Opinion
J-A17027-18 No. 1814 WDA 2017
10-10-2018
E-Z GO DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INC., Appellant v. LINDSAY GOLF GROUP, LTD (D/B/A BIRDSFOOT GOLF CLUB)
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 14, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Civil Division at No(s): 2014-10506. BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J. AND MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
E-Z-GO Division of Textron, Inc. appeals following a jury verdict in favor Lindsay Golf Group, Ltd, d/b/a Birdsfoot Golf Club on E-Z-GO's breach of contract claim against Birdsfoot. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
In their notice of appeal, dated December 1, 2017, E-Z-GO states it is appealing from certain evidentiary orders, the November 2, 2017 order denying E-Z-GO's motion for post-trial relief, and "any '[j]udgment' entered in this matter on or after December 1, 2017. In its brief, E-Z-GO states that the order in question is the trial court's November 2, 2017 order. An appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence entered subsequent to the trial court's disposition of post-trial motions; an appeal from an order denying post-trial motions is interlocutory. Mackall v. Fleegle , 801 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa .Super. 2002). Accordingly, we have corrected the caption. Additionally, we note that E-Z-GO's appeal was premature given that the praecipe seeking entry of the judgment was not filed in this matter until December 14, 2017. Despite this, in the interests of judicial economy, we will "regard as done that which ought to have been done", and treat E-Z-GO's appeal as properly filed. See Fanning v. Davne , 795 A.2d 388 (Pa. Super. 2002).
The Lindsay Golf Group, Ltd., owned and operated a golf course in Lawrence County known as Birdsfoot Golf Club. In 2010, Birdsfoot began leasing golf carts from G.C. Supply. Pursuant to a five (5) year Full Service Lease Agreement, G.C. Supply agreed to lease seventy (70) E-Z-GO golf carts to Birdsfoot. In exchange, Birdsfoot agreed to make six (6) payments each golf season.
In the spring of 2012, Birdsfoot experienced numerous problems with the golf carts under the Lease. G.C. Supply had not performed any winter maintenance. As a result, many carts broke down on opening day. Carts were inoperable due to parts sticking (e.g. starters, brakes, and accelerators) and bags were falling off of them. Birdsfoot staff had to push carts off of the golf course. These problems persisted throughout the 2012 golf season.
In or around June of 2012, G.C. Supply decided to sell the company to E-Z-GO. Several months later, on October 1, 2012, G.C. Supply formally assigned its assets to E-Z-GO, including the Lease between G.C. Supply and Birdsfoot. G.C. Supply notified Birdsfoot of the sale and assignment.
Given all of the golf cart problems Birdsfoot had, Birdsfoot sought to terminate the Lease and advised E-Z-GO that it was switching to a different golf cart. E-Z-GO informed Birdsfoot, however, that it was obligated to accept the assignment and continue to lease carts from E-Z-GO under the terms of the contract.
To address Birdsfoot's issues, representatives of E-Z-GO and Birdsfoot held a telephone conference in February of 2013, during which Birdsfoot explained that they did not want to continue the lease with E-Z-GO unless E-Z-GO could provide functioning carts. E-Z-GO assured Birdsfoot that it had the resources to do so, and made additional promises memorialized in an Addendum to the Lease dated March 15, 2013. Among the additional provisions, the Addendum contained the following language:
E-Z-GO will provide regular weekly service visits on Thursdays from April 15th - October 15th. If the number of fully functional [carts] is below 70, E-Z-GO will repair [carts] and bring the number up to 70 or more within 48 hours of notice of the repair request, but based upon a standard Monday-Friday work week.
Birdsfoot Golf Club shall have the right to terminate the FSLA upon the failure of E-Z-GO to cure any breach of the service requirements identified in the [Lease], as clarified by this correspondence, in accordance with the termination time requirements and provisions of the [Lease].
Despite these assurances, however, Birdsfoot's problems worsened during the 2013 golf season. E-Z-GO repeatedly failed to adhere to the terms of the Lease and Addendum. E-Z-GO did not provide consistently the requisite number of working golf carts in a timely fashion. E-Z-GO failed to comply with the 48 hour repair requirement. Although Birdsfoot sent numerous emails notifying E-Z-GO of the problems, E-Z-GO failed to respond. As a result, Birdsfoot continued to have substantial problems and be inconvenienced.
Because of this, in or around June of 2013, Birdsfoot began talks with Club Car, another golf cart supplier. The next month, Club Car presented a lease proposal to Birdsfoot which included brand new golf carts and a payoff for Birdsfoot's Lease with E-Z-GO. Birdsfoot could not refuse.
Birdsfoot contacted E-Z-GO corporate several times to obtain a payoff amount for its Lease, but Birdsfoot got no response. Birdsfoot then contacted E-Z-GO's local representative for a payoff figure, but just received another copy of the Lease.
On August 21, 2013, Birdsfoot entered into an agreement with Club Car and received $72,000, the amount Club Car calculated as due and owing under the Lease between Birdsfoot and E-Z-GO. Birdsfoot did not pay any of this money to E-Z-GO.
Shortly thereafter, by letter dated September 13, 2013, Birdsfoot notified E-Z-GO that it was terminating its agreement with E-Z-GO, effective immediately, for failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the Lease and Addendum. Consequently, Birdsfoot would not be making any of the remaining payments for September and October 2013 or any payments for 2014 as originally contemplated under the Lease. E-Z-GO never sent Birdsfoot a notice of default.
For the years in issue, the 2013 and 2014 golf season, each payment totaled $8,800 and $9,066 respectively.
E-Z-GO filed suit claiming that Birdsfoot had breached the Lease for failure to make the required rental payments due and owing for September and October 2013 and the six (6) payments for 2014. Additionally, E-Z-GO asked for interest on the outstanding payments. In total, E-Z-GO sought damages in an amount totaling approximately $112,000.
In response, Birdsfoot countered that it terminated the Lease and Addendum because E-Z-GO had failed to comply with the Lease and Addendum's performance requirements; therefore, it did not breach the Lease or owe any money to E-Z-GO. Additionally, Birdsfoot filed a counterclaim contending that E-Z-GO breached the Lease and Addendum, and thus owed Birdsfoot damages. E-Z-GO contended that it did not breach the Lease and Addendum.
A jury trial was held June 12, 2017 through June 19, 2017. At the close of E-Z-GO's evidence, E-Z-GO moved for a directed verdict on its breach of contract claim against Birdsfoot. The trial court denied E-Z-GO's motion. Birdsfoot proceeded to present its case.
At the close of all of the evidence, E-Z-GO renewed its previous motion for a directed verdict on its claim against Birdsfoot, which the trial court again denied. However, the trial court granted E-Z-GO's motion for a directed verdict on Birdsfoot's counterclaim against E-Z-GO, thereby dismissing Birdsfoot's counterclaim as a matter of law.
After closing arguments, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of Birdsfoot, finding that Birdsfoot did not breach its Lease with E-Z-GO. E-Z-GO recovered nothing.
E-Z-GO filed post-trial motions in which E-Z-GO asked the trial court to: 1) enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, 2) grant a new trial based upon the trial court's failure to grant E-Z-GO's requests for a directed verdict during trial, and 3) grant a new trial based upon certain legal errors committed by the trial court. By Order dated November 2, 2017, the trial court denied E-Z-GO's motion. E-Z-GO now appeals, and raises the following five issues:
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of E-Z-GO given that the evidence presented at trial dictates that Lindsay Golf Group, Ltd. ("Birdsfoot") materially breached the subject lease agreement under Pennsylvania law by failing to make the payments due and owing under that agreement and by pocketing a third-party lease buy-out?
2. Did the trial court err when it failed to caution the jury after Birdsfoot's counsel, Alexander Lindsay, made improper arguments regarding the size and wealth of E-Z-GO and its counsel in Mr. Lindsay's closing argument by stating to the jury, inter alia, that E-Z-GO, a 'Fortune 500' company, hired a 'big Pittsburgh law firm' that was 'rack[ing] up huge bills,' in an effort to 'beat' the 'little family' company Birdsfoot into submission' to make sure that the Lindsay 'family [was] going to be taught a lesson they'll never forget'?
3. Did the trial court err by ignoring long-settled Pennsylvania law when it overruled E-Z-GO's counsel's objection to the improper 'golden rule' arguments made by Birdsfoot's counsel during his closing argument when Birdsfoot's counsel Alexander Lindsay improperly asked the jurors, inter alia, whether the jurors could personally 'imagine ever being told by someone who you wanted to pay off to settle your debt
[to] just look at your agreement' and also said 'let me ask you something: Have you ever been in a situation where you're dealing with a payoff? You want to trade in a car, you have to pay it off?'Appellant's Brief at 5-6
4. Did the trial court err when it held that E-Z-GO waived its right to request a new trial based on the improper and inflammatory conduct by Birdsfoot's counsel in his closing argument to the jury?
5. Given that such fact was relevant, highly probative, and not confusing or otherwise unfairly prejudicial, did the trial court err when it limited the admissibility of the $72,000.00 lease buy-out that Birdsfoot received from a third party prior to failing to make the payments due under, and materially breaching, the subject lease agreement?
E-Z-GO first contends that the trial court erred when it refused to grant judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on its breach of contract claim. E-Z-GO argues that Birdsfoot breached the Lease by failing to make the last eight (8) payments in accordance with the terms of the Lease and pocketing the Lease buyout money from Club Car. Appellant's Brief at 19.
Our standard of review for judgement as a matter of law is as follows:
In reviewing a trial court's decision whether or not to grant judgment in favor of one of the parties, we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard of review when considering such motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case.
There are two bases upon which a judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two
reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all the factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.Reott v. Asia Trend , Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and internal brackets omitted), aff'd , 55 A.3d 1088 (2012).
The granting or refusal of a new trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's decision will not be reversed by an appellate court except for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Yacoub v. Lehigh Valley Med. Associates , P.C., 805 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. 2002). "In making this decision, we must consider, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, whether a new trial would produce a different result. Consequently, if there is any support in the record for the trial court's decision to deny a new trial, that decision must be affirmed." Gunn v. Grossman , 748 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2009).
E-Z-GO argues that there was no question of fact that Birdsfoot breached the contract. It was undisputed that Birdsfoot failed to make the final eight (8) payments under the Lease. Thus, to avoid a finding of liability, Birdsfoot must have demonstrated that E-Z-GO materially breached its obligations under the Agreement. E-Z-GO argues that since Birdsfoot failed to do so, the trial court should have granted its motions during trial for directed verdict, or its post-trial request for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict, but did not. Therefore, the trial court erred. Appellant's Brief at 19.
In Pennsylvania, "a material breach by one party to a contract entitles the non-breaching party to suspend performance." Widmer Eng'g Inc. v. Dufalla , 837 A.2d 459, 467 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis added). "'If a breach constitutes a material failure of performance, then the non-breaching party is discharged from all liability under the contract. If, however, the breach is an immaterial failure of performance, and the contract was substantially performed, the contract remains effective. In other words, the non-breaching party does not have a right to suspend performance [if the breach is not material].'" Id. (quoting Lane Enterprises v . L.B. Foster Co., 700 A.2d 465 (Pa. Super. 1997), rev'd on other grounds , 710 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court correctly concluded "that sufficient evidence of record was presented to have permitted the jury to find that E-Z-GO first materially breached the terms of the Agreement/Addendum." Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/17 at 9. The evidence showed that E-Z-GO failed to perform its obligations as required under the Lease and Addendum, thereby putting E-Z-GO in breach and justifying Birdsfoot's failure to pay. Birdsfoot had numerous problems with the golf carts provided by E-Z-GO. As noted by the trial court, "ample evidence was produced at trial that E-Z-GO generally did not have 70 fully functional carts available to Birdsfoot." Id. at 6. Additionally, "Birdsfoot presented sufficient evidence that E-Z-GO consistently did not timely provide the requisite number of fully functional golf carts to Birdsfoot pursuant to the Agreement/Addendum. . . . ." Id. at 9. The evidence further showed that, although Birdsfoot contacted E-Z-GO numerous times about malfunctioning carts in need of repair, E-Z-GO did not repair the carts within the timeframe required under the contract, if at all.
Given these circumstances, the jury could find that E-Z-GO materially breached the Lease and Addendum. The trial court stated: "If the jury found, among other things, that E-Z-GO's failure to provide 70 fully functional carts at all times to be a material breach, then the jury could have determined that Birdsfoot could have lawfully terminated the contract, thereby absolving them from liability to E-Z-GO for not making subsequent payment to E-Z-GO following E-Z-GO's breach of the Agreement/Addendum." Id.
Moreover, the fact that the trial court granted a directed verdict on Birdsfoot's counterclaim had no impact on E-Z-GO's claim for damages. The trial court explained its basis for granting a directed verdict on Birdsfoot's counterclaim: "the Court decided to dismiss [the counterclaim] primarily because Travis Lindsay was unable to adequately explain the manner by which the alleged damages suffered by Birdsfoot were calculated pursuant to" Birdsfoot's proposed exhibit. Id. The trial court's refusal to allow Birdsfoot to present evidence of its alleged losses "is not dispositive of whether a jury could find that E-Z-GO first materially breached the Agreement/Addendum." Id.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law when it denied E-Z-GO's motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, its request for a new trial on its breach of contract claim.
In its second appellate issue, E-Z-GO contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant E-Z-GO a new trial based on improper and prejudicial remarks Birdsfoot's counsel made during his closing argument. According to E-Z-GO, opposing counsel's conduct was so egregious, that it warranted a new trial. Appellant's Brief at 30.
Specifically, E-Z-GO claims that counsel for Birdsfoot improperly referenced the disparity of wealth between E-Z-GO and Birdsfoot. Appellant's Brief at 33. During closing argument, the following exchange occurred:
Counsel for Birdsfoot: [to the jury] And what was the position of E-Z-GO? The position of E-Z-GO is, who do you think you are? Who do you, this little family that's running this thing out there in the country, how dare you confront Textron, a fortune 500 company. How dare you? We're going to beat you into the ground, we're going to beat you into submission, and here's what we're gonna do, we're gonna find some reason to file a lawsuit. We terminate - we -we breached it seven ways to Sunday. But you see, we got this, we managed to put this in here, the attorney's fees provision. We're going to hire a big Pittsburgh law firm and we're going to rack up a huge bill.
Counsel for E-Z-GO: Objection, your Honor. This is entirely improper. By the way, Mr. Lindsay costs way more than I do. So, I mean -
The Court: I don't know how much either one of you cost, and I don't -none of that has been presented to the jury, so let's be cautious, counsel, where we're going with this attorney's fees argument.
Counsel for E-Z-GO: I mean, he can't talk about my law firm, and he—he costs way more than I do. He's way more senior.
He's in the American College of Trial Lawyers. His bill's way bigger than mine.Birdsfoot claims E-Z-GO waived these issues because E-Z-GO did not request a mistrial or curative instruction when the remarks were made. Appellee's Brief at 30. The trial court agreed and denied E-Z-GO's post trial motion. The trial court concluded that E-Z-GO failed to make a specific objection and request a curative/cautionary instruction or mistrial at that time the remarks were made. Consequently, E-Z-GO waived this issue. Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/17 at 16.
The Court: Both of you have been very competent, capable lawyers. The Court does not have any evidence about anybody's attorney's fees, hourly, contingent of any sort, so let's not confuse things by referencing the amount of anyone's attorney's fees, please.
Counsel for Birdsfoot: I won't discuss the amount. I won't touch it. But I will say this: You see, if they can get you to award any money -any money, a cent, they're going to bring this in. (Indicating.) And this family's going to be taught a lesson they'll never forget, the theory is. But they need you people to go along with it. . . .
"'[I]n order to preserve an issue for review, litigants must make timely and specific objections during trial and raise the issue in post-trial motions.'" Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Roberts , 797 A.2d 362, 364 (Pa. Super. 2002). Generally, a specific objection must be made stating the grounds on which the objection is based. See Millen v. Miller , 308 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 1973). With respect to improper remarks made by counsel, a timely and specific objection is necessary because it gives the trial court the opportunity to address it and caution the jury if needed. Id. This, did not occur here.
Although E-Z-GO made an objection, during closing argument, E-Z-GO did not specify the grounds for its objection. The dialogue that ensued did not relate to the disparity of wealth between the parties, as E-Z-GO now argues. Rather, the discussion concerned the bills for attorney's fees. During trial, E-Z-GO never raised the disparity of the parties' wealth issue or objected to any reference by Birdsfoot to that disparity. To the contrary, E-Z-GO used the financial success of Birdsfoot to its advantage, repeatedly commenting on how successful Birdsfoot had been and how it made more money despite its alleged problems with the golf carts. E-Z-GO first raised the issue of disparity of wealth in its post-trial motions. As a result, the trial court did not have an opportunity to address the disparity of wealth issue at trial. The trial court did, however, address the attorney's fees issue, when it was presented. Consequently, any issue regarding the disparity of wealth was not preserved and has been waived. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying E-Z-GO's motion for a new trial.
Upon E-Z-GO's counsel's objection, the trial court directed the attorneys to avoid discussion about attorney's fees. This was not done at sidebar, but rather, in front of the jury. A trial judge has broad powers and discretion in the handling of alleged prejudicial remarks made during argument, and the trial court's charge to the jury may serve to counter any prejudice that may arise from a counsel's remarks. Beckner v. Copeland Corporation , 785 A.2d 1003, 1007 (Pa. Super. 2001). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court's admonition to the attorneys in this case was adequate, and, thus, the trial court did not error in handling this matter.
In its third issue on appeal, E-Z-GO argues that remarks made by Birdsfoot's counsel during closing argument violated the "golden rule". Appellant's Brief at 33-34. Counsel for Birdsfoot argued as follows:
The "golden rule" prohibits a lawyer from asking the jury members to place themselves in the shoes of one of the parties and ask what each of them would have done under the circumstances of the case. Millen , 308 A.2d at 117. A "golden rule" argument is directed to a subjective rather than an objective view of the matter. Generally, it is "'considered objectionable because it constitutes an appeal to the jury to abandon their position of impartiality and to exercise their discretion in the guise of an interested party.'" Walton v. City of Manchester , 198 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ohio App. 1964) (quoting Boop v . Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 193 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Ohio App. 1963). This is not what occurred here.
As concluded by the trial court, Birdsfoot's counsel never directly asked the jurors to take the place of a party. Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/17 at 18. Rather, Birdsfoot's counsel analogized certain common occurrences in everyday life with the circumstances surrounding Birdsfoot's payoff request and a common sense approach to providing the payoff info requested by Birdsfoot. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that "even if Birdsfoot's counsel did in fact make a 'golden rule' argument, the Court believes that such a violation would not have influenced the verdict as the ultimate questions in this case did not hinge on EZGO's cooperation level when asked for a 'payoff figure by Birdsfoot." Id. EZGO's reliance on Millen for the proposition that the court should have given a curative instruction is misplaced. In Millen, the use of a "golden rule" argument compounded counsel's misstatement as to the proper standard of care in a negligence case stating that it was a subjective standard. These two errors in combination, which guided the jury to improperly consider the case from a subjective standpoint, warranted a reversal where the trial court failed to issue a curative instruction. Millen, 308 A.2d at 118. Such circumstances are not present in this case. Consequently, no curative instruction or grant of a new trial was required.
Let me ask you something: Have you ever been in a situation where you're dealing with a payoff? You want to trade in a car, you have to pay it off?E-Z-GO objected. After argument at sidebar as to whether this was improper, the trial court overruled E-Z-GO's objection and allowed Birdsfoot's counsel to proceed. As Birdsfoot argues on appeal, however, E-Z-GO did not move for a mistrial. Birdsfoot's counsel continued:
As I was saying, in your common sense experience, we all have to deal with a situation where we have payoff letters -we trade in a car, we get a new mortgage. We all do these. Can you imagine ever being told by someone who you wanted to pay off to settle your debt, just look at your agreement? You want to know how much to pay off your car, look at your agreement; pull it out, see what it is. You want to know what your mortgage is, you got the mortgage; go look at it, take out of your safety deposit box. Nobody would ever do that, but that's what they are saying. The reason that they didn't want to give them a payoff figure is they didn't want to allow them to get out of that agreement
On post-trial motions, the trial court denied E-Z-GO's request for a new trial based on these remarks, concluding that counsel for Birdsfoot, although coming close, did not violate the "golden rule". Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/17 at 18. While we agree with the trial court on the merits of this issue, we also conclude that E-Z-GO failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. Thus, E-Z-GO's fourth issue on appeal (i.e. the trial court erred in finding waiver) is also without merit.
It is unclear to the Court whether the trial court found waiver on this issue.
Generally, a party must request a mistrial prior to the matter going to the jury in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Kaplan v. O-Kane , 835 A.2d 735, 741 (Pa. Super. 2003); Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Roberts , 797 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2002). Failure to do so results in the issue being waived. Id. "Pursuant to McMillen v. 84 Lumber , Inc., 649 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1994), asking for a new trial in post-trial motions, after the verdict is recorded, is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." Kaplan , 835 A.2d 741. Since E-Z-GO did not request a mistrial at the time of the alleged improper remarks, E-Z-GO has waived the issue on appeal relating to the "golden rule".
Although there are exceptions to this rule that a mistrial must be requested at the time of the infraction, those exceptions do not apply in this case. Cf. Factor v. Bicycle Tech., Inc., 707 A.2d 504 (Pa. 1998) (allowing for a new trial when objecting party repeatedly requested lesser sanctions which were denied but did not request a mistrial at the time); Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985) (holding that waiver could be excused where strong public interest appears to outweigh ordinary need to protect judicial system with improperly preserved issues). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying E-Z-GO's motion for a new trial, because E-Z-GO failed to preserve the issue.
In its last appellate issue, E-Z-GO claims the trial court improperly limited any evidence of Club Car's $72,000 Lease payoff to Birdsfoot, when it allowed such evidence only to prove Birdsfoot's motivation for breaching the Lease, but not to prove the validity of the claim or the amount due and owing under the Lease. Appellant's Brief at 36. We disagree.
We note that our standard of review for evidentiary rulings is a narrow one:
When we review a trial court's ruling on admission of evidence, we must acknowledge that decisions on admissibility are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. A party suffers prejudice when the trial court's error could have affected the verdict.Reott , 7 A.3d at 839 (internal citations omitted).
Prior to trial, Birdsfoot presented a motion in limine arguing that evidence of the $72,000 payment it received from Club Car was irrelevant and no reference to it should be made at trial.
In making this argument, Birdsfoot relied on Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 408 Compromise Offers and Negotiations. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. In support of its decision, the trial court aptly stated:
That rule provides:
(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible - on behalf of any party - either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:
(1) Furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) Conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim.
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay . . . .
Id.
The Court's decision on the admissibility of evidence regarding the $72,000.00 Club Car paid to Birdsfoot is entirely consistent with the requirements of Rule of Evidence 408. Here, the evidence reflects that Birdsfoot received $72,000 from Club Car as a result of negotiations between Birdsfoot and Club Car, a third-party. According to the Rule, these negotiations could not be used by E-Z-GO to prove or disprove the validity or amount of the claim E-Z-GO made against Birdsfoot at trial. . . . However, as an exception to these rules, the Court could admit the evidence for another purpose. This is the exact position the Court took both previous to trial, as well as during trial. E-Z-GO was able to use it to show motive as to why Birdsfoot wanted to terminate the agreement or breach it.Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/17 at 11. We find no error of law or abuse of discretion regarding trial court's ruling on Birdsfoot's motion in limine.
In sum, although Birdsfoot successfully negotiated a new lease and benefitted financially therefrom, it was justified in terminating the Lease with E-Z-GO. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court correctly decided the issues E-Z-GO raised on appeal and affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/10/2018