Opinion
1 CA-CV 22-0497
04-06-2023
DANIEL EAGER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MATTHEW JAMES SCHLICHTING, Defendant/Appellee.
Ahwatukee Legal Office PC, Phoenix By David L. Abney Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Burnett Law Offices PLC, Mesa By Thomas A. Burnett, Donald E. Burnett Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Law Offices of Collin T. Welch, Oklahoma City, OK By Robert W. Fischer III Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2020-094836 The Honorable Stephen M. Hopkins, Judge Retired
Ahwatukee Legal Office PC, Phoenix By David L. Abney Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Burnett Law Offices PLC, Mesa By Thomas A. Burnett, Donald E. Burnett Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Law
Offices of Collin T. Welch, Oklahoma City, OK By Robert W. Fischer III Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WEINZWEIG, JUDGE
¶1 Plaintiff Daniel Eager appeals from a final judgment after a jury trial on his claim for personal injury damages against Defendant Matthew Schlichting. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We view and recount the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury verdict. Powers v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 217 Ariz. 398, 399, n.1, ¶ 4 (App. 2007).
¶2 Plaintiff stopped his car at a red light, and Defendant stopped behind him. Plaintiff started to turn right when the light turned green, but stopped suddenly for pedestrians in the crosswalk. Meanwhile, Defendant had started to drive forward and struck the rear-end of Plaintiff's car at about 20 to 25 miles per hour.
¶3 A few days later, Plaintiff felt numbness in his left hand, which progressed to pain. Four months after the accident, Plaintiff had surgery on his left elbow to relieve a compressed nerve. His condition improved, but the surgeon warned Plaintiff he probably would have symptoms for the rest of his life. Plaintiff later sued Defendant for negligence. Defendant conceded liability but contested causation and damages.
¶4 Before trial, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude Defendant from introducing assorted items of evidence at trial. As relevant here, Plaintiff moved to preclude (1) post-accident photographs that depicted exterior scratches and dents on both cars, and (2) any evidence about Plaintiff's two prior accidents in the last three years, including a more serious accident in which he was struck by a car while skateboarding and flew into the windshield. Plaintiff argued the photographs were irrelevant and prejudicial unless a biomechanical expert established the causal relationship between the photographs and Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff the other side of his body.
¶5 The superior court denied Plaintiff's motion to exclude evidence of prior accidents, stressing it could not determine the relevance of this evidence "without hearing what the specific questions and answers are," but that Plaintiff could "re-urg[e] the argument at trial." For similar reasons, the court deferred ruling on Plaintiff's motion to exclude the photographs.
¶6 Over three days, the jury heard conflicting evidence on causation and damages, including testimony from Plaintiff, Defendant and three physicians. Defendant's counsel cross-examined Plaintiff about the post-accident pictures and his prior accidents. Plaintiff never objected to this evidence at trial.
¶7 Defendant offered expert testimony from an orthopedic surgeon who examined the record and concluded the accident did not cause Plaintiff's nerve compression. He testified the injury likely occurred because of how Plaintiff positioned his elbow during a 48-hour road trip to New Hampshire. Plaintiff offered testimony from the doctor who operated on his elbow, and a hand surgeon who examined Plaintiff and reviewed the record. The hand surgeon opined that "it's more likely that [Plaintiff's nerve compression] comes from a car crash than arm on an armrest," and that nerve damage sometimes takes days to arise.
¶8 After hearing the evidence, the jury awarded Plaintiff $6,500 in damages. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial. Plaintiff now appeals. We have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶9 At issue on appeal is whether the superior court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiff's motions in limine to prospectively exclude the admission of evidence at trial. See State v. Rodriguez, 126 Ariz. 28, 31 (1980) ("As the court pointed out, her ruling did not admit the juvenile records, but merely denied their total preclusion until it became apparent as to the context in which they were to be offered.").
¶10 Relevant evidence is admissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 402. Ariz. R. Evid. 402. The standard for relevance "is not particularly high." State v. Oliver, 158 Ariz. 22, 28 (1988). Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence," and the fact "is of consequence in determining the action." Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence need not "support a finding of an ultimate fact; it is enough if the evidence, if admitted, would render the desired inference more probable." State v. Togar, 248 Ariz. 567, 572, ¶ 13 (App. 2020) (citation omitted). But relevant evidence may still be excluded when "its probative value" is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Ariz. R. Evid. 403. "[I]f evidence is admissible for any reason, the fact that it also incidentally raises an irrelevant issue does not make the admission of the evidence error." State v. Mosley, 119 Ariz. 393, 401 (1978).
¶11 The superior court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and this court "will not disturb a trial court's rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence unless a clear abuse of discretion appears, or the court misapplied the law, and prejudice results." Wendland v. AdobeAir, Inc., 223 Ariz. 199, 202, ¶ 12 (App. 2009).
Photographs
¶12 Plaintiff argues the court should have excluded post-accident photographs of the damaged vehicles. He contends the photographs were irrelevant because Defendant did not present biomechanical expert testimony about the pictures, which left the jury to speculate about their significance.
¶13 "Trial courts have great discretion in the admission of photographs." State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 433 (1980). "The basic test for admission is whether the trial court believes that the picture might reasonably aid the jury in understanding the testimony or passing upon the issues." Baker v. Atchison, T. &S. F. Ry. Co., 11 Ariz.App. 387, 388-89 (1970) (citation omitted).
¶14 The superior court did not abuse its discretion. The photographs offered visual evidence of the accident in dispute, accurately depicting the condition of both vehicles after the accident. Jurors could view and consider the damage reflected in the photographs to determine causation and damages. Expert testimony was not required to tell jurors what the photographs show because average jurors have common sense and a lifetime of experience. See Adams v. Amore, 182 Ariz. 253, 255 (App. 1994) ("Expert testimony is inappropriate if the jury is qualified without such testimony to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject.") (cleaned up).
Prior Accidents
¶15 Plaintiff next argues the court should have excluded any evidence of two prior accidents. This argument fails. Defendant contested Plaintiff's damages from the outset and argued that Plaintiff's injury was not caused by the minor accident at issue. Plaintiff's prior accidents were relevant to that argument. See Sanders v. Alger, 242 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 7 (2017) (causation is one element in a negligence action).
¶16 Nor can Plaintiff show prejudice. See Wendland, 223 Ariz. at 202, ¶ 12. Plaintiff and his trial counsel had every chance to contest and diminish the weight of this evidence. Indeed, Plaintiff recalled his expert witness to answer a question from the jury on whether it was "possible that the injury was caused by working on cars or by other car accidents," and the expert answered "yes, it's possible," but less likely. The jury had discretion to determine the appropriate amount of damages, and we will not revisit the weight of evidence on appeal. See Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019).
CONCLUSION
¶17 We affirm. We grant Defendant his reasonable costs on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.