Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:03cv1323 (SRU).
September 19, 2006
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In July 2003, Theresa Earl commenced an action in state court against defendants James F. Daigle, Jr., a former City of Norwich ("Norwich") Police Department detective, Louis T. Fusaro, the Chief of the Norwich Police Department, the City of Norwich, and the Norwich Police Department. In August 2003, Daigle filed a petition to remove the case to federal court. Earl's claims stem primarily from two incidents in July and August 2001, during which Daigle allegedly took semi-nude photographs of Earl in furtherance of purported law enforcement sting operations conducted by Daigle. Counts 1-12 and 21-22 of the complaint allege various state and federal claims against Daigle. Those claims are not at issue here.
In counts 13-20 and 23, Earl alleges that Fusaro, Norwich, and the Norwich Police Department are liable for negligent supervision, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Conn. Gen. Stats. § 46a-58, and indemnification. On October 20, 2005, Fusaro, Norwich, and the Norwich Police Department filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss counts 13-20 and 23 of Earl's complaint. Earl has not responded to the motion for summary judgment, and has not disputed any of the factual evidence submitted by defendants. Because the motion is unopposed and appears to correctly set forth the governing law, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
In response to a telephone call from chambers, Earl's counsel confirmed that he does not intend to file a response to the motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d. 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (court is required to "resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but rather must present significant probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is "merely colorable," or is not "significantly probative," summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.Id. at 247-48. To present a "genuine" issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248.
If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which she has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In such a situation, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23; accord Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (movant's burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of nonmoving party's claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Here, Earl has not produced any evidence from which a reasonable juror could question defendants' version of events; thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Count 13 is a state law claim for negligent supervision and training. As a matter of law, that claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-557n. Count 14 is a municipal liability claim pursuant to section 1983, alleging that Norwich is responsible for Daigle's actions, due to improper training or supervision. There is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could infer that there was an unconstitutional policy or practice of inadequate training or supervision. Earl also asserts a claim pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. § 46a-58 in Count 14. That claim also fails as a matter of law, because there is no private cause of action under that statute. See Alungbe v. Board of Trustees of Connecticut State University System, 283 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (D. Conn. 2003). Finally, Counts 15-20 and 23 seek indemnification by Norwich for Daigle's actions. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. § 7-465, a municipality is not required to indemnify an employee for willful conduct by the employee. Earl has not submitted any evidence to dispute the fact that Daigle acted willfully. Therefore, Earl's indemnification claims fail as a matter of law.
In sum, Earl has not opposed the motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the defendants' motion and accompanying memorandum, I believe that summary judgment on Counts 13-20 and 23 is appropriate.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 13-20 and 23 ( doc. # 38) is GRANTED.
It is so ordered.