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EALY v. OAKLAND COUNTY

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Sep 28, 2001
CASE No. 00-CV-73981-DT (E.D. Mich. Sep. 28, 2001)

Opinion

CASE No. 00-CV-73981-DT.

September 28, 2001


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


I. BACKGROUND/FACTS

On August 24, 2000, Plaintiff Patrick H. Ealy, pro se, filed the instant Complaint against Defendant Oakland County. Plaintiff claims that on July 17, 1999, he was a victim of racial profiling in Auburn Hills, Michigan. Plaintiff was arrested, after a traffic stop, on a warrant issued for his failure to pay back child support. Plaintiff claims he was held at the Oakland County jail for four days. On January 29, 1999, Plaintiff was ordered by a court to appear and prove that he was paying child support. On that day, he went to the Social Security office and obtained a payment letter which he took to the Family Support Division. A warrant was issued for his arrest on March 22, 1999, two months after he had proved he was paying and continues to do so. While in jail, he signed a modification form regarding his payment. On a subsequent court date, the state court ruled in Plaintiffs favor and the judge was upset that the Assistant Prosecutor Leonard C. Gorz did not advise the Judge that Plaintiff was making payments. Plaintiff claims that he has been injured because at the time of his arrest, he was a probationary employee at the General Motors' Orion Assembly. Because he missed work, he lost his job. Plaintiff fell behind in his car payments and rent. Plaintiffs car was repossessed and he was evicted. Plaintiff claims his credit is damaged.

Defendant claims that when Plaintiff was arrested on July 17, 1999, Defendant Oakland County had nothing to do with stopping or arresting Plaintiff therefore, it is not liable for any racial profiling allegation. Regarding the child support issue, on January 7, 1999, a paternity complaint was filed against Plaintiff Plaintiff did not answer the paternity complaint. Plaintiff was advised that if he failed to file an answer, a default judgment would be entered against him. Plaintiff did not agree with the calculation of his support obligation because his child was receiving support through Plaintiffs Social Security grant. Plaintiff was advised that he had the right to request the Friend of the Court to review his obligations but did not do so. On March 22, 1999, a Default Judgment was entered against Plaintiff on the paternity complaint. Plaintiff returned the Default Judgment documents along with a nasty letter to the Prosecutor's Office. On April 23, 1999, an Order to Show Cause was issued for failure to pay the child support. Plaintiff failed to appear at the show cause hearing and on May 21, 1999, a bench warrant was issued for non-payment of child support. When Plaintiff was stopped for a traffic violation on July 17, 1999, Plaintiff was arrested and taken to the Oakland County Jail on the bench warrant issued. Defendant claims that all the actions taken by its agents, servants and employees were appropriate and proper under the law.

Defendant has now filed a summary judgment motion stating that Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action against Defendant. Defendant further claims that Plaintiffs complaint is insufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Plaintiff filed a response.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This type of motion tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs Complaint. Davey v. Tomlinson, 627 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (E.D. Mich. 1986). In evaluating the propriety of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the Complaint must be treated as true. Janan v. Trarnmell, 785 F.2d 557, 558 (6th Cir. 1986). If matters outside the pleading are presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56(b) and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.

Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be entered only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The presence of factual disputes will preclude granting of summary judgment only if the disputes are genuine and concern material facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only if"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Although the Court must view the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, where "the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. A court must look to the substantive law to identify which facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

B. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendant's first argument essentially is that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), which tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Treating the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint as true, the Court's review of the Complaint finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant. Although Plaintiff claims he was a victim of racial profiling, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support his allegation of racial profiling nor does Plaintiff allege under what law, either state or federal, he raises his complaint of racial profiling. Plaintiff does not allege that the traffic stop itself was improper or unconstitutional.

Regarding the child support/paternity issue, Plaintiff appears to claim that Assistant Prosecutor Gorz acted improperly when he refused to have payments made to the F.O.C. and by failing to advise the court that Plaintiff did in fact make payments resulting in the issuance of the bench warrant which was therefore improper.

Liberally construing Plaintiffs allegations on this issue, Plaintiff may have stated a claim against Assistant Prosecutor Gorz. However, Assistant Prosecutor Gorz is not a defendant in this case, only the governmental entity, Oakland County, has been sued. Plaintiffs allegation of a constitutional claim against Defendant Oakland County fails. The Compliant has failed to state a claim against Defendant Oakland County.

Section 1983 of 42 United States Code provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. Rather, it provides a recovery mechanism for deprivation of a federal right. To establish a cause of action under § l983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) deprivation of a federal right by (2) a person acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). A municipality may be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, but only if the violation was caused by a municipal policy or custom, that is, if the municipality itself caused the constitutional violation. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability does not apply under § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Defendant's policy or custom caused any constitutional violation. Because respondeat superior or vicarious liability does not apply under § 1983, Plaintiff does not have a claim against Defendant because of Assistant Prosecutor Gorz's actions. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant County of Oakland pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

C. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

Although Defendant submitted various documents to support its Rule 56 motion, most of the documents go to whether the child support calculated by Assistant Prosecutor Gorz was proper. The documents include a September 2, 1999 letter by Mr. Gorz to the Grievance Administrator outlining his calculation of the child support at issue. Other documents include letters from Plaintiff to Mr. Gorz and documentation of the default judgment issued by the Oakland County Circuit Court. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that a custom and policy of Defendant Oakland County caused a constitutional violation, there are no genuine issues of material fact and Defendant Oakland County is dismissed under Rule 56.

D. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)

Defendant also claims that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed for failing to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) because the Complaint is not written out in the form required by Rule 8(a) which requires: 1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, and 2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). However, because Plaintiff is acting pro se his claims are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendant also argues qualified immunity. However, qualified immunity applies to government officials and not to municipal entities. Because there are no individual defendants, qualified immunity is inapplicable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the County of Oakland is dismissed. The Court will allow Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to add a defendant, Assistant Prosecutor Gorz.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10, filed March 8, 2001) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County of Oakland is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a Motion to Amend his Complaint to add Assistant Prosecutor Leonard C. Gorz as a DEFENDANT, with a brief as required by the Rules of Civil Procedures and the Local Rules of the Eastern District of Michigan, stating his reasons why Mr. Gorz should be added as a Defendant. Plaintiff must file the Motion to Amend within ten (10) days from the date of this Order. Defendant may file a response pursuant to Local Rule 7.1. A hearing will be scheduled by the Court. If Plaintiff fails to file the Motion to Amend, the case will remain closed.


Summaries of

EALY v. OAKLAND COUNTY

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Sep 28, 2001
CASE No. 00-CV-73981-DT (E.D. Mich. Sep. 28, 2001)
Case details for

EALY v. OAKLAND COUNTY

Case Details

Full title:PATRICK H. EALY, Plaintift v. OAKLAND COUNTY, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Sep 28, 2001

Citations

CASE No. 00-CV-73981-DT (E.D. Mich. Sep. 28, 2001)