This proposition is in accord with decisions of our court indicating that the equitable principle of relative hardships is not to be considered when property rights have been willfully or negligently violated. See Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423, 429-430 (N.D. 1975); Graven v. Backus, 163 N.W.2d 320, 325-326 (N.D. 1968); Owenson v. Bradley, 50 N.D. 741, 197 N.W. 885, 887-889 (1924). See also Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Haw. 491, 583 P.2d 971, 978-979 (1978); Gladstone v. Gregory, 95 Nev. 474, 596 P.2d 491, 495 (1979); McDonough v. W.W. Snow Construction Co., Inc., 131 Vt. 436, 306 A.2d 119, 122 (1973); Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 5.6, at 355 (1973).
Findings of fact by the district court, in a case tried upon the facts without a jury, will not be set aside by this Court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Eakman v. Robb, Syll. ¶ 2, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975); Kleinjan v. Knutson, 207 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1973). Furthermore, in Eakman v. Robb, supra 237 N.W.2d at 424, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the syllabus, we held: "4. A finding is `clearly erroneous' only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Findings of fact by the trial court, in a case tried upon the facts without a jury, will not be set aside by this court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Mattco, Inc. v. Mandan Radio Ass'n, Inc., 246 N.W.2d 222, Syll. ¶ 2 (N.D. 1976); Berry-Iverson Co. of North Dakota v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126, Syll. ¶ 1 (N.D. 1976); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423, Syll. ¶ 2 (N.D. 1975), and Kleinjan v. Knutson, 207 N.W.2d 247, 249 (N.D. 1973). Furthermore, in Eakman v. Robb, supra 237 N.W.2d at 424, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the syllabus, we held: "4. A finding is `clearly erroneous' only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Generally, an action to enforce restrictive covenants can be brought by anyone for whose benefit the covenant was made. Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 962 (Wyo.1996) (power to enforce the covenants is granted to every record property owner); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D.1975) (purchasers brought action to enforce restrictive covenants against owner and developer); Anderson v. New Prop. Owners' Ass'n of Newport, Inc., 122 S.W.3d 378, 384–85 (Tex.App.2003) (property owners' association had standing to bring suit); Wheeler, 65 S.W.3d at 569 (“covenants can be enforced by any benefited landowner”); Save the Prairie Soc. v. Greene Dev. Group, Inc., 323 Ill.App.3d 862, 256 Ill.Dec. 643, 752 N.E.2d 523, 528 (2001) ( “Owners of all similarly encumbered lots subject to the same general plan have the right to enforce such covenants.”).
Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972). Although we have allowed damages for emotional distress as a constituent element of other damages, we have not specifically analyzed the elements of an independent action for either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op, 409 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1987); Thiele v. Lindquist Vennum, 404 N.W.2d 52 (N.D. 1987); Ouren v. Krebsbach, 338 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 1983); Schleicher v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, 314 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1982); Smith v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1980); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). See also Hanke v. Global Van Lines, Inc., 533 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976).
(Alaska 1976); Starkovich v. Noye, 111 Ariz. 347, 529 P.2d 698 (1975); Longinotti v. Rhodes, 215 Ark. 380, 220 S.W.2d 812 (1949); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal.App.2d 393, 221 P.2d 965 (1950); McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo. 461, 83 P.2d 135 (1905); Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So.2d 29 (Fla.App. 1973); Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969); Hedworth v. Chapman, 135 Ind. App. 129, 192 N.E.2d 649 (1963); Pringle Tax Service, Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1979); Capitol Savings Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 235 Kan. 815, 682 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1984); McClung v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961); Gould v. Starr, 558 S.W.2d 755 (Mo.App. 1977); Brown v. Grenz, 127 Mont. 49, 55, 257 P.2d 246 (1953); Gerlach Livestock Co. v. Laxalt, 52 Nev. 191, 201, 284 P. 310, 313 (1930); Singer Shop-Rite, Inc. v. Rangel, 174 N.J. Super. 442, 416 A.2d 965 (1980); I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 329, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547, 189 N.E.2d 812 (1963); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975); Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty Co., 556 P.2d 1328 (Okla.App. 1976); Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 294 Or. 392, 657 P.2d 673 (1983); Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health Life Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 239, 87 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Black v. Gardner, 320 N.W.2d 153 (S.D. 1982); Bryson v. Bramlett, 204 Tenn. 347, 321 S.W.2d 555 (1959); Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872 (W.Va. 1982). As the greater number of tort cases fall within the range of those injuries which are not actionable without a showing of pecuniary damage or bodily harm, it has been natural for the courts to slide from the proposition stated in the previous paragraph that exemplary damages can only be allowed as an incident to an independent cause of action, to the generalization that 'actual' damages must be awarded as a prerequisite to the allowance of exemplary damages.
The granting or denying of injunctive relief is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). The district court's denial of the Heidts' motion will not be overturned on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Allen v. Minot Amusement Corp., 312 N.W.2d 698, 701 (N.D. 1981).
Our review of factual findings made by the trial court is governed by Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. We have often stated that questions of fact decided by the trial court upon conflicting evidence are not subject to reexamination by this Court on appeal. E.g., Hoge v. Burleigh County Water Management District, 311 N.W.2d 23, 28 (N.D. 1981); Bladow v. Bladow, 249 N.W.2d 917, 920 (N.D. 1977); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423, 429 (N.D. 1975). We must give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to appraise the credibility of the witnesses.
Peters v. Davis, 426 Pa. 231, 238, 231 A.2d 748, 752 (1967)."Cf. Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). Heinsohn's circuitous argument rules out the possibility of an innocent mistake.
We have made it clear in the past that we will not re-examine findings of fact decided by the trial court upon conflicting evidence. Kasper v. Provident Life Insurance Co., 285 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1979); Schmidt v. Plains Electric, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 794 (N.D. 1979); Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District No. 1, 252 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1977); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). Nor will we appraise the credibility of expert witnesses. Schmidt v. Plains Electric, supra; Foremost Insurance Co. v. Rollohome Corp., 221 N.W.2d 722 (N.D. 1974).