Opinion
CV-24-510
12-11-2024
SAMANTHA EALY APPELLANT v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep't of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FJV-23-23] HONORABLE ANNIE POWELL HENDRICKS, JUDGE
Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep't of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, JUDGE
Samantha Ealy appeals from the order of the Sebastian County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her minor child ("MC"). On appeal, Ealy challenges the circuit court's findings that grounds for termination were proved and that termination was in MC's best interest. We affirm.
MC was born in January 2023 and was taken into custody by the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) two days after his birth. In a separate dependencyneglect case, MC's seven-year-old brother ("MC2") had been out of Ealy's custody since February 2022 following an incident in which MC2 had left home alone. Ealy had been referred for services, but when MC was born, DHS was concerned that Ealy had not demonstrated adequate parenting skills in MC2's case. The parties stipulated that MC was dependent-neglected based on parental unfitness. The goal of the case was reunification, and visitation was ordered to be supervised.
In January 2024, the goal of the case was changed to termination of parental rights and adoption. The court found that although Ealy had worked her case plan, she had not demonstrated that she had learned from the services and had not demonstrated proper parenting skills. The court heard testimony at the permanency-planning hearing regarding an incident at a visitation in September 2023 that led to visitation ceasing. The caseworker found that Ealy had abused MC2 during this visit, but Ealy denied it. The court found that Ealy's testimony was not credible and declined to reinstate visitation and family counseling upon finding that Ealy had shown severe instability both in court at prior hearings and through her admissions to an acute mental-health-care facility on four occasions since the last hearing. DHS subsequently filed a petition for termination of parental rights alleging three grounds for termination.
The termination hearing was held in April 2024. DHS presented the testimony of two caseworkers, a DHS program assistant (PA), and a CASA volunteer. The evidence showed that Ealy had participated and completed all services offered by DHS. In August 2022, when she was pregnant with MC, Ealy completed a psychological evaluation in MC2's case. The evaluation stated that she met the criteria for the diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder and mild intellectual disability. Further, the evaluation found that she "does not demonstrate good judgment," and needed to "be in a stable supported living situation in order to increase her stability and decrease her fear and distrust." Other recommendations were in-home parent training, social-skills training, day treatment, and ongoing support and monitoring. The circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem for Ealy at the beginning of this case.
In line with these recommendations, Ealy attended day treatment throughout the case where she learned social skills, and a home-health aide visited her home twice a week. She also attended weekly counseling, which was ongoing, and she completed anger management classes. Ealy completed two group parenting classes and one individual parenting class, and she also received parenting instruction in her home from two PAs. Despite these services, DHS personnel and the CASA volunteer believed that Ealy had not demonstrated competent parenting skills or mental-health stability.
Caseworker Carol Lee Jarvis testified that Ealy overfed MC despite Jarvis's explaining many times that crying does not always mean a baby is hungry. Jarvis testified that despite MC's doctor being concerned, Ealy did not understand the health ramifications of overfeeding. Jarvis did not believe that Ealy understood basic nutrition. Jarvis also said that Ealy did not understand the need to make sure MC's bath water was not too hot and did not understand how rough or gentle she needed to be with her children. PA Jennifer Rector testified that she had to instruct Ealy a couple of times not to pull MC's stroller up the stairs to her apartment while he was in his stroller.
CASA volunteer Janet Beachy testified that she observed a lack of "nurturing, motherly interaction" toward MC and that he usually was propped up with a bottle. Beachy testified that Ealy did not have reliable transportation and stated that she would miss medical appointments if DHS or CASA did not transport her. When Ealy had to have surgery on her ankle, she called DHS for a ride at the last minute, and DHS and CASA accompanied her at the hospital. Beachy noted that this demonstrated a lack of support, although Ealy claimed to have support from her church. After her surgery, both Jarvis and Beachy repeatedly reminded Ealy to follow the doctor's instruction not to put weight on her leg, but she did not listen. Jarvis testified that she talked with Ealy multiple times about the importance of taking her medications regularly. Beachy stated that Ealy could repeat what she needs to do but had trouble implementing a plan.
Jarvis testified that other issues that arose at visitations included Ealy's talking about adult things around the children and calling the children names but then claiming she was just joking. Jarvis said that when Ealy got aggravated or upset, it was hard to calm her down. At the last visit in September 2023, which was supervised by a PA, Ealy initiated a FaceTime call with Jarvis because she could not control MC2. After Jarvis spoke with MC2, the PA stepped outside to speak to Jarvis about what had been going on. MC2 then ran outside hysterically crying. Ealy texted Jarvis immediately to say that MC had grabbed MC2's ear. However, shortly after this visit, Ealy was admitted to an acute mental-health facility and admitted to Jarvis that she had hurt MC2, but she didn't mean to and was upset about it. Beachy believed that Ealy would not harm the children on purpose, but she needed someone to supervise and step in if she did something inappropriate.
Aside from her lack of parenting skills and poor judgment, DHS and Beachy had concerns about Ealy's depression. Jarvis testified that she believed Ealy had been admitted for an acute mental-health stay at least six times in the last six months. In the three months before the termination hearing, she had three acute admissions. Eric Seoby, a social worker who de-escalates patients in crisis, testified that he had seen Ealy seven or eight times. The first time he saw her, she was having an emotional crisis, including suicidal thoughts, because of everything going on in her life and the court proceeding. Sometimes Seoby could deescalate without sending Ealy inpatient, but other times she needed a higher level of care. Ealy's regular therapist she saw on a weekly basis, Joni Henry, said that they had been addressing Ealy's past trauma and reinforcing coping skills. Henry agreed that Ealy takes a while to process information and needs repetition of the same instruction. Henry testified that DHS had not communicated with her about Ealy's case but opined that intensive family therapy was needed.
Ealy testified that during the last visit, she "kind of spanked" MC2 and "flicked" his ear. Ealy said that her first acute stay occurred after her visitation was suspended, and she reported suicidal intentions. Ealy said that she would not be depressed and have these feelings if she had her children.
The circuit court terminated Ealy's parental rights on three grounds: failure to remedy, subsequent factors, and aggravated circumstances. The court specifically cited Ealy's mental instability, issues with boundaries, mood swings, and an inability to care for her own health issues. The court further found that termination was in MC's best interest.
The appellate court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court's ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. King v. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark.App. 126, 620 S.W.3d 529. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. An order terminating parental rights must be based on a showing by clear and convincing evidence (1) of one or more of the statutory grounds for termination listed in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2023) and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. The best-interest inquiry requires the circuit court to take into consideration (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Id.
Ealy challenges the circuit court's findings on all three grounds for termination. We address the subsequent-factors ground. A circuit court may terminate parental rights on the basis of the subsequent-factors ground if factors arise subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent's circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii) (a).
Ealy argues that her parenting skills cannot be a basis for a finding under this ground because her parenting was a cause for removal. Alternatively, she argues that her parenting deficiencies were not significant enough to warrant termination. She also argues that her mental health does not support this ground because her depressive episodes did not occur until after her visitation was stopped and were linked directly to her inability to see her children. She claims that there is no evidence to suggest that reinstating her visitation would not curtail her severe bouts of depression.
DHS argues that Ealy's failure to demonstrate the skills she learned from parenting classes as provided in her case plan was a subsequent factor. We agree. When MC was taken into custody, Ealy had received nearly one year of services in MC2's case, and she then received another year of services in MC's case. Despite working with her for two years, Ealy's poor judgment still resulted in safety concerns such that supervision of her parenting was required. Furthermore, Ealy's mental instability was a significant subsequent factor that persisted despite ongoing therapy. Although Ealy claimed that she would no longer be depressed if her children were returned, the attorney ad litem argued that there would still be difficulties and triggers throughout life. Ealy's psychological evaluation revealed that her mental instability predated her children's removal. Ealy reported that she attempted suicide in 2019 and was hospitalized twice that year. She also admitted at the time of the 2022 evaluation to having occasional suicidal thoughts. In light of the foregoing evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the circuit court erred in finding sufficient proof of the subsequent-factors ground. Because proof of only one ground is sufficient to terminate, it is unnecessary to discuss the remaining grounds found by the circuit court. Garrett v. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark.App. 401, 499 S.W.3d 659.
Regarding the circuit court's finding that termination was in MC's best interest, Ealy challenges only the potential-harm factor. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address the evidence as to adoptability. In determining potential harm, the circuit court may consider past behavior as a predictor of likely potential harm should the child be returned to the parent's care and custody. Scott v. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark.App. 347, 552 S.W.3d 463. The circuit court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Id. The potential-harm evidence must be viewed in a forwardlooking manner and considered in broad terms. Id.
Ealy argues that her parenting skills and mental health did not support the finding of potential harm. In support, she cites Benedict v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 96 Ark.App. 395, 242 S.W.3d 305 (2006), which reversed a termination because of a clearly erroneous best-interest finding. Ealy argues that, as in Benedict, she had shown sincere efforts to comply with her case plan and had made consistent efforts to improve her parenting skills despite her intellectual deficiencies. However, in Benedict, this court held that the appellant had benefited from the services provided by DHS, had shown "objective improvement," and had shown "marked progress" in her ability to provide a stable home. 395 Ark.App. at 412, 242 S.W.3d at 319. Here, the evidence showed that despite two years of services, Ealy's mental health had worsened, and her parenting skills had not improved. Furthermore, her visitation was halted after she harmed MC2 while being supervised by DHS. The evidence showing her lack of capacity to safely parent MC supports the finding that termination was in his best interest.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.