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Dye v. Ford Motor Company

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Western Division
Jun 8, 2000
No. 3:99CV83-D-D (N.D. Miss. Jun. 8, 2000)

Opinion

No. 3:99CV83-D-D

June 8, 2000


OPINION


Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.

A. Factual Background

In late 1996, the Plaintiffs, Thurman Dye and his wife Betty Dye, purchased a 1997 Ford pickup truck in Memphis, Tennessee. The Dyes, who reside in Blue Springs, Mississippi, operated the truck without incident for approximately two years.

Then, between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. on December 1, 1998, the Dyes were awakened by the continuous blowing of the truck's horn while the truck was parked in their carport. They went to the door leading to the carport and saw that the truck was on fire. The Dyes attempted to douse the fire but were unsuccessful and the flames quickly engulfed the house. In the end, their home and its contents were destroyed, as was the truck. In addition, Mr. Dye suffered burns that required medical treatment and Mrs. Dye suffered a near nervous breakdown, causing her to miss six months of work. Three months after the fire, the Dyes gave what remained of the truck to a neighbor, who subsequently disposed of it as scrap.

On June 8, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed the current products liability action, pursuant to Section 11-1-63 of the Mississippi Code, alleging that the Ford truck they purchased was defective and unreasonably dangerous and caused the fire that destroyed their home and personal property. The Defendant Ford Motor Company has now moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

While all legitimate factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

C. Discussion 1. Mississippi Products Liability Act

In Mississippi, products liability claims are guided by the Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA), which is codified at Section 11-1-63 of the Mississippi Code. In order to prevail on their claim, the Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time the truck left Ford Motor Company's control,

(1) the truck was defective because it deviated in a material way from Ford's specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications;
(2) the defective condition rendered the truck unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; and
(3) the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the truck proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought.

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1999).

In order to establish the first element of their claim and to overcome the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the truck, upon leaving Ford's control, was defective because it deviated in a material way from Ford's specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same specifications. Miss Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(1).

The Plaintiffs have simply failed to present any evidence supporting this element of their claim. While the Plaintiffs' expert witnesses have opined that the truck was the cause of the fire, they did not express an opinion as to how the truck was defective nor did they allege that the truck failed to meet Ford's specifications. This is a crucial omission because, in order to establish a prima facie case and move beyond summary judgment, the Plaintiffs must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the truck was defective. Their expert testimony fails to do so. As a result, the expert testimony is of no assistance to the Plaintiffs as to this first element of their claim. See, e.g., Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1999).

Alternatively, the Plaintiffs appear to attempt to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish this element of their claim. This reliance is misplaced.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three elements that the plaintiff must establish:

(1) the instrumentality causing damage must be under the exclusive control of the defendant;
(2) the occurrence must be such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those in control of the instrumentality used proper care; and
(3) the occurrence must not be due to any voluntary act on the part of the plaintiff.

Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n, 515 So.2d 916, 920 (Miss. 1987).

Here, the Plaintiffs are unable to establish the first element because it is undisputed that, at the time of the accident, the truck was not under the exclusive control of the Defendant. Rather, the truck was under the Plaintiffs' control. As such, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is of no assistance to the Plaintiffs. Edwards v. Campbell Clinic, Inc., 90 F. Supp.2d 723, 726-27 (N.D.Miss. 2000).

D. Conclusion

In sum, Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment will be granted. Ford has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of the Plaintiffs' claims.

A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.

ORDER

Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 31) is GRANTED;

(2) the Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed; and

(3) this case is CLOSED.

All memoranda, depositions, declarations and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.


Summaries of

Dye v. Ford Motor Company

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Western Division
Jun 8, 2000
No. 3:99CV83-D-D (N.D. Miss. Jun. 8, 2000)
Case details for

Dye v. Ford Motor Company

Case Details

Full title:THURMAN DYE, BETTY DYE, and GUIDEONE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFFS…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Western Division

Date published: Jun 8, 2000

Citations

No. 3:99CV83-D-D (N.D. Miss. Jun. 8, 2000)

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