Accordingly, there was no need for Mr. Meyer — or this court, for that matter — to correct for such a discount in determining the hypothetical royalty rate here. See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Prior to judgment, liability for infringement, as well as the validity of the patent, is uncertain, and damages are determined in the context of that uncertainty."); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'g, 5 Cl. Ct. 591 (1984) ("a finding of validity is not entitled to any collateral effect"); see also Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[P]re-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the parties' legal relationship and other factors.") (Rader, J., concurring); Riles, 298 F.3d at 1313 ("A reasonable royalty determination for purposes of making a damages evaluation must relate to the time infringement occurred, and not be an after-the-fact assessment."). Based on the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff's model does not reflect the royalty rate that a hypothetical negotiation between Boeing and Lockheed would have yielded.

Although Branning contends that the Claims Court should have used compound rather than simple interest in computing the amount of the judgment, the record is clear that he has failed to show entitlement to the higher rate. Branning failed to produce any evidence during the trial of the case that an allowance of simple interest would be inadequate to provide just compensation. Consequently, his reliance on Dynamics Corporation of America v. United States, 766 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1985) is misplaced. There the court remanded the issue to the Claims Court to determine if compound interest should be allowed, in light of undisputed evidence showing that under the facts and circumstances involved, the use of simple interest would be inequitable.

The issue is one of fact, based on the particular circumstances of a given case. Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, there was no presentation directed at the appropriate interest rate, or whether it should be compounded. Defendant therefore urges the court to use the statutory interest rate set out in the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3114- 3116, 3118 (2000).

The issue is one of fact, based on the particular circumstances of a given case. Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, there was no presentation directed at the appropriate interest rate, or whether it should be compounded. Defendant therefore urges the court to use the statutory interest rate set out in the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3114- 3116, 3118 (2000).

As the Federal Circuit has noted, compound interest may be necessary "to accomplish complete justice" under the just compensation clause. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Among the considerations that bear on this question, those most significant for this case seem to be the time lag between the taking and the compensation and the use to which the plaintiffs might have put the award.

We do not think that our decision in Amoco Cadiz can be read as permitting such a rationale to govern in a case based on a federal cause of action. Cf. Bio-Rad Lab, Inc. v. Nicolet Inst. Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 969 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reversing and remanding where district court relied on inadequate and erroneous reasons for uncompounded low-rate award of interest); Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing and remanding award of simple interest where rationale was that simple interest was "traditional" even though there was no clear precedent that delay damages could not include compound interest). Accordingly, the district court must revisit this issue and either award compound interest or explain why a deviation from the norm is appropriate.

It is well settled that the determination whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555, 35 USPQ2d 1065, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc); accord City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 115 S.Ct. 2091, 2096 (1995) (stating that the allowance of prejudgment interest "rests very much in the discretion of the tribunal which has to pass upon the subject, whether it be a court or a jury" (quoting The Scotland, 118 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1886))); Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520, 226 USPQ 622, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest). The government has failed to establish that the court abused its discretion in fixing the delay damages.

The cases they do not cite leave the matter to the discretion of the district court. See, e.g., China Union Lines, Ltd. v. American Marine Underwriters, Inc., 755 F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1985); Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 556-57 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Transorient Navigators Co., S.A. v. M/S Southwind, 788 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1986). In Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 766 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the district court's refusal to compound prejudgment interest was reversed as an abuse of discretion. The Gorensteins point out that the federal trademark statute allows the award of attorney's fees only for trademark infringement. Quality Care was also seeking unpaid royalties, and that was a claim not of infringement but for payment for the use of its trademark pursuant to the license before the license was terminated.

In exercising that discretion, however, the district court must be guided by the purpose of prejudgment interest, which is "to ensure that the patent owner is placed in as good a position as he would have been had the infringer entered into a reasonable royalty agreement." Devex, 461 U.S. at 655, 103 S.Ct. at 2062, 217 USPQ at 1188; see Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520, 226 USPQ 622, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The district court gave no convincing reason why Bio-Rad's alleged delay in bringing the case to trial or alleged discovery improprieties warranted using a seven percent rate of uncompounded interest.

Indeed, "absent special circumstances, compound, not special interest, ought to be awarded." Id. See, Dynamics Corporation of America vs. United States, 766 F. 2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1985) as cited in Gorenstein Enter., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1989). --------