Opinion
23A-JV-2775
10-03-2024
D.W., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Casey Farrington Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court The Honorable Danielle P. Gaughan, Judge The Honorable Peter P. Haughan, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D15-2305-JD-4181
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Casey Farrington Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Bradford and Crone concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Altice, Chief Judge.
[¶1] D.W. has filed a Petition for Rehearing claiming that this court "did not evaluate the advisement of rights argument D.W. presented in his briefing." Petition for Rehearing at 5. In so arguing, D.W. notes that in the memorandum decision, we stated: "We begin by noting that on appeal D.W. does not make any argument that his waiver was unknowing, involuntary, and not personal." D.W. v. State, 23A-JV-2775 slip op. at 10 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 6, 2024). We agree that this is an incorrect statement as D.W. argued in his Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief that his waiver was not personal. Omitting this statement does not change the analysis that followed in which we concluded: "Even assuming error in the advisement of his constitutional rights or with compliance with the juvenile waiver statute, any such error does not rise to the level of fundamental error as clearly, D.W. was afforded all of his constitutional rights." Slip op. at 10.
Bradford, J. and Crone, J., concur.