Indeed, the only relevant decision our researches have uncovered supports our analysis. In Earthline Corp. v. Mauzy, Acting Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 68 Ill. App.3d 304, 24 Ill.Dec. 787, 385 N.E.2d 928 (1979), a unanimous Illinois appellate court held state trade secret law did not prevent the state EPA Director from disclosing to the state attorney general trade secrets voluntarily submitted under the state EPA's licensing requirements, when disclosure was necessary to enforce environmental protection laws. The Illinois court further observed that the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977 Ch. 111 1/2, Par. 1007(b)(ii), "states that information submitted concerning persons subject to certain Federal regulatory permit requirements `may be disclosed or transmitted to other officers, employees or authorized representatives of this state or of the United States concerned with or for the purpose of carrying out this Act.'"
Additionally, federal law permits the further unauthorized disclosure of these trade secrets by the FAA, thereby bolstering plaintiffs' theory that this disclosure constitutes a tort — breach of statutory duty with resulting injury. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1980) (a federal agency's subsequent intra-agency disclosure of trade secrets voluntarily submitted not a tort under trade secrets act). See also Earthline Corp. v. Mauzy, 385 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. 1979) (state trade secret law did not prevent agency from disclosing to another agency trade secrets voluntarily submitted under licensing requirements). If a tort has been committed in Georgia, then Georgia's long-arm statute would appear to permit even a non-resident plaintiff to use its long-arm statute to sue another non-resident who commits a tort in Georgia.
As is clear from the trial court's opinion, a different standard was applied in the instant case. The court expressly refused to apply the Blue Cross exception and instead held that a preliminary injunction should be denied if there is no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, citing Earthline Corp. v. Mauzy (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 304, 385 N.E.2d 928. Earthline was a totally different situation where plaintiff corporation sought to prevent disclosure of certain permits by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to the Attorney General which were clearly matters of public record by provision of statute. There was no imminent closure of an operating business and resulting loss of property threatened by the failure to issue a preliminary injunction.
The plaintiff must show "(1) it has no adequate remedy at law; (2) a substantial likelihood of its success on the merit exists; (3) it is subject to immediate, irreparable injury; and (4) in the absence of preliminary relief, it will incur greater injury than would be received by the objectors if the relief were granted." Earthline Corp. v. Mauzy (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 304, 306, 385 N.E.2d 928. Defendant's first argument is that plaintiff has requested money damages and therefore sub silentio has admitted the existence of an adequate legal remedy.
The requirements for a preliminary injunction have been stated so often that little repetition is needed here. Briefly, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he possesses a clearly ascertained right which needs protection; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury; (3) that there is no adequate remedy at law; (4) that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (5) that in the absence of preliminary relief plaintiff will suffer a greater injury than will the defendant if relief is granted. Earthline Corp. v. Mauzy (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 304, 385 N.E.2d 928. • 4 As the earlier part of this opinion has held in dealing with plaintiff's underlying claim, there is no likelihood of success on the merits.