Opinion
6732/10.
Decided September 23, 2010.
Martin Rosen, Esq., Attorney for the Plaintiff, White Plains, New York.
Henry H. Moy, Esq., Attorney for the Defendant, Danbury, Connecticut.
The following documents numbered 1 to 17 were read in connection with the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint:
The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211 or 3212 upon grounds that a judgment of divorce rendered in the state of Connecticut on May 15, 2002 bars the plaintiff's equitable distribution claim and divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over child support. The defendant also seeks an award of counsel fees in connection with the defense of this action. The plaintiff opposes the motion alleging that equitable distribution was never determined by the Connecticut courts and therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to distribute the parties' marital property. The plaintiff also alleges that the Connecticut child support order was invalid and therefore, is not entitled to full faith and credit by this Court.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The relevant and material facts are undisputed. The parties were married in Danbury, Connecticut on April 12, 1985. They have one child of the marriage, M.A., (DOB XX/XX/1991), who is 19 years of age and attending college. The husband has remained a resident of the State of Connecticut at all times. In 1997, the wife left the marital residence located at XX Long Meadow Road, Brookfield, Connecticut, and moved to New York with the parties' child.
On December 20, 2000, the husband filed a summons and complaint in Superior Court of the State of Connecticut, entitled R.A.A. v. E.E.A., seeking dissolution of marriage, joint legal custody of the parties' child, and equitable distribution of the marital assets and estate. The wife filed an appearance with the court on February 20, 2001. Both parties signed and filed a Case Management Agreement with the court on February 5, 2001 indicating that the divorce was uncontested and that the parties were in agreement on all issues. The wife filed a financial affidavit with the court listing as her assets a residence located at XX Huntsville Road, Katonah, New York, and two motor vehicles. The husband filed a financial affidavit with the court listing as his assets a residence located at 75 Long Meadow Road, Brookfield, Connecticut, an interest in a business held jointly with his partner, personal property consisting of tools, various bank accounts, a life insurance policy, and pension and retirement accounts. The wife concedes that she transferred her interest in the marital residence to the husband before the Connecticut divorce action was commenced.
On May 15, 2002, the parties were granted a judgment of divorce in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut, under Docket No. FA-01-0341238-S, which made the following provisions: ordered the distribution of marital property by each party "retain[ing] their own assets and debts as they appear on their Financial Affidavits;" awarded the parties joint custody with the wife being the primary custodial parent and the husband having liberal visitation; ordered the husband to pay the wife child support in the amount of $400.00 per week by wage execution; ordered the husband to provide medical insurance for the child and to pay for one-half of the child's unreimbursed medical expenses; and awarded no alimony to either party.
Pursuant to Connecticut law, the husband stopped paying child support once the child turned 18 and began attending college, which action prompted the wife to seek redress in the New York courts by commencing the within action.
In April of 2010, eight years after the Connecticut judgment of divorce was entered, the wife commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint seeking equitable distribution of the marital property and child support for their 19-year-old child under the laws of the State of New York. The defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint upon grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over child support and res judicata bars the claim for equitable distribution.
DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
Equitable Distribution
Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2) and (5)(a) permits a New York proceeding to obtain the distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce. While the statute makes no distinction between a divorce resulting from an ex parte or bilateral divorce proceeding, "the statute should be interpreted only as far as the Constitution permits." ( O'Connell v. Corcoran , 1 NY3d 179 , 183-184.) In accordance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, "a judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United states, which it had in the state where it was pronounced." ( Id. at 184.) Thus, where a foreign divorce decree would preclude a spouse from commencing a separate action for distribution of marital property within the decree-rendering state, New York must also preclude a subsequent action for equitable distribution of marital property. ( Id.)
Since the divorce decree was rendered in Connecticut, the court must determine whether the laws of Connecticut would permit the plaintiff to proceed with an action for equitable distribution. As in New York, under Connecticut law, the doctrine of res judicata "is fully applicable to judgments and decrees entered in an action for divorce . . . and provides that a valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand." ( Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 459.)
Connecticut uses a claim preclusion analysis, as does New York, which "prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made." ( Id.; See Cook v. Cook, 260 AD2d 160 [1st Dept 1991], leave to appeal dismissed in part and denied in part, 93 NY2d 994.) "[A] final decree of divorce is res judicata with respect to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the proceeding." ( Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. at 463.) Thus, the effect of a divorce decree in both Connecticut and New York is to foreclose a later action to obtain equitable distribution or other economic relief, even where no such relief was sought by either party in the original divorce action. ( See Erhart v. Erhart, 226 AD2d 26, 29 [4th Dept 1996].)
Consistent with New York law, Connecticut courts have "adopted a transactional test for determining whether an action involves the same claim as a prior action such that it triggers the doctrine of res judicata." ( Id. at 461; See O'Connell v. Corcoran, 1 NY3d at 185.) "The claim that is extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." ( Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. at 462.) Essential to this analysis is an examination of the claims made in the complaint in the present action with the pleadings and judgment in the Connecticut divorce action. ( Id.)
It is undisputed that the Connecticut court had personal jurisdiction over both parties to hear and determine the divorce proceeding as well as the ancillary issues of equitable distribution, custody, and child support. The complaint in the Connecticut divorce action sought joint legal custody of the parties' child and equitable distribution of the marital assets and estate. After being served with the summons and complaint, the wife appeared in the Connecticut action by filing an "Appearance" form with the court. Thereafter, she participated in the action by filing a Case Management Agreement with the court on February 5, 2001, indicating the divorce was uncontested and the parties were in agreement on all issues, and by filing a financial statement. On May 15, 2002, a judgment of divorce was entered in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut, which specifically distributed the marital property by each party "retain[ing] their own assets and debts as they appear[ed] on their Financial Affidavits."
Under Connecticut law, the doctrine of res judicata covers claims that were actually litigated, as well as those claims that could have been litigated in a previous action. ( Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446) The claim for equitable distribution was not only included in the husband's complaint in the Connecticut action, but was actually decided by the Connecticut court and included in the judgment of divorce. Since the claim for equitable distribution could have been litigated in the Connecticut action, and was actually litigated, the principle of res judicata bars the issue from being relitigated in this Court.
Plaintiff argues that this Court has jurisdiction to decide equitable distribution because the Connecticut court did not address the issue even though it had jurisdiction to do so. However, plaintiff's counsel is misguided, as he relies heavily upon O'Connell v. O'Connell, 226 AD2d 950 (3d Dept 1996), a case that reversed by the Court of Appeals — a point that counsel fails to include in his papers. ( O'Connell v. O'Connell, 226 AD2d 950 [3d Dept 1996], rev'd, O'Connell v. Corcoran , 1 NY3d 179 .)
In O'Connell, the plaintiff sought a divorce in Vermont under its no-fault divorce law. The defendant, a New York resident, appeared and answered the Vermont action, opposing the divorce. At the hearing on the divorce, the plaintiff explained to the court that all of the parties' assets were located in New York and that the Vermont court lacked jurisdiction to distribute the property. Neither the trial judge nor the defendant contested the plaintiff's statement. At the close of the hearing, the court granted the plaintiff a judgment of divorce that made no property distribution. The following year, the plaintiff commenced an action in New York against the defendant seeking equitable distribution of the marital property pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(a). The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the complaint was barred by res judicata, arguing that since the Vermont court had personal jurisdiction over the parties, the court could have rendered a judgment directing equitable distribution of their marital assets. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the lower court's order denying the motion to dismiss because the issue of equitable distribution was never resolved, addressed, or litigated in the Vermont divorce proceeding. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a foreign divorce decree would serve as a bar to a subsequent action for equitable distribution brought in the courts of the decree-rendering state, the decree also has that effect in New York under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Since under Vermont law, res judicata covers claims that were actually litigated, as well as those that could have been litigated in a previous action, the complaint filed in New York was dismissed.
As discussed above, in the instant case, since the judgment of divorce would bar the claim for equitable distribution from being brought in the Connecticut courts, the judgment of divorce has the same preclusive effect in New York. Accordingly, the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
The Court notes that the plaintiff's action for equitable distribution was commenced eight years after the judgment of divorce was filed and entered in the Connecticut court. While not raised by defendant's counsel, the claim for equitable distribution would also be barred by the six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR § 213(1). This statute, known as the residual statute of limitations, provides that an action for which no limitations period is prescribed by law must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the cause of action. Since the Equitable Distribution Law does not provide a statute of limitations period, an action seeking equitable distribution of marital property is subject to a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to run from the date of entry of the foreign divorce decree. ( See Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, 14 McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY Domestic Relations Law § 236, Part B, C236B:3 at p. 250 [McKinney's 1999]; Ricca v. Valenti , 24 AD3d 647 , 648-649 [2d Dept 2005]; Yecies v. Sullivan, 221 AD2d 433 [2d Dept 1995]; Kahn v. Kahn, 801 F.Supp 1237, 1243 [ SDNY 1992]; Marshall v. Bonica, 27 Misc 3d 1211[A] [Sup Ct Kings Co 2010].)
Child Support
Here, the Connecticut judgment of divorce, entered on May 15, 2002, included a child support order obligating the husband to pay the wife child support in the amount of $400.00 per week by wage execution and to pay for one-half of the child's unreimbursed medical expenses. Under the laws of Connecticut, if a child is unmarried, a court may order child support until "such child completes the twelfth grade or attains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first." ( Spencer v. Spencer , 10 NY3d 60 , 67[ citing Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46B-215 [a][1].) Once the child turned 19, the husband stopped paying child support, prompting the wife to seek redress in the New York courts under New York law, which allows child support until the age of 21.
Despite New York's strong public policy in assuring that both parents fulfill their support obligations to their children until they reach the age of 21, this Court has no jurisdiction to compel the father to pay support for his child by virtue of the Connecticut support order. ( See Spencer v. Spencer, 10 NY3d at 68-69.) Since the father has always remained a resident of the state of Connecticut, Connecticut retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of its child support order and New York has no subject matter jurisdiction to modify the order, thereby requiring a dismissal of the cause of action. ( Id. at 66, citing 28 USC § 1738B [d]; Family Court Act § 580-611 [a].)
Attorney's Fees
Defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees in connection with his defense of this action. However, he has failed to submit any documentation as to the costs incurred and related expenses to establish the value of services rendered and therefore, his application is denied. ( Reynolds v. Reynolds, 300 AD2d 645 [2d Dept 2002].)
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant's application for attorney's fees is denied.
All other relief requested and not decided herein is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.