Opinion
No. CV 04-0833564
August 22, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT WITH INTEREST (#187)
On March 1, 2005, the plaintiff, Omar Earlington, filed an offer of judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-14 in the amount of $1,000,000.00. On October 31, 2006, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Omar Earlington in the amount of $2,588,000.00. On May 16, 2007, the court denied the defendant's motions to set aside the verdict, for a new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for remittitur. Also on May 16, 2007, judgment was entered for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict. On May 30, 2007, the defendant filed an appeal to the Appellate Court. On June 20, 2007, Omar Earlington, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-2, filed a Motion for Judgment with Interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a and Practice Book § 17-18. The defendant objects to the plaintiff's motion for judgment with interest arguing that Practice Book § 61-11(a) stays any proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment. In his reply to the defendant's objection, the plaintiff contends that he is merely seeking to establish the right to pre-judgment interest, not initiating a "proceeding to enforce or carry out the judgment."
The jury also returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Tamar Earlington in the amount of $108,000.00.
Practice Book § 61-11(a) provides, in pertinent part, "[e]xcept where otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed until the time to take an appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause."
In All Seasons Services, Inc. v. Guildner, 89 Conn.App. 781, 786, 878 A.2d 370 (2005), the Appellate Court determined that the filing of a judgment lien is not an impermissible proceeding to enforce a judgment, but that an action to foreclose a lien would violate Practice Book § 61-11(a). The All Seasons Services court also ruled that "[b]ecause the primary purpose of post-judgment discovery is to identify assets that can be utilized at some later time to satisfy a money judgment once an appeal is resolved, we conclude that neither the examination of a judgment debtor nor the service of post-judgment interrogatories is a proceeding to enforce or to carry out the judgment in violation of Practice Book § 61-11(a)." Id., 789. "The stay does not vacate the judgment obtained by the successful litigant. It merely denies that party the immediate fruits of his or her victory; in order to protect the full and unhampered exercise of the right of appellate review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winsted Land Development Co. v. Design Collaborative Architects, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 960071571 (October 20, 1999, Frazzini, J.) (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 618).
In the present case, the defendant's argument that plaintiff's motion for pre-judgment interest is a "proceeding to enforce or carry out the judgment" in violation of Practice Book § 61-11(a) is incorrect because the plaintiff is not seeking the immediate distribution of the fruits of his trial court victory. The motion for pre-judgment interest is similar to the permissible judgment lien in All Seasons Services because both are efforts to secure an interest in assets, not collect the assets. Additionally, the plaintiff's motion for judgment with interest brought pursuant to § 52-192a does not violate the provisions of § 61-11(a) because an order entitling the plaintiffs to pre-judgment interest would not hamper appellate review. Consequently, the plaintiff's attempt to secure the right to pre-judgment interest does not contravene the purpose of § 61-11(a). Accordingly, the pendency of the defendant's appeal does not prevent the plaintiff from securing the right to pre-judgment interest.
The court must now determine whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of General Statutes § 52-192a(c) which now provides that: "[a]fter trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount. The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action was filed with the court if the offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint, the interest shall be computed from the date the offer of compromise was filed." (Emphasis added.)
Effective October 1, 2005, General Statutes § 52-192a(c) was amended to lower the interest rate from 12% to 8%.
The court has examined the record and finds that the plaintiff has recovered an amount greater than the offer of judgment. The plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the amount recovered pursuant to § 52-192a(c), from April 19, 2004, the date the complaint was filed, at the rate of twelve percent per annum. The plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest at 12% because the defendant decided not to accept the plaintiff's offer of judgment prior to October 1, 2005, the effective date of the reduction in the interest rate. See Kroll, McNamara, Evans Delehanty, LLP v. Alderman Alderman, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 03 0828562 (June 2, 2006, Miller, J.) [41 Conn. L. Rptr. 489].
See footnote 3.
The judgment entered in this matter in favor of plaintiff Omar Earlington on May 16, 2007, is hereby modified as follows: Judgment shall enter in favor of Omar Earlington in the amount of $2,588,000.00. Plaintiff Omar Earlington is further awarded interest, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a(c), from March 1, 2005, at an annual interest rate of 12% on the verdict of $2,588,000.00.