[¶ 7] The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people. Eagle v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 154, ¶ 9, 583 N.W.2d 97. Legislative classifications are subject to different standards of scrutiny, depending on the right infringed by the challenged classification. Id.
We have also, more familiarly, employed varying levels of scrutiny in analyzing equal protection claims: (1) strict scrutiny if a statute involves an inherently suspect classification or infringes upon a fundamental right, requiring that distinctions be necessary to promote a compelling state interest; (2) an intermediate standard of review, requiring a close correspondence between statutory classifications and goals, if an important substantive right is involved; and (3) a rational basis standard, under which a statutory classification will be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, if no suspect class, fundamental right, or important substantive right is involved. Eagle v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 1998 ND 154, ¶ 9, 583 N.W.2d 97. [¶ 15] The pursuit of happiness guaranteed by N.D. Const. art. I, § 1, includes "the right to enjoy the domestic relations and the privileges of the family . . . without restriction or obstruction . . . except in so far as may be necessary to secure the equal rights of others," which is protected by the due process clause of N.D. Const. art. I, § 12.
The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people. Eagle v. North Dakota WorkersComp. Bureau, 1998 ND 154, 119, 583 N.W.2d 97. Legislative classifications are subject to different standards of scrutiny, depending on the light infringed by the challenged classification. Id.