See footnote 1 of this opinion. Indeed, the defendant's analysis of this issue in his appellate brief is limited to three conclusory sentences and a citation to Dwyer v. Harris , 128 Conn. 397, 23 A.2d 147 (1941), which is not on point. Because we have found evidence in the record supporting the court's finding of reaffirmation, and because the defendant has not provided any evidence or authority that has left us with the definite and firm conviction that the court made a mistake, we conclude that the court properly found that the defendant reaffirmed the debt, thereby tolling the applicable statute of limitations.

Radigan v. Hughes, 84 Conn. 137, 141, 79 A. 50; Norton v. Shepard, 48 Conn. 141, 142. It was on this basis that an unequivocal acknowledgment of indebtedness was held adequate in the two cases relied upon by the trial court — Sears v. Howe, 80 Conn. 414, 417, 68 A. 983; and Wells v. Carson, 140 Conn. 474, 476, 101 A.2d 297. It is true that an unconditional promise to pay will not be implied if the acknowledgment of indebtedness, even though unequivocal, is accompanied by a conditional promise to pay. Dwyer v. Harris, 128 Conn. 397, 400, 23 A.2d 147. In such a situation the indebtedness remains barred by the statute until the condition has been met. Potter v. Prudential Ins. Co., 108 Conn. 271, 281, 142 A. 891. Here the acknowledgment of indebtedness was unequivocal, and, as has been pointed out, there was no change in the original unlimited oral promise to pay back the stock.

" (Citations omitted.) Dwyer v. Harris, 128 Conn. 397, 400, 23 A.2d 147 (1941). "[A] general acknowledgment may be inferred from acquiescence as well as from silence, as where the existence of the debt has been asserted in the debtor's presence and he did not contradict the assertion."

" (Citations omitted.) Dwyer v. Harris, 128 Conn. 397, 400, 23 A.2d 147 (1941). " [A] general acknowledgment may be inferred from acquiescence as well as from silence, as where the existence of the debt has been asserted in the debtor's presence and he did not contradict the assertion."

" (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dwyer v. Harris, 128 Conn. 397, 400, 23 A.2d 147 (1941). In the present case, the January 21, 2003 letter is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

" (Citations omitted.) Dwyer v. Harris, 128 Conn. 397, 400, 23 A.2d 147 (1941). "[A] general acknowledgment may be inferred from acquiescence as well as from silence, as where the existence of the debt has been asserted in the debtor's presence and he did not contradict the assertion."

Thus the defendant, Serman, did not acknowledge the existence of the debt at that time thereby triggering a new statute of limitations. See Dwyer v. Harris, 128 Conn. 397 (1941). Therefore, count one and two of the complaint are barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-576.

He told him nothing concerning the sale of the cows or truck, nor anything about the credits he was giving his account by any payments on the truck by its purchaser, Clark. The defendant testified, and it is apparently true, that he never authorized the plaintiff to sell the truck and defer the payments thereon, nor did he, directly or indirectly, authorize anyone to make payments on his account, and at no time did he have any knowledge that C. P. Viets Son, or the plaintiff, was crediting his account with the deferred payments; and finally, that he never made any promise, directly or indirectly, to pay the balance due on his account. The governing principle concerning the acknowledgment of an indebtedness sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations (Gen. Stat. [1930] § 6005) is stated in Dwyer vs. Harris, 128 Conn. 397, 400, quoting from Potter vs. Prudential Ins. Co., 108 Conn. 271, 280, as follows: "The determination of whether a sufficient acknowledgment has been made depends upon proof that the defendant by an express or implied recognition of the debt voluntarily renounced the protection of the statute." To suspend or remove the operation of the statute, it is the generally accepted rule of law that there must be an express or implied acknowledgment to pay the obligation. 34 Am. Jur. Limitation of Actions § 300.