As such, it is clear that the decision of the council, acting as the licensing authority, was a discretionary action, meriting review only for an arbitrary or capricious decision. See E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass.App.Ct. 826, 828, 371 N.E.2d 446 (1978). The arbitrary and capricious standard of review “requires only that there be a rational basis for the decision.”

There is no doubt that a local board may consider and decide the broad questions of how a proposed facility will affect its particular community. E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 827 (1978), and cases cited. Additionally, while within metropolitan Boston the Marshal is allowed the same scope of inquiry as local licensing authorities have outside the district ( St. James Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 260 Mass. 548, 555 [1927]), outside the metropolitan fire district the Marshal acts only as "an administrative officer to pass upon technical compliance with law and . . . regulations."

Although, in acting upon applications for special permits for fuel sales, the city council would take into account factors similar to those considered in passing upon § 13 license requests, the decision to grant or deny a special permit could reasonably depend, as matter of discretion, upon the degree of use to which the fuel license would be put. See E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 827 (1978), and cases therein cited. Our conclusion, that there is nothing in the record to show that the city council (the permit-granting authority) had any reason to believe that the underground storage tanks would be used for a purpose other than to service the applicant's own vehicles, also disposes of Juniper's argument under G.L.c. 40A, § 7. See Lord v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Somerset, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 228 (1991).

But as matters stand here, the "for cause" revocation provision of G.L.c. 148, § 13, seventh par. (1990 ed.), may be invoked only at such time as the board determines that the plaintiffs are in breach of an express condition of their licenses (none are presently imposed) or are operating in a manner which creates a risk to the public of fire or explosion. See Derby Ref. Co. v. Aldermen of Chelsea, supra; E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826 (1978). Judgment affirmed.

See Scudder v. Selectmen of Sandwich, 309 Mass. 373, 376-377 (1941, "public interest"); Kidder v. City Council of Brockton, 329 Mass. 288, 290-291 (1952, traffic congestion); Johnson Products, Inc. v. City Council of Medford, 353 Mass. 540, 543 (1968, "the somewhat wide discretion given to the licensing authority extends beyond . . . fire risk and involves other [public interest] considerations" and testimony under oath is not required), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 392 U.S. 296 (1968); Bennett v. Aldermen of Chelsea, 361 Mass. 802, 806-808 (1972, discussion of the breadth of discretion of the licensing authority); Davidson v. Selectmen of Duxbury, 358 Mass. 64 (1970, residential area, narrow street, traffic congestion). See and compare E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 827-828 (1978), and cases cited. See also St. James Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 260 Mass. 548, 552-556 (1927), and the general discussion in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 51-59 (1975).

Turnpike Amusement Park, Inc. v. Licensing Commn. of Cambridge, 343 Mass. 435, 437 (1962). Another such example is E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826 (1978), in which a decision of the board of appeals of that town to grant variances and a special permit did not bind the selectmen when exercising their power to license, under G.L.c. 148, § 13, the storage of explosive or inflammable substances. To some extent those cases involve parallel but distinct public issues: drainage and water supply questions in the case of wetlands, police questions in the case of public amusements, and safety questions in the case of inflammables.