was suicidal and was having a mental health crisis,” they “left [the] area without another word.” Id. ¶ 10.
According to Easley, DOC regulations require inmates who commit self-harm or attempt suicide to be placed “on constant watch” in an observation cell. Id. ¶ 11. Instead of an observation cell, Easley was placed “in a cell with nothing and placed on all restrictions in retaliation by Defendant Bloom.” Id. ¶ 12. He states that Defendants Bloom and Bresnahan “ignored” the fact that the razor he used to cut his wrists was still in the cell. Id. ¶ 13. He further avers that Bloom “took all 4 psych medications Plaintiff had without clinical evaluation in retaliation.” Id. ¶ 14. Bloom and Bresnahan then “wrote a fabricated misconduct on Plaintiff stating he threatened] to kill [them]” to “discourage Plaintiff from pursuing mental health treatment” and “in retaliation [for him] having a mental health crisis.” Id. ¶ 15.
Sometime thereafter, Ivicic, Bresnahan, and Bloom “took Plaintiffs c-code stability code due to plaintiff requesting c-code monthly evaluations per policy with a psychologist.” Id. ¶ 20. On September 9, 2022, Easley was told “he was no longer a c-code stability code and will no longer receive mental health treatment.” Id. ¶ 22. Easley contends that he has always had mental health issues and received medication for treatment in the past, but that Bloom and Renberg “decided to take [him] off [his] medications and make him a b-code” without performing a clinical evaluation. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. As a result, he has experienced depression, suicidal thoughts, insomnia, mood swings, impulse issues, and rage. Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
Presently pending is Bloom and Renberg's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 39. Easley filed a brief in opposition, ECF No. 47, and the moving Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 50. This matter is ripe for disposition.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
1. Deliberate indifference to medical needs
Easley first contends that Bloom and Renberg violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by displaying deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
Applying this standard to Easley's allegations, the Court is unable to determine at this stage whether Defendants' response to Easley's self-injurious behavior represented an exercise of medical judgment or a refusal to provide care. The heart of Easley's claim is that Renberg and Bloom changed his mental health classification and took away his psychiatric medications in response to his suicide attempt without conducting any sort of clinical evaluation. Defendants characterize these decisions as medically appropriate “adjustments” to Easley's mental health treatment plan, positing that, because Defendants “are all alleged to be mental health staff, [they] were therefore making clinical determinations.” ECF No. 40 at 4. Easley counters that Defendants' decision to terminate his medications and psychiatric services represented a complete deprivation of any meaningful mental health care. At this stage in the proceedings, each of these characterizations is equally plausible. Ultimately, a more fully developed record - including, but not limited to, Easley's medical records and Defendants' treatment notes - may tilt the scales in either direction. At this preliminary stage, however, the Court must draw all inferences in Easley's favor. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied as to this claim.
2. Retaliation
Turning to his retaliation claim, Easley contends that Defendants terminated his medications, refused to provide necessary mental health treatment, and filed a false misconduct against him, all in retaliation for “having a mental health crisis.” ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 12, 14, 16. To establish illegal retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). To be actionable, the adverse action “need not be great” but “must be more than de minimis.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006). This is an objective inquiry. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012).
Throughout his complaint, Easley repeatedly emphasizes that the unlawful retaliation he allegedly experienced was a direct response to his suicide attempt and mental health crisis. As correctly noted by Defendants, neither of these actions represents the type of expressive or communicative conduct that falls within the definition of constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that conduct is protected by the First Amendment “when ‘the nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken,' shows that the ‘activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the [First Amendment's] scope.'”) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974)). In the absence of constitutionally protected activity, Easley's retaliation claim necessarily fails.
In his opposition brief, Easley offers, for the first time, the argument that Defendants' alleged retaliation stemmed from a grievance that he filed against Bloom and Renberg. See ECF No. 47 (“Plaintiff initiated a retaliation claim due to Defendants retaliating after Plaintiff initiated a grievance against Defendants] Bloom/Renberg”). This grievance is not referenced anywhere in Easley's pleading. It is axiomatic that a complaint “may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal marks and citation omitted); Bracken v. Cty. of Allegheny, 2017 WL 5593451, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017) (“A pleading may not be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). Nor are factual averments in briefs the type of “evidence” that can defeat a properly supported dispositive motion. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985). Consequently, the new information provided in Easley's opposition brief cannot be relied upon to salvage his retaliation claim.
While Easley states that he filed a grievance against Bresnahan at some point, see ECF No. 4 ¶ 18, he does not mention any grievance targeting Bloom or Renberg.
That said, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Because the grievance referenced in Easley's opposition brief might support a different outcome on his retaliation claim, amendment in the instant case would not be futile. Accordingly, it is recommended that Easley be granted leave to file an amended complaint within a specified time following dismissal that incorporates his argument that he experienced unlawful retaliation after filing a grievance. Easley is reminded that his amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 39] be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion should be denied as to Easley's deliberate indifference claim. Defendant's motion should be granted as to Easley's First Amendment retaliation claim, but without prejudice to Easley's ability to file a curative amendment within a reasonable time following the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).