]" (Cit.)' Yoho, 263 Ga. at 341. An owner who owes a secondary duty to another to perform a contractual duty is a "contractor" within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-8 (a). Dye v. Trussway, 211 Ga. App. 139, 140 ( 438 S.E.2d 194) (1993). The secondary liability and corresponding immunity apply to those who contract to perform certain work then sublet that work in whole or in part.
In her affidavit, Nicks states that she is unclear "as to the company I was assigned to, I am sure I handled accounts for both Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises." Because she admits to having been employed at least in part by Coca-Cola, this case is not controlled by our Supreme Court's decision in Yoho v. Ringier of America, 263 Ga. 338 ( 434 S.E.2d 57) (1993), or this court's recent decision in Dye v. Trussway, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 139 ( 438 S.E.2d 194) (1993), which applies Yoho. "In combination, OCGA §§ 34-9-8 (a) and 34-9-11 grant tort immunity to contractors who are secondarily liable for workers' compensation benefits. Our law, however, does not grant tort immunity to owners, who are not contractors, even though they are in control of premises and are actively involved in the enterprise in which an employee was injured.