Thus the acquittal is irrelevant to the question of whether defendant is guilty of the crime with which she is charged. As held in Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 738 (4) ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974): "The acquittal of one party to a crime does not bar the prosecution and conviction of another party to the crime in a separate and distinct trial of the issues." An acquittal may occur for one of a myriad of reasons, or for no explicable reason.
It does not make into a crime an act that was innocent when it was performed, change the manner or degree of punishment to which Chandler maybe subjected, or alter any substantive rights conferred on him by law. See State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245-246 (3) ( 466 SE2d 216) (1996) (statute altering evidence presented in a DUI prosecution); Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402 (1) (e) ( 444 SE2d 748) (1994) (statute altering that which could be presented in capital sentencing trial); Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 737-738 (3) ( 208 SE2d 791) (1974) (statute eliminating defendant's ability to give an unsworn statement at trial). Judgments affirmed.
" Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 574 (1) ( 198 SE 667) (1938). Such a right includes the right to a recommendation of mercy by the jury as a matter of grace (id.), but does not include the right of a defendant to make an unsworn statement at trial ( Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735 (3) ( 208 SE2d 791) (1974)), the right to have unchanged the scope of evidence which may be offered against a defendant ( Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402 (1) (e) ( 444 SE2d 748) (1994)), the right not to have prior convictions used in the sentencing phase ( Solomon v. State, 247 Ga. 27 (7) ( 277 SE2d 1) (1980)), or the right not to have evidence of a defendant's participation in other crimes introduced ( Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 748 ( 187 SE2d 831) (1972)). To have an ex post facto violation in Jones and in the case at bar, appellant and Jones must have had a substantial right at the time they committed the offenses for which they were given probated sentences, to receive probated sentences that could not be revoked unless the recipient committed a revocable act while serving the probated sentence.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in limiting the right to a thorough cross-examination by disallowing the repetition of a question. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 737(2) ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974); Lucas v. State, 192 Ga. App. 231, 232(2) ( 384 S.E.2d 438) (1989). 8. Jackson objected to the admission of 27 photographs of the victims asserting they were repetitious, gruesome and inflammatory.
The fact that Schoolcraft was tried a week later and acquitted has no bearing on the present case. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735 (4) ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974). 5.
to a thorough and sifting cross-examination must be tempered and restricted so as not to infringe on privilege areas or wander into the realm of irrelevant testimony.Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 737 (2) ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974). 2.
Furthermore, even the acquittal of one party to the crime does not bar the prosecution and conviction of another party to the crime. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 738 (4) ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974). This enumeration is without merit.
In so arguing, Cannon recognizes that the prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, but not procedural, rights. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735 ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974); Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573 ( 198 S.E. 667) (1938). Since under Code Ann. § 27-2711, Ga. L. 1956, pp. 27, 32; 1958, p. 15; 1965, p. 413, restitution was an authorized condition of probation, the enactment of Code Ann. Ch. 27-30 did not affect his substantive rights, but instead is merely a more detailed enactment regarding restitution.
Control of the cross examination of a witness is to a great degree within the discretion of the trial court and will not be controlled unless abused. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735 ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974); McNabb v. State, 70 Ga. App. 798 ( 29 S.E.2d 643) (1944); Sweat v. State, 63 Ga. App. 299 ( 11 S.E.2d 40) (1940). Enumeration 6 is without merit.
In order for there to be a reversal, however, there must be evidence that such information existed at or before trial, and that such information was actually withheld. Fleming v. State, 236 Ga. 434 ( 224 S.E.2d 15) (1976); Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735 ( 208 S.E.2d 791) (1974). During testimony in the instant case, both Norma Blackwell and her attorney denied that she had or was negotiating a substantially lighter sentence in exchange for her testimony.