(citation omitted)); see also Holt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 32 So.3d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (explaining that 1993 amendment to section 48.193(1)(a) 3., adding the words “holding a mortgage or other lien on,” is more reasonably read to extend personal long-arm jurisdiction to those holding a mortgage or lien on real property in Florida, not eliminating the long-standing jurisdictional basis for those owning real property within Florida).In Dyck–O'Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), our sister court essentially addressed the same scenario presently before us. There, as in the present case, the trial court dismissed the appellant's amended complaint for deficiency judgment, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellee, a non-resident. 181 So.3d at 555.
Federal due process concerns were satisfied by [Mr. Aluia's] prior conduct, the final judgment of foreclosure, and the foreseeable future consequence of a deficiency judgment." See Dyck–O'Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ; see also § 48.193(1)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2014) ("A person ... submits himself ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from ... [o]wning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property within this state."). Mr. Aluia reasonably should have anticipated "being haled into court" in this state.
We review de novo orders granting or denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing , 181 So. 3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Wendt v. Horowitz , 822 So. 2d 1252, 1256 (Fla. 2002) ). After our de novo review of the trial court's determination on personal jurisdiction over these four nonresident defendants, and strictly construing the long-arm statute as required, seeRautenberg v. Falz , 193 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), we agree with the trial court ruling.
Indeed, even our court has allowed an independently filed complaint for a deficiency judgment under section 702.06 to proceed. See Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So. 3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Because all other districts are aligned against us, certifying conflict is appropriate; alternatively, we should grant the company's motion to review this case en banc and alleviate the need for supreme court review altogether.
In rejecting that same argument in Rojas, we held “[t]he language of the statute merely requires that Appellant's cause of action arose from a nonresident's ownership of real property in Florida.” See Rojas, 197 So.3d at 1202, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D1637, 2016 WL 3769012 at *2 ; see also Dyck–O'Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). As we held in Rojas, and the First District held in Huthsing, Mr. Moniz should have reasonably anticipated being haled back to Florida to address a claim for a deficiency, as the foreclosure final judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction to do so.
Indeed, even our court has allowed an independently filed complaint for a deficiency judgment under section 702.06 to proceed. See Dyck–O'Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Because all other districts are aligned against us, certifying conflict is appropriate; alternatively, we should grant the company's motion to review this case en banc and alleviate the need for supreme court review altogether.