He indicates that he was merely informed of the "legal names" of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. Hence, being a 15 year old 8th-grade student, he "could not have had the requisite `intelligent understanding of the nature of the offenses'" mandated by Williams v. State, 10 Md. App. 570, 271 A.2d 777 (1970). He also relies on Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484, 248 A.2d 401 (1968), in which we held that a guilty plea to the charge of escape was not satisfactorily shown to be freely and intelligently entered where the record failed to establish whether the accused understood the nature of the charge. There is no merit in appellant's contention.
It is the specific statutory authorization of imprisonment in the penitentiary (even as an alternative to other forms of punishment), and not the punishment actually imposed, which determined whether the unlimited period or the one year period of the statute should be applicable. See Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 387-388, 384 A.2d 456 (1978); Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167-168, 167 A. 60, 65 (1933); Archer v. State, supra, 145 Md. at 136, 138, 125 A. at 747-748; Schaumloeffel v. State, supra, 102 Md. at 472, 62 A. at 804; Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484, 487-488, 248 A.2d 401 (1968). See Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.), Art. 57, § 11 ("No prosecution . . . shall be commenced for . . . any misdemeanor, except those punished by confinement in the penitentiary, unless within one year from the time of the offense committed").
See Hudson, 286 Md. at 595, 409 A.2d at 705. While the petitioner was told that she was charged with assault, she was not told of the maximum permissible length of sentence. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 245 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. at 1713 n. 7. See Mathews v. State, 15 Md. App. 686, 688-92, 292 A.2d 131, 133-34 (1972); Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484, 487, 248 A.2d 401, 403 (1968). These facts establish that there was not compliance with the requirement of Rule 731 c that the record affirmatively show that the trial court determined that "the plea [was] made voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."
As we have stated, this was the law of this State prior to the Boykin opinion. See Duvall v. State, [ 5 Md. App. 484, 487, 248 A.2d 401 (1968)]. But while we have recognized generally that federal constitutional rights were involved in the waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered, what Boykin did was to specify three such rights which are among those so involved.
But by the great weight of authority an appeal will lie from a judgment of conviction entered upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for fundamental constitutional deficiencies nullifying the plea, including a claim of denial of counsel representation or that a waiver of constitutional rights was not made knowingly and understandingly. See, People v. Navarro, 1966, 243 Cal.App.2d 755, 52 Cal.Rptr. 686; Duvall v. State, 1968, 5 Md. App. 484, 248 A.2d 401; Commonwealth v. Sapp, 1968, 428 Pa. 377, 238 A.2d 208; State v. Saylors, 1966, 70 Wn.2d 7, 422 P.2d 477. Non-compliance with the standards of our Rule 11, M.R.Crim.P., as mandated by McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, has been viewed by the Iowa Court as such fundamental constitutional irregularity subject to direct appellate review, notwithstanding the judgment of conviction followed a guilty plea. State v. Sisco, 1969, Iowa, 169 N.W.2d 542.
[Emphasis added]. And in Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484, 488 we wrote: "More specifically there is authority holding that Section 11 of Article 57 which limits prosecutions for misdemeanors 'except those punished by confinement in the penitentiary' to one year is properly interpreted by viewing the word 'punished' to mean 'punishable' by confinement in the penitentiary.
Prosecution for certain offenses under the motor vehicle code shall be instituted within 2 years after the offense was committed, Courts Art. § 5-106(b), and prosecution for Sabbath breaking and drunkenness shall be instituted within 30 days after the offense was committed, Courts Art. § 5-106(c). See Spillers v. State, 10 Md. App. 643; Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484. See also Courts Art. § 5-107.
He conceded that limitations would not be a bar because the offense charged was a penitentiary misdemeanor. Code, Art. 57, § 11; Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484. Upon motion made by Blondes and hearing had on 5 April, the court, Mathias, J., entered an order removing the case from the trial calendar for 10 April and assigned it for trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on 7 May before Prendergast, J., all motions to be filed on or before 18 April.
State v. Sisco, (Iowa 1969), 169 N.W.2d 542, 548. In accord: State v. Braeutigan (1971), 107 Ariz. 405, 489 P.2d 42; In Re Tahl (1969), 1 Cal. 3rd 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 460 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911; Westendorf v. People (1970), 171 Colo. 123, 464 P.2d 866; State v. Bugbee (1971), 161 Conn. 531, 290 A.2d 332; Clark v. State (Fla. App. 1972), 256 So.2d 551; Hamm v. State (1970), 123 Ga. App. 10, 179 S.E.2d 272; People v. Weakley (1970), 45 Ill.2d 549, 259 N.E.2d 802; Wilson v. State (Me. 1970), 268 A.2d 484; Duvall v. State (1968), 5 Md. App. 484, 248 A.2d 401; People v. Butler (1972), 387 Mich. 1, 195 N.W.2d 268; State v. Blaylock (Mo. 1965), 394 S.W.2d 364; Brown v. Warden (1972), 88 Nev. 166, 494 P.2d 959; Neller v. State (1968), 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949; State v. Ford (1972), 281 N.C. 62, 187 S.E.2d 741; Day v. Page (Okla. Cr. 1968), 436 P.2d 59; Commonwealth v. Belgrave (1971), 445 Pa. 311, 285 A.2d 448; Bishop v. Langlois (1969), 106 R.I. 56, 256 A.2d 20; Nachtigall v. Erickson (1970), 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.E.2d 198; Ex Parte Battenfield (Tex. Cr. App. 1971), 466 S.W.2d 569; Woods v. Rhay (1966), 68 Wn.2d 601, 414 P.2d 601, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905; State v. Harrel (1968), 40 Wis.2d 187, 161 N.W.2d 223.
These requirements have been established as the law of this State. See Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484. While no specific ritual is required of the court in ascertaining the existence of the requirements, Church v. State, 5 Md. App. 642, they may not be presumed from a silent record, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516. * * *"