Opinion
C/A No. 0:18-3079-SAL-PJG
05-29-2020
Adrian Tyrell Eaglin, Plaintiff, v. Michael McCall, Director; Warden Jim Riley; Ass. Warden Lane; A. Hudson, Sgt.; Willie Ocean, Capt.; Ms. Albert, Mail Carrier; Mr. Zahm, Mail Carrier; J. Hollis, Unit Manager; Warden Willie Davis; John Robinson, Lt.; Ms. S. Ferrell, Grievance Coordinator; Dr. Woods; Mr. Innabinet, Mental Health Counselor; Mr. Burrows, Ofc.; Nurse Chudd; Ms. Charlene Toliver, Classification; Ms. Harrolds, Classification; Ms. Garcia, Nurse Pract.; Vaugh Jackson, Dept. Warden, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Adrian Tyrell Eaglin, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this action alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 112.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Eaglin of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 114.) Eaglin filed a response in opposition to the motion, as well as a cross- motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 125), and the defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 128). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motion should be granted, and Eaglin's motion should be denied.
The court observes that this motion was untimely pursuant to the court's deadline to file dispositive motions, and Eaglin did not present any cause for its untimeliness. However, even considering Eaglin's motion for summary judgment, the court finds for the reasons that follow that it should be denied.
Eaglin also filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 137.) The Local Civil Rules make no provision for sur-replies. However, consideration of Eaglin's sur-reply would not change the court's recommendation on the defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Eaglin raises claims of excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment; a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; and due process claims in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 46.) Eaglin seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Generally
The defendants argue that Eaglin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claims. A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." This requirement "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Generally, to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); but see Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (describing limited circumstances where exhaustion may be excused). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires "using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thus, "it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The defendant has the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Pursuant to South Carolina Department of Corrections policy (see SCDC Policy GA-01.12 "Inmate Grievance System," ECF No. 112-8), an inmate seeking to complain of prison conditions generally must first attempt to informally resolve his complaint. Next, an inmate may file a "Step 1 Grievance" with designated prison staff. If the Step 1 Grievance is denied, the inmate may appeal to the warden of his facility via a "Step 2 Grievance." Moreover, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, review from the South Carolina Administrative Law Court ("ALC"), a state executive-branch tribunal, is generally part of the available administrative remedies an inmate must exhaust. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-500 ("There is created the South Carolina Administrative Law Court, which is an agency and court of record within the executive branch of the government of this State.") (emphasis added); see Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 649 S.E.2d 35, 38 (S.C. 2007) (reaffirming that "the ALC has jurisdiction over all inmate grievance appeals that have been properly filed") (citing Slezak v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 605 S.E.2d 506 (S.C. 2004)); (SCDC Policy GA-01.12 "Inmate Grievance System" at § 13.9, ECF No. 112-8).
The law is clear that exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit and must be completed prior to filing an action. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 676-77 (4th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Page v. Paduly, No. 9:09-cv-0952-RMG-BM, 2010 WL 4365644, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2010) (finding that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies where he either did not properly pursue a grievance concerning the issues raised in the case prior to filing the lawsuit, or did not even file grievances until after the lawsuit had already commenced); Cabbagestalk v. Ozmint, C/A No. 9:06-3005-MBS, 2007 WL 2822927, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2007) (noting that the court must look to the time of filing—not the time the district court is rendering its decision—to determine if exhaustion has occurred); see also Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that § 1997e(a) "permits suit to be filed so long as administrative remedies are exhausted before trial"); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding a prisoner "may not exhaust administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit").
The defendants present evidence in the form of affidavit testimony from Sherman Anderson, Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch, as well as copies of the grievances filed by Eaglin. (Anderson Aff., ECF No. 112-3 at 2-6; Grievances, ECF No. 112-3 at 7-66.) Anderson testifies—and the record confirms—that Eaglin filed seventeen Step 1 grievances and three Step 2 grievances during the relevant time period. However, only one of the Step 2 grievances related to the claims raised in this action—specifically Eaglin's claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs when he was denied special-order commissary items due to his allergies. (Anderson Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 112-3 at 2.) Accordingly, the record is clear that Eaglin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any other claim raised in the instant action, and Eaglin has made no response or forecasted any evidence to counter the defendants' argument. The defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment as to Eaglin's other claims.
Eaglin also filed a motion seeking injunctive relief regarding his due process claims and his subsequent transfer to the Colorado Department of Corrections. (ECF No. 127.) To the extent Eaglin seeks injunctive relief against any of the named defendants, his request is moot because Eaglin is no longer in SCDC custody. Accordingly, his motion should be terminated.
Turning to the relevant Step 2 grievance filed on November 20, 2018, the form states that the grievance was administratively closed a few days later due to Eaglin's transfer to the Colorado Department of Corrections. (Step 2 Grievance, ECF No. 112-3 at 62; Anderson Aff. ¶¶ 2 & 3t, ECF No. 112-3 at 2, 5-6.) Neither the grievance form nor the defendants' evidence indicates whether Eaglin was provided a copy of this response or notification of the closure of his grievance such that Eaglin would have been able to avail himself of the next step in the grievance process. Moreover, the defendants do not provide any information on the relevant procedures for exhaustion of administrative remedies when an inmate is transferred out of the state. Accordingly, as to this claim only, on this record, the defendants have not carried their ultimate burden to show that Eaglin's claim should be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the court will therefore address it on the merits, below.
2. Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
In his Amended Complaint, Eaglin alleges that he is allergic to sulfa, and that the personal hygiene products at SCDC institutions' canteens contain this chemical. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 46 at 17.) Eaglin alleges that the use of these products causes him to have allergic reactions, which he alleges results in his skin breaking out, and has caused cracked skin, bumps, bleeding, and puss. (Id.) Eaglin further alleges that he was granted approval from the SCDC medical department to order sulfa-free hygiene products from outside of SCDC, but that his orders were confiscated by the defendants—specifically Defendants Davis, Jackson, Hollis, and Hudson. (Id. at 17-18, 32.) Because of this, Eaglin alleges that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. (Id.)
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To proceed with his claim under the Eighth Amendment, Eaglin must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was "sufficiently serious," and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). "These requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called 'punishment,' and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called 'cruel and unusual.' " Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). "What must be established with regard to each component 'varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.' " Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)).
Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's medical needs is actionable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). To satisfy the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must show that the prison official's state of mind was "deliberate indifference" to the inmate's health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and disregards that substantial risk. Id. at 847; Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). To be liable under this standard, the prison official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, because even a subjective standard may be proven through circumstantial evidence, "a prison official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, no matter how obvious." Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, "a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that a risk was obvious." Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
Not "every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. To establish deliberate indifference, the treatment "must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). Mere negligence, malpractice, or incorrect diagnosis is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. While the Constitution requires a prison to provide inmates with medical care, it does not demand that a prisoner receive the treatment of his choice. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988). "[A] prisoner's mere difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted) (alterations in original); see also Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
As an initial matter, the four defendants specifically named by Eaglin consist of a warden, a department warden, a unit manager, and a sergeant—that is, non-medical personnel. To establish a claim for denial of medical care against non-medical personnel, a prisoner must show that they failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. Because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel, they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment which the medical personnel deemed necessary and appropriate for the prisoner. See id.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants provide Eaglin's medical records as well as sworn testimony from the defendants. Review of Eaglin's medical records reveals that he was seen over two hundred and fifty times by SCDC medical personnel within the relevant time period between April 2016 and November 2018. (See generally Medical Recs., ECF No. 112-5 at 4-110.) Of these medical encounters, at least forty entries relate to Eaglin's complaints of allegedly suffering an allergic reaction on his skin to sulfa. Review of these records shows that SCDC medical personnel provided care to Eaglin for his alleged allergic reaction, including prescribing various skin creams, ointments, and medications. Notably, Eaglin complained that the skin cream did not work, that he stopped taking medication because it was "not helping," and that he wished to order his own products. (See Medical Recs., ECF No. 122-5 at 45, 48.) Additionally, an April 12, 2018 medical encounter indicates that Eaglin "admitted yesterday that the soaps and deodorant he has been using have been free of these allergens and he is still breaking out, so I think we need to consider other sources for the causative agent of the rash." (Id. at 47) (also noting that Eaglin was "unwilling to entertain the idea that the rash could be of any other etiology. He believes that the Warden and fellow security staff are out to get him by impeding his ability to attain certain hygiene products and will not change his train of thought on the matter.")
Moreover, the record indisputably shows that SCDC officials worked with Eaglin to accommodate his purported allergy. The defendants provide affidavit testimony that Eaglin was authorized and approved by Warden Davis to order Yardley London brand bar soap from outside of SCDC. (Davis Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 112-28 at 2; see also Hudson Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 112-26 at 2; Jackson Aff. ¶ 9, ECF No. 112-27 at 2.) The defendants further aver that Eaglin received an order of nine bars of Yardley London soap on December 6, 2017, and thirteen bars of Yardley London soap on October 23, 2018. (Hudson Aff. ¶¶ 5, 9, ECF No. 112-26 at 2-3.) However, when Eaglin placed orders for hygiene products from outside of SCDC that included unapproved items—many of which included sulfas as an ingredient—he did not receive the unapproved products, as these items were considered contraband pursuant to SCDC policy. (Hudson Aff. ¶¶ 6-8, 10, ECF No. 112-26 at 2-3; Jackson Aff. ¶¶ 9-11, ECF No. 112-27 at 2; Davis Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 112-28 at 2.)
In response, Eaglin summarily argues that that he was denied medically-approved skin care items and that his orders were confiscated by the defendants. (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n Summ. J., ECF No. 125 at 8; Pl.'s Sur-Reply, ECF No. 137 at 6.) Eaglin reiterates that he has experienced "long term pain and suffering" due to the skin irritation caused by using hygiene products to which he suffered allergic reactions. (Pl.'s Sur-Reply, ECF No. 137 at 6.) Eaglin disputes the defendants' statement that he has no documented allergy to sulfa and provides medical records that appear to acknowledge Eaglin's sulfa allergy. (ECF No. 137-2 at 1-4.)
The medical records provided by Eaglin do not show any documented allergy test results; rather, it appears that the sulfa allergy notation in the medical records was subjectively reported. However, for purposes of resolving the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court views Eaglin's allegations in the light most favorable to Eaglin.
Courts have recognized that "lay people are not qualified to determine . . . medical fitness, whether physical or mental; that is what independent medical experts are for." O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Nelson, 603 F.3d at 449 ("A prisoner's disagreement as to the appropriate treatment fails to rise to the level of a constitutional claim and fails to create a genuine issue of material fact."); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In the face of medical records indicating that treatment was provided and physician affidavits indicating that the care provided was adequate, an inmate cannot create a question of fact by merely stating that she did not feel she received adequate treatment."); Fleming v. Lefevere, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("Plaintiff's own opinion as to the appropriate course of care does not create a triable issue of fact because he has not shown that he has any medical training or expertise upon which to base such an opinion."). Here, the record indisputably shows that Eaglin had access to medical care and treatment on a continual basis while housed within SCDC facilities during the relevant time period; was treated with a variety of medications, ointments, and skin creams; and was granted special permission to order certain hygiene products from outside of SCDC. The undisputed record also shows that Eaglin received his special-order hygiene products when he complied and ordered only the products that had been approved by the medical department and the Warden. Moreover, Eaglin has provided no admissible evidence supporting a finding that he faced "a substantial risk of serious harm" from his skin condition while housed within SCDC as required to establish the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Eaglin does not have a constitutional claim against the defendants merely because he disagrees with the course of treatment he received. See Jackson, 846 F.2d at 817; Nelson, 603 F.3d at 449; see also O'Connor, 426 F.3d at 202; Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1240; Fleming, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. At most, Eaglin's claims allege negligence or medical malpractice, which are not actionable under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n.3 (1986); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The district court properly held that Daniels bars an action under § 1983 for negligent conduct."); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."). Accordingly, based on the record presented in this case, no reasonable jury could find that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Eaglin's medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted (ECF No. 112) and Eaglin's motion for summary judgment be denied (ECF No. 125.) May 29, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' " Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).