Dyer v. City of Atlanta

3 Citing cases

  1. City of Atlanta v. Donald

    111 Ga. App. 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 7 times
    Finding that a cause of action for nuisance similar to that asserted by Plaintiff here, exists where the plaintiff alleges that a defendant-city owns and controls the airport and that the offending nature of the overflights are "necessary" (i.e., unavoidable because of the design of the airport)

    1. The Supreme Court transferred this case to this court because the case requires only the application of constitutional provisions and not their construction. 2. Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 190 ( 132 S.E.2d 188) and Dyer v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 538 ( 134 S.E.2d 585) are distinguished. 3. (a) The owner of private property which has been taken by a governmental defendant for public purposes without just and adequate compensation having been first paid has a right of action against the governmental defendant to recover damages for the taking.

  2. City of Atlanta v. Donald

    143 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1965)   Cited 6 times
    In City of Atlanta v. Donald, 143 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1965), cited by defendant, the Supreme Court of Georgia held the facts alleged in the amended complaint were insufficient to state a cause of action.

    3. Since the special demurrers mentioned above were erroneously overruled, the amended petition must be construed and dealt with as if they had been sustained. See Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Childs, 174 Ga. 888 ( 164 S.E. 766) and Irby v. Lamb, 218 Ga. 840 ( 131 S.E.2d 183). And with those allegations eliminated from the amended petition, its facts are in all material respects substantially similar to those alleged in Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 190 ( 132 S.E.2d 188) and Dyer v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 538 ( 134 S.E.2d 585) where it was held that the petitions failed to state a cause of action for injunction and damages. But in this case the plaintiff contends that the City of Atlanta has taken an air easement over her property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ( Code § 1-815) which provides that no State shall deprive any person of his property, without due process of law and also in violation of Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I of Georgia's Constitution of 1945 ( Code § 2-301) which provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate compensation being first paid. As authority for this contention, she cites and relies on United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 ( 66 S.C. 1062, 90 LE 1206) and Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 ( 82 S.C. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585), but these cases do not support her contention.

  3. Richmond County v. Williams

    137 S.E.2d 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)   Cited 16 times

    (d) The damages for depreciation of their property resulting from the physical damage to it are clearly recoverable. Cf. Savannah Asphalt Co. v. Blackburn, 96 Ga. App. 113 ( 99 S.E.2d 511); Annot., 79 ALR2d 966, § 6, though the elements of inconvenience, etc. resulting from the noises of engines, horn blowing, glare of lights and the like from passing traffic on the highway are not recoverable. Austin v. Augusta Terminal R. Co., 108 Ga. 671 (3), supra; Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68, supra; Patten v. Mauldin, 219 Ga. 211 ( 132 S.E.2d 664); Dyer v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 538 ( 134 S.E.2d 585). Allegations as to these should have been stricken on proper demurrer. The demurrer here, however, was in a "shotgun, scatter bore" form and as we view it amounted to no more than a general demurrer to the petition as a whole.