See also Durrett v. Tunno, 113 Ga. App. 839, 841 ( 149 S.E.2d 826) and Boatright v. Padgett Motor Sales, 117 Ga. App. 578, 581 ( 161 S.E.2d 402), holding that on motion for summary judgment by a defendant the plaintiff's testimony is to be construed in favor of the plaintiff. And ruling to the contrary: Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 116 Ga. App. 391 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 526); McKnight v. Guffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 (4) ( 162 S.E.2d 743); Davis v. Ferrell, 118 Ga. App. 690, 692 ( 165 S.E.2d 313) and Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 514 (3) ( 167 S.E.2d 697) which cites Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288 (3, 5) ( 149 S.E.2d 708); Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 386 ( 162 S.E.2d 375); and Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389, supra, as controlling authority."

The cases cited to sustain the majority ruling have been questioned as proper authority on motions for summary judgment, or the cases cited follow such cases. Because of the confusion created by these cases, and others like them, this court certified a question to the Supreme Court in Burnette Ford v. Hayes, which was answered by the Supreme Court in 227 Ga. 551 ( 181 S.E.2d 866), and upon return to this court, the rulings in Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288 (3, 5) ( 149 S.E.2d 708); Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 386 ( 162 S.E.2d 375); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 116 Ga. App. 391 ( 157 S.E.2d 526); McKnight v. Griffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 ( 162 S.E.2d 743); Davis v. Ferrell, 118 Ga. App. 690 ( 165 S.E.2d 313); and Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513 ( 167 S.E.2d 697) were held to be no longer considered as binding authority on this court on the matters in question. Burnette Ford v. Hayes, 124 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 183 S.E.2d 78).

" Western A. R. Co. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 486 ( 23 S.E. 494). This is a substantial, fundamental rule of evidence which has been followed consistently by all courts of this State. It has been utilized by the Supreme Court and by this court in making a determination of whether the verdict was supported by the evidence ( Southern R. Co. v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 428 ( 49 S.E. 294)), in the grant of a nonsuit ( Freyermuth v. South Bound R. Co., 107 Ga. 31 ( 32 S.E. 668); Ray v. Green, 113 Ga. 920 ( 39 S.E. 470)), in the direction of a verdict ( Farmers Peanut Co. v. Zimmerman-Anderson-Carr Co., 52 Ga. App. 265 ( 183 S.E. 115)), and in the sustaining and denial of motions for summary judgment ( Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288 (3, 5) ( 149 S.E.2d 708); Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 386 ( 162 S.E.2d 375); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 390 ( 157 S.E.2d 525); McKnight v. Guffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 ( 162 S.E.2d 743); Davis v. Ferrell, 118 Ga. App. 690 ( 165 S.E.2d 313)). (Anything to the contrary appearing in Boatright v. Padgett Motor Sales, 117 Ga. App. 578 ( 161 S.E.2d 402) must yield to the holding in Lampkin and the older cases of Dykes). A party "is not entitled to a finding if that version of his testimony the most unfavorable to him shows that the verdict should be against him." Davis v. Akridge, 199 Ga. 867 (2) ( 36 S.E.2d 102).

Peck v. Baker, 76 Ga. App. 588 (1a) ( 46 S.E.2d 751). The question presented to a trial court by a motion for summary judgment is substantially the same as that presented by a motion for directed verdict. Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 524). The essence of both motions is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trior of the facts, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established facts. 6 Moore's Federal Practice 2d, Par. 56.04[2] at page 2066. 2. "`The mere ownership of land or buildings does not render one liable for injuries sustained by persons who have entered thereon or therein; the owner is not an insurer of such persons, even when he has invited them to enter.

The courts reasoned that this is the correct result because if the case went to trial under the same evidence, the party offering self-contradictory testimony would have a verdict directed against him. Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524) (1967). Once the trial court has eliminated the favorable portions of the contradictory testimony, it must take all testimony on motion for summary judgment "as it then stands, and construe it in favor of the party opposing the motion in determining whether a summary judgment should be granted."

W. A. R. Co. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 486 ( 23 S.E. 494) (1894). "This is a substantial, fundamental rule of evidence which has been followed consistently by all courts of this State. It has been utilized by the Supreme Court and by [the Court of Appeals] in ... the sustaining and denial of motions for summary judgment ( Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288 (3, 5) ( 149 S.E.2d 708); Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 386 ( 162 S.E.2d 375); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 390 ( 157 S.E.2d 525); McKnight v. Guffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 ( 162 S.E.2d 743); Davis v. Ferrell, 118 Ga. App. 690 ( 165 S.E.2d 313))." Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 520 ( 167 S.E.2d 697) (1969).

A party against whom summary judgment has been granted is in the same position as if he suffered a verdict against him. Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 522 ( 167 S.E.2d 697); McKnight v. Guffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 (1) ( 162 S.E.2d 743); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 524); Montgomery v. Pickle, 108 Ga. App. 272 (3) ( 132 S.E.2d 818); Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 46 ( 118 S.E.2d 193). Thus, it is evident that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits of the case.

The courts reasoned that this is the correct result because if the case went to trial under the same evidence, the party offering self-contradictory testimony would have a verdict directed against [her]. Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524) (1967). Once the trial court has eliminated the favorable portions of the contradictory testimony, it must take all testimony on motion for summary judgment ` as it then stands, and construe it in favor of the party opposing the motion in determining whether a summary judgment should be granted.' Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 167 S.E.2d 697) (1969).

The courts reasoned that this is the correct result because if the case went to trial under the same evidence, the party offering the self-contradictory testimony would have a verdict directed against him. Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524) (1967). Once the trial court has eliminated the favorable portions of the contradictory testimony, it must take all testimony on motion for summary judgment ` as it then stands, and construe it in favor of the party opposing the motion in determining whether summary judgment should be granted.'

In Evans Pennington v. J. S. Scofield's Sons Co., 120 Ga. 961 ( 48 S.E. 358) (1904) and Linder v. Renfroe, 1 Ga. App. 58 ( 57 S.E. 975) (1907), the problem with the plaintiff's witnesses was not that they contradicted each other but that they contradicted themselves on cross examination. Similarly, in Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 ( 157 S.E.2d 524) (1967), a plaintiff's affidavit was held insufficient to create a material issue of fact where he had testified differently on deposition. The conflict in this case between the appellant's president and the appellee over whether or not there was a contract did not authorize the grant of a directed verdict but instead set forth the central issue to be resolved by the jury.