Opinion
2022 CA 0377
11-04-2022
DAVID DUXWORTH v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND OFFICE OF STATE POLICE
Charles M. Stevenson Covington, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, David Duxworth Adrienne E. Aucoin Jeremiah J. Sams Gail C. Holland Faye Dysart Morrison Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections and Office of State Police Erica S. McLellan Emma J. Devillier J. Taylor Gray Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General Criminal Division
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket Number C678880 The Honorable Richard "Chip" Moore III, Judge Presiding
Charles M. Stevenson Covington, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, David Duxworth
Adrienne E. Aucoin Jeremiah J. Sams Gail C. Holland Faye Dysart Morrison Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections and Office of State Police
Erica S. McLellan Emma J. Devillier J. Taylor Gray Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General Criminal Division
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUD3RY, AND WOLFE, J J.
WHIPPLE, C.J.
This matter is before us on appeal by plaintiff, David Duxworth, from a judgment of the trial court denying his petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC"), Louisiana Department of Justice, and Office of the State Police (collectively referred to herein as "the State"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
On June 29, 1998, plaintiff entered a guilty plea for attempted molestation of a juvenile, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:81.2, and was sentenced to seven years at hard labor, which was suspended with plaintiff being placed on probation under the supervision of the DPSC for a period of five years. On July 13, 1998, plaintiff executed sex offender registration and notification requirements with the assistance of his probation officer. On July 21, 1998, the State filed a motion to reconsider sentence and/or correct illegal sentence requesting that the court require plaintiff to register as a sex offender pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 895(H) and LSA-R.S. 15:538. That same date, plaintiff filed a motion to be relieved of the duty to notify and register as required by LSA-R.S. 15:542. At a hearing on September 22, 1998, the State withdrew its motion, and the trial court rendered plaintiffs motion moot.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 895(H) provides that when a court places a defendant on probation, a defendant convicted of a sex offense as defined in LSA-R.S. 15:541 must register as a sex offender. Additionally, LSA-R.S. 15:538 sets forth conditions of probation and parole for a sexual offender whose offense involves a minor child.
At the time of plaintiffs sentencing, LSA-R.S. 15:542(A) required that "[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty or has been convicted of any sex offense ... shall register with the sheriff of the parish of the person's residence."
The minute entry from the hearing indicates that the court subsequently considered and denied a motion to withdraw guilty plea by plaintiff.
On January 25, 2019, plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking injunctive relief or declaratory judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:544.1 and requesting that he be relieved of the sex offender registration and notification requirements of LSA-R.S. 15:544. Plaintiff contended therein that at the time he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced, LSA-R.S. 15:544(B) permitted the trial court to waive the requirements for registration and that no such registration requirement was imposed by the trial court. While conceding in his petition that he has continued to register for twenty-one years due to "pressure from law enforcement," he "finally" seeks to correct "the injustices that he has suffered." The State opposed plaintiffs petition, maintaining that Louisiana's sex offender registration and notification laws applied to plaintiff on the date of his conviction by operation of law pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:542(A), and because he was convicted of a "sex offense," as defined by LSA-R.S. 15:542(E), plaintiff had a statutory obligation to register as a sex offender. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling on April 12, 2021, with reasons, denying plaintiffs petition with prejudice. A judgment in conformity with the trial court's reasons was signed on December 20, 2021, from which plaintiff now appeals.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition where the minutes show that he was never required to register as a sex offender and, at the time of his conviction, LSA-R.S. 15:544(B) allowed the trial court to relieve defendants of registration requirements.
Louisiana's sex offender registration and notification provisions (commonly referred to as "Megan's Law") were originally enacted in 1992 and are codified in LSA-R.S. 15:540, et seq. See 1992 La. Acts No. 388, §1. Louisiana's statutory scheme for registration of sex offenders is merely a civil regulatory framework. State v. Billiot. 2012-0174 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So.3d 113, 117, citing State ex rel Qlivieri v. State, 2000-0172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, 745-750, cert, denied. 533 U.S. 936, 121 S.Ct. 2566, 150 L.Ed.2d 730, and 534 U.S. 892, 122 S.Ct. 208, 151 L.Ed.2d 148 (2001). Thus, the restrictions imposed by Megan's Law are civil, rather than punitive, for the protection of the public. State v. Trosclair, 2011-2302 (La. 5/8/12), 89 So.3d 340, 350.
At the time of plaintiffs conviction, LSA-R.S. 15:544(B) provided as follows:
Any person having the duty to register and give notice under R.S. 15:542 may petition the court to be relieved of that duty. The petition shall be made to the court in which the petitioner was convicted of the offense that subjects him to the duty to register, or, in the case of conviction in other states, to the district court of the parish in which the person is registered. The district attorney of the parish shall be named and served as the defendant in any such petition. The court shall consider the nature of the sex offense committed and the criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior of the petitioner, both before and after conviction, and may consider other factors. The court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register and give notice only if the petitioner shows, with clear and convincing evidence, that future registration of the petitioner will not serve the purposes of this Chapter. [Emphasis added.]
In the instant case, there is no evidence in the record to establish that the trial court heard and considered the nature of the sex offense committed and the behavior of plaintiff before and after his conviction, or any other factors, as required by law to relieve plaintiff from the registration requirements. The record is also devoid of any evidence to establish that plaintiff showed, with clear and convincing evidence, that "future registration of [plaintiff] will not serve the purposes of this Chapter," as required by LSA-R.S. 15:544(B).
Although LSA-R.S. 15:544(B) sets forth a process by which a court could relieve a petitioner from the duty of registering, the minute entry from September 22, 1998, shows that plaintiffs motion was not considered or heard by the trial court, but instead, was deemed moot. An issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that issue has been "deprived of practical significance" or "made abstract or purely academic." In re E.W., 2009-1589 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10), 38 So.3d 1033, 1037. Moreover, a case is moot when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. Stevens v. St. Tammany Parish Government 2016-0197 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1/18/17), 212 So.3d 562, 566-567. To the extent that plaintiff interprets the trial court's treatment of his motion to relieve him of the duty to notify and register as rendered "moot," we find no evidence of any determination by the trial court that plaintiff was relieved of the requirement to register as a sex offender absent any express finding by the trial court.
Plaintiff argues that the State's withdrawal of its motion to reconsider sentence and/or correct illegal sentence and its request that the court require him to register as a sex offender constituted an acquiescence by the State "that the requirements were met," such that he was relieved of the duty to register. The record, however, contains no evidence to support plaintiff's speculative interpretation of the State's motive for withdrawing its motion. Thus, in the absence of an express determination or ruling by the trial court that plaintiff was relieved of the duty to register, we find no error in the trial court's denial of plaintiffs petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. After a thorough review of the record herein, we find that plaintiff failed to establish that the requirements of LSA-R.S. 15:544(B) were met or that his statutory obligation to register was waived.
Lastly, plaintiff challenges the trial court's reasons for judgment, contending that the trial court erred in basing its denial of relief to plaintiff by finding in its written reasons that the twenty-five-year registration period had not expired, when plaintiff contends he did not advance that argument to the court. Plaintiff avers that although he pled in the alternative that application of the increased registration period from ten years to twenty-five years violated the ex post facto provisions of state and federal constitutions, he never addressed this alternative argument in his memorandum to the court.
At the time of plaintiffs conviction, LSA-R.S. 15:544(A) provided for a ten-year registration period. Louisiana Revised Statute 15:544 was amended by 2007 La. Acts No. 460, §2, effective January 1, 2008, to extend the registration period for a person convicted of a sexual offense against a victim who is a minor to a period of twenty-five years from the date of initial registration, unless the underlying conviction was reversed, set aside or vacated. Plaintiffs initial registration was on July 13, 1998. Relying on State ex rel Olivieri v. State. 2000-0172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, cert, denied. 533 U.S. 936, 121 S.Ct. 2566, 150 L.Ed.2d 730, and 534 U.S. 892, 122 S.Ct. 208, 151 L.Ed.2d 148 (2001), wherein the Supreme Court concluded that retroactive application of the law requiring registration of sex offenders and public notification does not impose punishment and, therefore, does not violate state and federal ex post facto law, the trial court determined that plaintiffs initial registration period often years had not expired when the amended statute became effective, and that plaintiff was subject to the extended registration period of twenty-five years. On appeal, plaintiff does not assign error to the trial court's finding that he is subject to the extended registration period of twenty-five years.
We note that appellate courts review judgments and not reasons for judgment. Libertas Tax Fund I. LLC v. Laiche. 2021-0330 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 236, 242, writ denied, 2022-00160 (La. 4/12/22), 336 So.3d 82. In fact, judgments are often upheld on appeal for reasons different than those assigned by atrial court. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572. The written reasons for judgment are merely an explication of the trial court's determinations and do not alter, amend, or affect the final judgment being appealed. Libertas Tax Fund I, LLC, 340 So.3d at 242.
In the instant matter, we are called upon to review the judgment before us on appeal, which judgment denied plaintiffs petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. For the reasons set forth above, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court denying plaintiffs petition for declaratory judgment.
Finding no merit to plaintiffs arguments on appeal, we hereby affirm the December 20, 2021 judgment of the trial court, denying plaintiffs petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with prejudice. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff, David Duxworth.
AFFIRMED.