Dye v. County of Hennepin

Full title: Gabrielle Andrea Dye, Plaintiff, v. County of Hennepin; Patrick D…

Court: United States District Court, D. Minnesota

Date published: Jan 18, 2005

Civil No. 03-4894 (DWF/SRN) (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 2005)

Opinion

Civil No. 03-4894 (DWF/SRN).

January 18, 2005

Seth Marvin Colton, Esq., and Theresa A. Bofferding, Esq., Lommen Nelson Cole Stageberg, Minneapolis, MN, counsel for Plaintiff.

Toni A. Beitz, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Hennepin County Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN FRANK, District Judge

Introduction

This matter came on for hearing before the undersigned United States District Judge on December 10, 2004, pursuant to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Gabrielle Andrea Dye opposes the motion. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Dye's federal claim. The Court dismisses without prejudice Dye's remaining state law claims.

Background

The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth at length in this Court's January 30, 2003, Order ("the Order"). As a result of the Order, Dye's claims regarding the amount of time required for the extradition officer's investigation were dismissed. Dye's remaining claims challenge the amount of time it took to outprocess her from the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center ("ADC"). The following facts are relevant to those claims.

On Saturday, August 25, 2001, at approximately 11:20 p.m., Dye was stopped by Minneapolis police officers for running a red traffic light. During the stop, the officers determined that Dye was wanted in the State of Nevada pursuant to a felony fugitive warrant. As a result, the officers began to question Dye as to whether she had ever lived outside Minnesota. Dye said that she had lived in Minnesota her entire life, except for a short period living in Ohio. Dye denied ever having lived in Nevada and denied being the person who was the subject of the Nevada warrant.

The officers searched Dye, handcuffed her, and transported her to the ADC where Dye was booked at approximately 12:30 a.m. on Sunday, August 26, 2001. At 6:00 a.m., Dye was moved from the jail intake area to the housing area. At approximately 9:00 a.m., Dye telephoned her mother. Dye's parents contacted jail personnel, officials within the sheriff's office, and other law enforcement agencies in an attempt to set the matter straight. Dye's parents also attempted to visit Dye, but were told that visitors were not allowed that day because of a computer problem.

After making numerous calls on Dye's behalf, Dye's mother was finally directed to Deputy Doug Cannon, the Hennepin County officer in charge of extraditions. Dye's mother visited Deputy Cannon at his office at approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 27. Deputy Cannon sent Dye's fingerprints to Nevada and confirmed that Dye's fingerprints did not match the fingerprints in the warrant. Based upon this information, Deputy Cannon told Dye's mother that he would order Dye's release. After speaking with Deputy Cannon, Dye's parents attempted to visit Dye in jail and again were told that a computer problem prevented their visit.

Dye asserts that Deputy Cannon delivered the fingerprint results to the Hennepin County jail at 3:00 p.m. on August 27. ADC records show that it did not receive authority to release Dye until 9:35 p.m. The parties also dispute the time of Dye's actual release from ADC. Dye contends that she was not released until 1:30 a.m. ADC records show that Dye accepted her property and was released between 11:20 and 11:35 p.m. At the time of her release, Dye had been in custody for slightly less than 48 hours.

Based upon these events, Dye's Complaint asserts a federal claim for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state claim for a violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, and a state claim for false imprisonment. Dye asserts that Hennepin County's delay in releasing her was part of a policy, practice, custom, or usage of unreasonable delays in the release of detainees. Dye contends that Hennepin County's new computer system and the County's July 29, 2001, move to a new Public Safety Facility compounded these release delays. Dye further alleges Hennepin County had posted a sign in the Adult Detention Waiting Area stating that delays of up to eight hours should be expected in processing releases.¹ Dye alleges that Hennepin County acted indifferently to its known processing problems.

1 Defendants assert that this sign was posted in the intake area of the old jail, a separate facility that had closed before Dye was incarcerated.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all facts in the Complaint to be true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8^th Cir. 1986). The Court grants a motion to dismiss only if it is clear beyond any doubt that no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the Complaint. Id. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The Court need not resolve all questions of law in a manner which favors the complainant; rather, the Court may dismiss a claim founded upon a legal theory which is "close but ultimately unavailing." Id. at 327.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

Section 1983 prohibits a person acting under color of state law from depriving another person of his or her "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . ." According to Baker v. McCollan, "[t]he first inquiry into any Section 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws.'" 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). If the answer to this inquiry is no, then there is no "claim cognizable under Section 1983." Id. at 146-147.

Dye asserts that Hennepin County and its named employees, acting under color of state law, violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Dye asserts that her detainment for 10.5 hours pending release from the ADC was unconstitutional. In support of her allegations, Dye relies primarily on two cases, Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8^th Cir. 2001), and Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9^th Cir. 2004).

In Young, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding a city liable when a wrongfully arrested woman was ordered released by a judge but was detained an additional 2.5 hours by authorities. 249 F.3d 730. During that time period, the woman was chained to six other detainees and returned to the jail where she was strip-searched in front of the detainees. See id. at 736. The Eighth Circuit held that the judge that had ordered the woman's release had ordered that her release occur immediately. See id. The Eighth Circuit found that the handcuffing and strip-search of the woman was shocking in light of the judge's order. See id.

In Berry, a group of plaintiffs challenged "in toto" policies that resulted in 26- to 29-hour delays in the outprocessing of detainees. 379 F.3d 764. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs should have an opportunity to have a jury determine whether their continued detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and in light of the lengthy periods of time for the outprocessing of detainees. See id. at 773.

Defendants assert that no Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit case has recognized a constitutional right to be processed in less time than that which elapsed here. Defendants further assert that several cases suggest that Dye's detention was not unconstitutional. The cases Defendants rely on address claims brought by individuals challenging the length of time required for outprocessing after the individuals were ordered to be released.

In Brass v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's finding that a 39-hour time period required for outprocessing the plaintiff, arrested on the mistaken belief that he was someone else wanted on a warrant, was reasonable and not unconstitutional. 328 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9^th Cir. 2003). In Fowler v. Block, a California district court held that delays of 24-48 hours after the defendant's acquittal "due to administrative release procedures cannot be found per se unreasonable." 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1278-1279 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In Fowler, the court specifically held that the sheriff had to deal with "prisoner and paperwork back-logs, inoperative computer systems, inefficient paper chases, and the simple fact that the jails are overcrowded and the Sheriff understaffed." Id. at 1278.

Defendants also cite to Thompson v. Sheahan, 2001 WL 204774 (N.D. Ill. 2001). In Thompson, Lamar Thompson was arrested on a charge of criminal trespass and placed in custody at the county jail. See id. at 1. Thompson pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to four days in jail with credit for time already served. See id. The court ordered Thompson to be released from custody that day, and he was transported back to the county jail. See id. Thompson was released from the jail 14 hours later. See id. The district court noted, "[t]he Seventh Circuit has previously explained that the Sheriff is generally free to exercise discretion in processing prisoners for release because judges do not normally direct the Sheriff when and where to effectuate a release." Id. at 2. The district court also held that, "[e]ven if we assume for purposes of [the Defendant's] motion to dismiss that Thompson's fourteen-hour detention constituted a wrongful deprivation of liberty, his due process claim is still not cognizable. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for every wrongful or improper deprivation of liberty by a state." Id. at 3 ( citing Lundblade v. Franzen, 631 F. Supp. 214, 217 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).

In support of Defendants' assertion that the time for processing was reasonable, Defendants have also represented to the Court that on August 27, 2001, 104 arrestees were received for booking at the ADC, 147 detainees were processed for release, and 167 detainees had court appearances. Intake at the ADC was designed for processing 28,000 bookings per year, and intake processed 44,138 bookings in 2001, which is an average of 121 per day.

Based on the foregoing facts and case law, the Court finds that Dye's delay in being released from the ADC was objectively reasonable and not unconstitutional. The cases cited by Dye in support of her allegations are factually distinguishable from this case. In Young, the Eighth Circuit stated that it was shocked by the defendant city's conduct in light of the fact that the plaintiff was handcuffed, strip-searched, and detained for 2.5 hours after a judge had ordered her immediate release. This Court has reviewed the Eighth Circuit's decision in Young and while the Eighth Circuit did comment on the delay in the plaintiff's release, it is clear from the decision that the Eighth Circuit was most concerned with the handcuffing and strip search of the plaintiff.

The Court also finds little support for Dye's claims in the Ninth Circuit's Berry decision. In Berry, the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs to continue to pursue their suit against a city where outprocessing took between 26-29 hours. This Court is in agreement with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Berry insofar as it acknowledges that at some point unreasonable delays become actionable. However, even accepting Dye's time line of events, the time it took to release Dye from ADC was 10.5 hours. In its prior Order, this Court found that the Defendants had not explained why such lengthy periods of time were required for the outprocessing of detainees. In response, Defendants have described the administrative procedural burdens associated with outprocessing a large volume of detainees. Based on a review of the facts surrounding Dye's detention and the case law cited by Defendants, the Court finds the 10.5 hour delay to be inactionable.

B. Policy, Custom, or Practice ( Monell Claim)

In order to establish Hennepin County's liability, Dye must prove the existence of an unconstitutional "policy or custom" or practice of being deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Hennepin County citizens. Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A government "custom" may be the basis for liability if "persistent and widespread" unconstitutional practices have become "so permanent and well settled" as to have "the force of law." Id. at 691 ( citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). To establish a constitutional violation by government custom, the Eighth Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove:

1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and

3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Jane Doe "A," et al. v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8^th Cir. 1990).

Dye asserts that the ADC has an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of detaining inmates for an extended period of time after they are due to be released. According to Dye, this policy, custom, or practice is evidenced by a sign posted in the waiting area of the ADC that alerts inmates that they could expect delays of up to 8 hours in processing their releases. Further, Dye asserts that the ADC's slow computer system, the ADC's failure to maintain a back-up computer system, and the ADC's failure to properly train its employees on the new computer system is evidence of the ADC's unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of detention.

Defendants assert that in the absence of any clear constitutional requirement for a more expedient processing time, an 8-hour "norm" cannot establish a widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. Indeed, Defendants assert that because no court has held that an 8-hour time span for outprocessing a detainee is a per se violation of the Constitution, there can be no evidence of an unconstitutional ADC policy to be found from the sign posted in the waiting area.

Dye's allegation with respect to the ADC's computer system must fail. On May 8, 2001, the ADC updated their computer system with a customized jail management system ("JMS") designed to modernize the ADC's record keeping. ADC staff then received 8-12 hours of JMS training from instructors employed by the company that created JMS. During the early weeks of JMS's implementation, processing times were substantially slower than they had been when the ADC was using its former system. However, a county work group commenced shortly after JMS's implementation to resolve these problems.

The Court also finds that Dye has not produced any evidence to show that the Sheriff or Hennepin County had notice that more or different training was needed to enable ADC employees to outprocess detainees at the same rate as before JMS was implemented. Therefore, Dye cannot prove that Hennepin County "had notice that its procedures were inadequate and likely to cause a constitutional violation." P.H. v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 660 (8^th Cir. 2001) ( citing Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8^th Cir. 1996)).

However, "[n]otice may be implied where the failure to train is so likely to result in a constitutional violation that the need for training is patently obvious or where a pattern of misconduct indicates that the . . . [municipality's] . . . responses to a regularly recurring situation are insufficient to protect . . . constitutional rights." Id. ( citing Thelma D. v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 934 F.2d 929, 934-935 (8^th Cir. 1991)). Nevertheless, there is no evidence to show that Hennepin County deliberately failed to train its employees on the new JMS computer system or that it acted indifferently to known computer problems. The Court finds that the evidence shows that ADC employees received between 8-12 hours of training on the new system and promptly fixed any major problems that occurred directly after JMS's implementation. Therefore, Dye cannot prove that Hennepin County had actual or implied notice that its outprocessing computer procedures at the ADC would deprive Dye of her constitutional rights.

C. State Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a federal court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when a federal claim is properly before the court. However, when all federal claims have been dismissed, the court has discretion to dismiss the remaining state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 34 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 1994). Section 1367(c)(3) specifically states that the Court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." The Court's discretion as to whether to exercise jurisdiction over these remaining claims should be informed by principles of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Here, the Court has granted summary judgment on Dye's federal claim, and only Dye's state law claims remain. As such, the Court determines that it will not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction in this instance and that the remaining claims stated in the Complaint are dismissed without prejudice.

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED as to Count One.

2. Counts Two and Three of Plaintiff's Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.