' See, also, to the same effect, the following authorities: Lee v. Lincoln, 1 Story, 610, Fed. Cas. No. 8,195; Two Hundred Chests of Tea, Sugar, 8 Pet. 277; Elliott v. Swartout, 10 Pet. 137; Curtis v. Martin, 3 How. 106; Tyng v. Grinnell, 92 U.S. 467; Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U.S. 108; Swan v. Arthur, 103 U.S. 597; Schmieder v. Barney, 113 U.S. 645, 5 Sup.Ct. 624; Drew v. Grinnell, 115 U.S. 477, 6 Sup.Ct. 117; Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 7 Sup.Ct. 1240; Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U.S. 70, 8 Sup.Ct. 714; Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 9 Sup.Ct. 559; Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 12 Sup.Ct. 55; Earnshaw v. Cadwalader, 145 U.S. 247, 12 Sup.Ct. 851; Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 13 Sup.Ct. 881. In Tyng v. Grinnell, supra, it was said by Mr. Justice Clifford that:

Mr. J.C. McReynolds, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom The Attorney General was on the brief, for the United States: The action of the collector is presumptively correct and the burden is on the importers to establish their contention; the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be approved, therefore, even though this court should think the weight of evidence against that conclusion. Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118; Earnshaw v. Cadwalader, 145 U.S. 247, 262; Erhardt v. Schroeder, 155 U.S. 124; United States v. Ranlett, 172 U.S. 133, 146. Similarity is a question of fact. Herman v. Miller, 127 U.S. 363, 370. As this classification has existed since 1894 no hardship whatever has been imposed on the importer.

The remedies provided by the act of June 10, 1890, furnish the equivalent for the action against the collector which was originally the remedy for an illegal exaction of duties, United States v. Passavant, 169 U.S. 16; Schoenfeld v. Hendricks, 152 U.S. 691; and as in that action, so in this proceeding, the importer must establish the illegality in order to recover back duties paid under protest; and this, in a case like the present, involves, in substantiating that contention, the making proof of the identity of the merchandise. Earnshaw v. Cadwalader, 145 U.S. 247, 262; Erhardt v. Schroeder, 155 U.S. 124. Moreover, where merchandise liable in large part to duty is entered as exempt therefrom, the collector has the right to assume that the mingling was intentional and with design to evade the revenue laws; and hence even where the confusion of goods is accidental or not fraudulent in fact, and forfeiture is not incurred, it yet devolves on the importer to show what part of the whole he contends should not be taxed.

So if, without such cleansing, the amount of such impurities can be fixed at a certain percentage, as the findings in this case assume, we see no objection to the allowance being made, though the seed be not in fact cleansed. The case is readily distinguished from Earnshaw v. Cadwallader, 145 U.S. 247, in which the question was whether, as a matter of fact, the term "iron ore," as known to persons familiar with the commerce respecting it, meant ore which had or had not been dried, and thus freed of the water which is naturally found in it. And as it appeared that dried ore was not known to commerce, that the allowance between dealers for the moisture that would be expelled by heating the ore had been based upon express contract or stipulation, and that no custom existed authorizing such allowance, except by contract, it was held that the tariff act referred to ore in its natural state. It was said, however, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Blatchford, that the principle of that case was different from that in regard to dirt clinging to the skin of a potato, or clay, sand, or gravel mixed with flaxseed, such impurities being plainly discoverable and readily eliminated.

This term also has different meanings according to the situation to which it is applied but the important element is that of buying, selling and exchange in the market. Earnshaw v. Cadwalder, 145 U.S. 247, 258, 12 Sup. Ct. 851; Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 78, 16 P.2d 900. There is nothing in the operations of the plaintiff which brings them within this term.

In this background and setting it is quite clear that the word "commercial" relates to buying, selling, and exchange in goods, wares, and merchandise in the general sales or traffic of our own markets. Erushaw v. Cadwalader, 145 U.S. 247, 258, 12 S.Ct. 851, 36 L.Ed. 693. It is clear that the limitation on the word embraced within the purview of the phrase "doing an inter-city business" was intended to restrict the word "commercial" to at narrower sense than the broad meaning of "commerce." "Statutes requiring or authorizing a levy of taxes are to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of its citizens.