Even the broad "proper case" ground does not vest the trial court with discretion to open a default for reasons which fall short of a reasonable excuse for failure to answer. See Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c. Works, 131 Ga. App. 775 ( 206 S.E.2d 612) (1974). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to open default.

The term "excusable neglect," as used in this code section, refers to a "reasonable excuse" for failing to answer, as distinguished from wilful disregard of the process of the court. Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c., Inc., 131 Ga. App. 775, 777 ( 206 S.E.2d 612) (1974). The facts of this case do not establish as a matter of law the existence of a reasonable excuse for failing to file a timely answer.

We need not reach the last enumerated error alleging lack of a legal excuse for defendant's failure to answer. See McMurria Motor Co. v. Bishop, 86 Ga. App. 750, 755 ( 72 S.E.2d 469); Swain v. Harris, 101 Ga. App. 263 (3) ( 113 S.E.2d 467); Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c. Works, 131 Ga. App. 775, 776 ( 206 S.E.2d 612); 1 Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) 520, § 340. Judgment reversed. Shulman, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.

In Ulmer's affidavit accompanying the motion to reopen, his sole defense appears to be limited to a lack of jurisdiction based on residency which he was willing to waive if the default were opened. Having a defense to an action is not in itself a ground to open default. Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c. Inc., 131 Ga. App. 775 ( 206 S.E.2d 612). For this relief to be granted, there must be a motion, meritorious defense, a legal excuse for non-appearance, and payment of costs and these must be made a part of the record. B-X Corp. v. Fulton Plumbing Co., 140 Ga. App. 131, 132 ( 230 S.E.2d 331).

3. With reference to the appellants' claim of "excusable neglect" (as a basis for opening default (Code Ann. § 81A-155 (b)), we note that "excusable neglect" does not mean "gross negligence," and default should never be opened for capricious or fanciful reasons. Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c. Works, 131 Ga. App. 775 ( 206 S.E.2d 612) (cited in Shulman, Ga. Prac. Proc. 140-141, § 8-9) provides "if a party, on reading a writ, reaches the wrong conclusion and therefore pays no attention to the process and fails to answer, his neglect is inexcusable and gross, and . . . the trial court has no authority to open a default for reasons which fall short of a reasonable excuse for the negligent failure to answer." Jordan v. Clark, 119 Ga. App. 18, 19 ( 165 S.E.2d 922); Early Co. v. Bristol, supra.

See Code Ann. § 81A-158 (b). In addition, see generally Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c., Inc., 131 Ga. App. 775 ( 206 S.E.2d 612) (1974) (error to open a default based upon appellant's explanation that he became confused as to the date his answer was due because the appellee's complaint was served on the various defendants on different days.) Notwithstanding the absence of a nonamendable defect apparent upon the face of the record, the defendant's motion to set aside is valid since it was made within the same term that judgment was rendered.

Even though we should treat the plea of payment denominated an amendment, as itself an answer ( West Court Square v. Assayag, 131 Ga. App. 690 ( 206 S.E.2d 579)) that it set forth a meritorious defense, and that it was filed prior to the entry of any final judgment, nevertheless, as stated in that case: "Having a defense to an action is not in itself a ground to opening default." See also Early Co. v. Bristol Steel c., Inc., 131 Ga. App. 775 ( 206 S.E.2d 612). For this relief to be granted there must be a motion, meritorious defense, a legal excuse for nonappearance, and payment of costs. None of these, except the plea itself, appear in this case.

See, e.g., BellSouth , 293 Ga. App. at 250 (2), 666 S.E.2d 699 ; Hernandez v. Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting , 352 Ga. App. 838, 847-848, 835 S.E.2d 787 (2019) ; Summerville v. Innovative Images , 349 Ga. App. 592 (2) (b), 826 S.E.2d 391 (2019) ; Samadi v. Fed. Home Loan Mtg. Corp. , 344 Ga. App. 111 (1) (b), 809 S.E.2d 69 (2017) ; In re Estate of Loyd , 328 Ga. App. 287 (3), 761 S.E.2d 833 (2014) ; Sierra-Corral Homes v. Pourreza , 308 Ga. App. 543 (1), 708 S.E.2d 17 (2011) ; Herringv. Harvey , 300 Ga. App. 560 (1), 685 S.E.2d 460 (2009) ; NorthPoint Group Holdings v. Morris , 300 Ga. App. 491 (1), 685 S.E.2d 436 (2009) ; Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost , 291 Ga. App. 133 (2), 661 S.E.2d 185 (2008) ; Sidwell v. Sidwell , 237 Ga. App. 716 (1), 515 S.E.2d 634 (1999) ; Tauber v. Community Centers Two , 235 Ga. App. 705 (3), 509 S.E.2d 662 (1998) ; First Union Nat. Bank of Ga. v. Floyd , 198 Ga. App. 99 (2), 400 S.E.2d 393 (1990) ; Early Co. v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works , 131 Ga. App. 775, 206 S.E.2d 612 (1974). It has been a great day at the State.