Eady v. State

61 Citing cases

  1. Williamson v. State

    57 Ala. App. 113 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)   Cited 3 times

    The sufficiency of the evidence is not presented to this Court for review as there was no motion to exclude the state's evidence for failure to make out a prima facie case; there was no motion for a new trial; there was no request for the affirmative charge, and no exceptions were reserved to the Court's oral charge to the jury. Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516; Tally v. State, 54 Ala. App. 34, 304 So.2d 275; Mosley v. State, 54 Ala. App. 59, 304 So.2d 613; Jackson v. State, 52 Ala. App. 667, 296 So.2d 753; Frazier v. State, 53 Ala. App. 492, 301 So.2d 256. However, in deference to matters raised in appellant's brief, we will deal with the pertinent facts in this case.

  2. Randall v. State

    583 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1978)   Cited 13 times

    See also, I Wigmore on Evidence §§ 25-26, at 398-406 (1940).E.g., Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516, 518 (1972); Sizemore v. State, 496 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Winn v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 202, 135 S.W.2d 118, 119 (1940).E.g., State v. Aten, 203 Kan. 920, 457 P.2d 89, 96 (1969); Dorsey v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 311, 356 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1962).

  3. Gainer v. State

    553 So. 2d 673 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)   Cited 24 times
    Affirming a theft conviction where the defendant "wrongfully obtained her status as a joint [account] owner"

    Coates, 36 Ala. App. at 373, 56 So.2d at 385. Apparently Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516 (1972), upon which Gainer relies, and McMickens v. State, 16 Ala. App. 78, 75 So. 626 (1917) (both of which indicate that direct proof of nonconsent is necessary), were thought to be such prosecutions. However, when the purported owner is deceased, as in the case at bar, direct proof of that owner's nonconsent is obviously not available.

  4. McCord v. State

    501 So. 2d 520 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)   Cited 84 times

    "OBTAINS OR EXERTS CONTROL OR OBTAINS OR EXERTS UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL over property includes but is not necessarily limited to the taking, carrying away or the sale, conveyance or transfer of title to, or interest in, or possession of, property, and includes but is not necessarily limited to conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, larceny by conversion, embezzlement, extortion or obtaining property by false pretenses." Because the definition in § 13A-8-1(7) supra, incorporates many of the common law elements of larceny and larceny by trick, as well as false pretenses, and embezzlement, it is evident that the legislature did not intend to abandon altogether the concepts of an owner's nonconsent, which was critical to a larceny prosecution, Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516 (Ala.Cr.App. 1972), or consent obtained by fraud, which characterized larceny by trick, Jones v. State, 56 Ala. App. 444, 322 So.2d 735 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 408, 322 So.2d 741 (Ala. 1975), and false pretenses, Harrison v. State, 465 So.2d 475 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), or breach of trust which distinguished embezzlement, Adams v. State, 43 Ala. App. 281, 189 So.2d 354 (Ala.App.), cert. denied, 280 Ala. 707, 191 So.2d 372 (Ala. 1966). Thus, we adopt the premise of the Model Penal Code § 223.2(1), and the reasoning of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Doyle v. State, supra, and conclude that our legislature intended that the control over property exercised by a defendant indicted under § 13A-8-2(1) must be unauthorized by the owner of the property, as that term is defined in § 13A-8-1(8), and not merely unauthorized by statute, regulation, or other applicable norm.

  5. Gunaca v. State

    383 So. 2d 590 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980)   Cited 5 times

    He urges this court to hold that the proof of non-consent was insufficient. The defendant's argument in chief is grounded upon McMickens v. State, 16 Ala. App. 78, 75 So. 626 (1917) as was reaffirmed in Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516 (1972). In his brief, appellant states:

  6. Strickland v. State

    348 So. 2d 1105 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)   Cited 17 times
    In Strickland the jury had retired the previous night, but had not begun its deliberations when the exception was made, outside their presence, the next morning.

    In MacSwafford v. State, 46 Ala. App. 187, 239 So.2d 329 (1970) it was not error for the trial judge to urge the jury to reach a verdict, stating inter alia: "It costs the county money to have a jury; and, as I say some jury has to determine the case one way or the other. . . ." In a footnote in Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, at 729, 267 So.2d 516, at 518 (1972), Judge Harris aptly stated this court's view of the charge in question: "If the `Allen' or `dynamite' charge was being presented to this court for the first time, and we were not bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court, I would welcome the opportunity to sound the death knell to this type of charge now and forevermore. . . ."

  7. Odom v. State

    348 So. 2d 277 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    The sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State is not before us for review since no motion to exclude the evidence was made by appellant, the affirmative charge was not requested in writing, and there was no motion for a new trial. Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516; Grant v. State, 46 Ala. App. 232, 239 So.2d 903; Robinson v. State, 46 Ala. App. 684, 248 So.2d 583. IV

  8. Vaughn v. State

    347 So. 2d 582 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)   Cited 5 times

    Appellant contends the trial court erred in giving the deadlocked jury an Allen type charge. Although this Court does not favor such a charge, we nevertheless have recognized its approval by our Supreme Court. Ashford v. McKee, 183 Ala. 620, 62 So. 879 (1913); Strickland v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 348 So.2d 1105 (1977); Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516 (1972) footnote by Harris, J., at p. 729. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).

  9. Luker v. State

    344 So. 2d 1219 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)   Cited 5 times

    We have written to all of the issues presented on this appeal. Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516; Jones v. State, 55 Ala. App. 466, 316 So.2d 713; Bass v. State, 55 Ala. App. 88, 313 So.2d 208; Hurst v. State, 54 Ala. App. 254, 307 So.2d 62. We have carefully examined the record and find no reversible error.

  10. Anderson v. State

    337 So. 2d 93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)

    The sufficiency of the evidence is not presented by this record. There was no motion to exclude the State's evidence; there was no request for the affirmative charge; no exceptions were reserved to the Court's oral charge to the jury, and there were no adverse rulings on the admission of evidence which contained any merit. Eady v. State, 48 Ala. App. 726, 267 So.2d 516; Webb v. State, 55 Ala. App. 195, 314 So.2d 114; Mosley v. State, 54 Ala. App. 59, 304 So.2d 613. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial in which he did not raise the sufficiency of the evidence but alleged that one of the jurors had in the past purchased stolen property from appellant knowing the same had been stolen, and this was highly prejudicial to the appellant and that he was due a new trial.