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Duval v. AVIS Budget Grp.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Sep 21, 2023
693 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2023)

Opinion

CASE NO.: 23-cv-60556-CIV-DIMITROULEAS

2023-09-21

Giovanni DUVAL, Plaintiff, v. AVIS BUDGET GROUP, Defendant.

Faudlin Pierre, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Orlando D. Cabeza, Audrey Fernandez, DeMahy Labrador Drake Victor Rojas & Cabeza, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant.


Faudlin Pierre, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Orlando D. Cabeza, Audrey Fernandez, DeMahy Labrador Drake Victor Rojas & Cabeza, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant AVIS Budget Group ("AVIS")'s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed August 22, 2023 (the "Motion") [DE 20]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion [DE 20], Plaintiff Giovanni Duval ("Plaintiff")'s Response [DE 23], Defendant's Reply [DE 23], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff commenced this action against AVIS on March 21, 2023. See [DE 1]. In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, pursuant to the laws of Florida, AVIS was liable under respondeat superior for false imprisonment and arrest, malicious prosecution, and false reporting of criminal behavior to law enforcement. See [DE 1] at ¶¶ 24-40. On May 2, 2023, AVIS filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or, Alternatively, Motion to Strike and for a More Definite Statement. [DE 8]. On July 11, 2023, the Court entered an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See [DE 16]. Therein, the Court dismissed without prejudice all three counts of the Complaint for failure to state a claim, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend in accordance with the Order. See id. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 8, 2023. See [DE 19].

On August 22, 2023, Defendant filed the instant Motion, seeking to dismiss with prejudice Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's claim for false arrest/imprisonment. [DE 20]. Defendant subsequently filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses as to the remainder of the Amended Complaint. [DE 21]. The Motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review.

According to the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint [DE 19], Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Florida. ¶ 1. Defendant AVIS is a New Jersey rental car company with its principal place of business in New Jersey. ¶ 2.

All facts set forth in the background are according to the allegations of the Amended Complaint [DE 19], which the Court assumes as true for purposes of the Motion.

In October 2019, Duval lost his driver's license. ¶ 6. At the time, Duval was unaware that his driver's license was not in his possession. ¶ 6.

On October 4, 2019, AVIS, a rental car company, rented a 2019 Toyota Tacoma with VIN 3TMCZ5AN5KM222575 to an unknown individual in Fort Pierce, Florida. ¶ 7. The individual presented AVIS' employee with Duval's lost driver's license. ¶ 7. AVIS' employee did not inspect the driver's license or compare the signature or the photograph on the driver's license to the unknown individual. ¶ 7. AVIS' employee did not check for alterations in the driver's license. ¶ 7. AVIS and its employee(s) rented the vehicle to the unknown individual without verifying the person's identity. ¶ 7. AVIS has no records of the individual who actually rented its vehicle. ¶ 7. AVIS claims that it was Duval who rented the vehicle. ¶ 9.

At the time AVIS was renting this vehicle, Duval was approximately 150 miles away, working at his job in Miami, Florida. ¶ 8. Duval has never been to Fort Pierce, Florida. ¶ 8. Duval has never rented a vehicle with AVIS and had no prior dealings with AVIS. ¶ 8.

On October 8, 2019, AVIS sent a letter to Duval's aunt which stated that Duval failed to return the vehicle. ¶ 10. On or about October 8, 2019, AVIS, through its agent, spoke with Duval's aunt. ¶ 10. As a result of this conversation, Duval's aunt reached out to Duval and asked him whether he rented a vehicle from AVIS. ¶ 11. Duval then looked for his driver's license and discovered that he was no longer in possession of it. ¶ 11. Duval told his aunt that he did not rent a vehicle and told her to tell AVIS that he did not a rent a vehicle and his driver's license was lost. ¶ 11. Per Duval's instructions, Duval's aunt informed AVIS that Duval said he did not rent a vehicle from AVIS and that his driver's license was missing. ¶ 11.

AVIS and its employees are aware that criminals use loss or stolen driver's license to rent vehicles from its establishment. ¶ 12. Despite this knowledge and Duval's explanation of innocence, AVIS did not conduct any investigation to determine the true identity of the individual who rented its vehicle. ¶ 13. For example, AVIS did not review its surveillance footage, rental agreement, credit card or driver's license used for the rental. ¶ 13. AVIS had ample amount of information and time to discover the true identity of the person who rented the vehicle. ¶ 13.

On October 30, 2019, AVIS contacted the Fort Pierce Police Department, reported that Duval had stolen its vehicle, and requested his arrest. ¶ 14. At approximately 11:09 AM, Fort Pierce police officer Estefany Andrade arrived at AVIS' Fort Pierce store. ¶ 14. Officer Andrade met with Grace Stubbs, manager and agent of AVIS. ¶ 15. Stubbs was acting as an agent and within the scope of employment when she reported AVIS' vehicle stolen to Fort Pierce Police Department. ¶ 15. In reporting the vehicle stolen, Stubbs told Officer Andrade that Duval physically appeared at the Fort Pierce store, rented the vehicle, and drove off with it. ¶ 15. Stubbs further stated that Duval agreed to rent the vehicle for one day and that the Duval was required to return the vehicle the next day. ¶ 16. Stubbs then stated that Duval did not return the vehicle as agreed and the vehicle has never been returned despite multiple requests. ¶ 16.

Stubbs informed Officer Andrade that AVIS attempted to contact Duval multiple times with no success. ¶ 17. Stubbs failed to disclose to Officer Andrade that AVIS was able to communicate with Duval's aunt. ¶ 17. This led Officer Andrade to believe that AVIS did not have any communication with Duval. ¶ 18. Stubbs failed to disclose to Officer Andrade that Duval's aunt informed AVIS that Duval did not rent the vehicle and that his driver's license was stolen. ¶ 17. Stubbs failed to disclose to Officer Andrade that it could not produce a rental agreement between Duval and AVIS. ¶ 17.

Stubbs then completed and executed a stolen vehicle affidavit in which she stated:

And I swear and affirm that the above vehicle was taken without my permission on or about 10/5/2019. Furthermore, I will prosecute the offender(s) if apprehended and I will indemnify and hold harmless the Fort Pierce Police Department, its City Commission, its employees, agents, servants in any claim for damages, and or costs incurred in the recovery of said vehicle, including, but not limited to, towing and storage.

. . .

The above mentioned vehicle was rent[ed][sic] from our store in Ft. Pierce and scheduled to return on the 10/5/2019, and has not been returned or contacted since.

Furthermore, I understand that if criminal charges are filed, there will be NO dismissal of said charges, and I agree to appear at trial and any other time as may be required in order to bring this matter determination by the court. Additionally, I understand that evidence of the above-described vehicle being sold or exchanged, or evidence of the filing of a false report concerning said theft may result in criminal prosecution and/or forfeiture above described vehicle.
¶ 19. On behalf of AVIS, Stubbs made this statement without verifying its truthfulness or having any personal knowledge as to the statements she provided to the police. ¶ 20. AVIS then provided the police with an AVIS generated form that stated that Duval had rented the vehicle. ¶ 21.

Officer Andrade applied for an arrest warrant for Duval based solely on the false testimony of AVIS agent. ¶ 22. Officer Andrade's application stated in relevant part:

On or about October 5, 2019 Giovanni Duval did unlawfully and knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or to use the property of another, to wit: a motor vehicle, the property of AVIS Car Rental as owner or custodian, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the true owner of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom or to appropriate the property to the use of the taker or to the use of any person not entitled thereto, in violation of Florida Statute 812.014.
¶ 22.

Stubbs, AVIS' manager and agent, provided the false information in the warrant that provided probable cause for its issuance. ¶ 23. Specifically, Stubbs claimed that Duval rented a car from AVIS at its Fort Pierce location and did not return the car after multiple requests with no response. ¶ 23.

This warrant was later executed in November 2019 when Plaintiff was arrested at the Fort Lauderdale Airport after returning from a trip out of the country. ¶ 24. Plaintiff was not informed of the basis of his arrest at the airport, but he was told that he was being charged with one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle after he arrived at the police station. ¶ 25. Thereafter, a criminal proceeding was initiated against Plaintiff, requiring Plaintiff to hire an attorney to defend him and to pay a bond for his release. ¶¶ 26-27.

AVIS was solely responsible for Duval's detention and prosecution. ¶ 34. AVIS could have taken several steps to avoid Duval's detention and prosecution. Before renting the vehicle to the unknown individual, AVIS could have: Used a more secure ID verification process; trained its employees to spot fraudulent uses of IDs; requested additional identification or identifying information; inspected the ID more carefully. ¶ 34. After learning that Duval claimed he did not rent the vehicle from its Fort Pierce store, AVIS could have: conducted a more thorough investigation; reviewed the surveillance footage; checked the rental agreement; examined the driver's license; cross-checked its records with Duval's alibis; documented the conversation it had with Duval's aunt. ¶ 35.

Through his criminal defense attorney, Duval informed the state attorney that he had not rented the vehicle. ¶ 27. In response to Duval's claim of innocence, the state attorney conducted its own investigation. ¶ 28. The state attorney made contact with AVIS' general manager Hani-Bhatt who referred the state attorney to AVIS' loss prevention Lidia Saber. ¶ 28. The state attorney sent an email requesting documentation evincing that Duval had stolen the vehicle including rental agreement, surveillance video, etc. ¶ 29. The state attorney also left a voicemail requesting said documents. ¶ 29. Despite the state attorney's requests, from the initiation of the criminal proceeding to its dismissal, AVIS did not provide evidence that Duval was the one who rented the vehicle. ¶¶ 30, 32.

The State of Florida dismissed all charges against Duval on January 11, 2021. ¶ 31. In support of its dismissal, the state attorney stated:

State would not be able to prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt. After repeated request[s] the only information provided for the rental agreement is a document that says the vehicle was rented to the defendant but does not have the rental agreement. Rental company did not provide any restitution documentation, rental agreement contract or any surveillance video. Last email stated the case may be dropped if the documentation was not provided, no information has been provided. The defendant was not found in possession of the vehicle. Defendant made no statements to law enforcement. State would not be able to show that the defendant is the one who stole the vehicle just that he failed to return it at the scheduled time if he is the one who actually rented it which he is disputing through his defense counsel. State has no evidence to dispute this besides the rental form that has the defendants name but no further information.
¶ 31.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant AVIS allegedly has a routine practice of falsely reporting innocent people to law enforcement to obtain benefits from false reporting. [DE 19] at ¶¶ 36-37. Plaintiff further alleges that AVIS has problems in how it handles rentals, including failing to identify and verify who rented the vehicle, failing to record agreed rental extensions, failing to delete proper rental extensions without warning to the customers, claiming customers do not pay for rentals, failing to follow safeguards against false theft reports, giving false information in theft reports, failing to track inventory and renting stolen vehicles, failing to withdraw or correct knowingly false theft reports, destroying records of false theft reports, and maintaining outdated computer systems. ¶ 37. AVIS allegedly obtains benefits from falsely reporting its vehicles stolen, such as not having to spend money to update its rental systems and having police recover the missing vehicles, among other things. ¶ 38.

AVIS has not withdrawn its report that Duval stole its vehicle. ¶ 33. As a result, the vehicle is still listed as stolen, which could lead to more false arrests for Duval. ¶ 33.

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff brings the following claims against AVIS: Count I -- false imprisonment/ false arrest; Count II -- malicious prosecution; and Count III -- false reporting of criminal behavior to law enforcement. See [DE 19]. Defendant moves to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Defendant subsequently filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses as to the remainder of the Amended Complaint. See [DE 21]. As its first Affirmative Defense, AVIS asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for False Imprisonment/False Arrest (Count I). See [DE 21] at ¶ 76.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This pleading standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that asserts mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. And "on the assumption that all the allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact)," the factual allegations pleaded "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' " Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "The Supreme Court has employed a 'two-pronged approach' in applying the foregoing principles: first, a reviewing court should eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and second, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 'assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.' " Boyd v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, 856 F. 3d 853, 864 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

III. Discussion

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that AVIS fabricated probable cause and reported to police that Duval had stolen its vehicle, even though Duval's aunt had told AVIS that Duval did not rent the vehicle and that his identification was lost. See [DE 19] at ¶ 42. AVIS made this claim without evidence to substantiate it, such as a rental agreement or surveillance footage. See [DE 19] at ¶ 42. According to the Amended Complaint, AVIS improperly influenced, persuaded, and instigated the police to arrest and imprison Duval against his will. ¶ 43. AVIS contacted the Fort Pierce police and reported that Duval had stolen its vehicle, despite being aware that Duval's aunt had relayed to AVIS that Duval had lost his driver's license and did not rent a car from its Fort Pierce store. ¶ 43. AVIS did not conduct any investigation to determine the identity of the individual who rented its vehicle, including reviewing surveillance cameras and rental agreement. ¶ 43. Upon the police's arrival at AVIS' Fort Pierce store, AVIS' agent provided false statements to substantiate Duval's arrest. ¶ 45. AVIS, through its agents, falsely stated that Duval had rented a vehicle from its Fort Pierce store, which he did not. ¶ 45. AVIS falsely stated that there had been no further communication with Duval, when in fact there had been communication between AVIS and Duval's aunt. ¶ 45. AVIS falsely claimed that there was a rental agreement between Duval and AVIS, when there was not. ¶ 45. The information that provided probable cause for Duval's arrest rested on AVIS' fabrication that a crime had been committed by Duval. ¶ 45. The police did not have personal knowledge of AVIS' allegations of theft, and AVIS did not disclose to the officer the complete set of facts (i.e., Duval's alibi and his aunt's proclamation of Duval's innocence). ¶ 46. AVIS requested that Duval be arrested and promised to prosecute him upon his apprehension. ¶ 46. The Amended Complaint claims that the detention of Duval unreasonable, and not warranted by the circumstances. ¶ 47. AVIS knew or would have known that Duval did not steal its car had it conducted a reasonable investigation once it was notified by Duval's aunt that Duval did not rent a car from its Fort Pierce store. ¶ 47. AVIS could have taken several steps to avoid Duval's detention, including using a more secure ID verification process, training its employees to spot fraudulent uses of IDs, requesting additional identification or identifying information, inspecting the ID more carefully, and conducting a more thorough investigation. ¶ 47. AVIS could not produce a rental agreement, surveillance camera, or copy of driver's license to substantiate its claims of theft. ¶ 47.

In its Motion to Dismiss, AVIS argues that the claim in Count I for false imprisonment/false arrest is factually and legally insufficient. Specifically, AVIS argues that the facts alleged by Plaintiff in support of his false imprisonment claim — reporting suspected criminal activity and submitting an affidavit to law enforcement regarding the crime — does not rise to the level of constituting solicitation, influence, or persuasion of law enforcement to arrest Plaintiff. In other words: the necessary element of "instigation" is missing.

In response, Duval first contends that the motion to dismiss Count I should be denied as moot because after filing its Motion to Dismiss as to Count I, Defendant on the same day filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. See [DE 21]. As its first Affirmative Defense, AVIS asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for False Imprisonment/False Arrest (Count I). See [DE 21] at ¶ 76. Plaintiff's argument is without merit. See, e.g., Hines v. Nazaire, No. 17-10093, 2019 WL 3010284, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2019) (rejecting the argument that the district court should not have entertained a motion to dismiss because it was docketed on the same day as the answer); Faustin v. Mike Pacheco's Lawn Serv., Inc., No. 14-81361-CIV, 2015 WL 13779242, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2015) ("[T]he Answer and Affirmative Defenses states, with respect to Count II, that 'Defendants have moved to dismiss Count II of the Complaint therefore a response is not required at this time. To the extent a response is required; Defendants deny the allegations in Count II of the Complaint.' [DE 15 at 5]. This Motion to Dismiss refers solely to Count II. Therefore the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss is timely and will consider it on the merits."). Here, the Court finds the Motion to Dismiss Count I timely and will consider it on the merits.

A false imprisonment/false arrest is an "unlawful restraint of a person against his will, the gist of which action is the unlawful detention of the plaintiff and the deprivation of his liberty." Bartley v. Kim's Enter. of Orlando, Inc., 568 F. App'x 827, 834 (11th Cir. 2014). In a cause of action under Florida law for false imprisonment/false arrest, the essential elements are: "(1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a person; (2) against that person's will; (3) without legal authority or 'color of authority'; and (4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances." Id. At the very least, a plaintiff's claim of false imprisonment/false arrest must establish that the detention was unlawful and contrary to his will. Id.

AVIS argues that the claim in Count I of the Amended Complaint for false imprisonment/false arrest must be dismissed as factually and legally insufficient for failure to allege facts sufficient to establish the necessary element of instigation. AVIS contends that the facts alleged by Plaintiff in support of his false imprisonment claim — reporting suspected criminal activity and submitting an affidavit to law enforcement regarding the crime — does not rise to the level of constituting solicitation, influence, or persuasion of law enforcement to arrest Plaintiff.

Private citizens have the privilege of reporting information on suspected criminal activity to law enforcement without fear of subsequent tort liability, even if the information they provide turns out to be mistaken. Pokorny v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678, 682 (Fla. 1980). However, this reporting must be done in a way that affords the police the discretion to decide what should be done about an arrest without being subjected to influence or persuasion. Id. "[T]o be liable in an action for false imprisonment, one must have personally and actively participated therein, directly or by indirect procurement." Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So. 2d 699, 701 (1944). In Pokorny, the Florida Supreme Court has narrowly defined the "indirect procurement" requirement articulated in Johnson and held that where a citizen provides information to law enforcement, without more, such action does not constitute false imprisonment. Pokorny, 382 So. 2d 678. Pokorny held that "a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other's arrest by law enforcement officers." 382 So.2d at 682.

Here, there is no allegation that AVIS actually detained Duval. Accordingly, to sustain a false arrest/imprisonment claim, the factual allegations must establish that AVIS instigated Duval's arrest. To "instigate" an arrest, AVIS must have taken an active role in encouraging or procuring the arrest. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:

It is not enough for instigation that the actor has given information to the police about the commission of a crime, or has accused the other of committing it, so long as he leaves to the police the decision as to what shall be done about any arrest, without persuading or influencing them.
Id. See, e.g., Roberson v. Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida, 364 So.3d 1097, 1101-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (Rental car company's action in submitting an affidavit to law enforcement regarding a stolen vehicle did not "instigate" the plaintiff's arrest.); Harder v. Edwards, 174 So. 3d 524, 531-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (directing verdict in favor of store investigator who submitted affidavit and potential evidence of crime to investigating detective).

In this case, the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are not sufficient to state a claim for false imprisonment. The count lacks factual allegations establishing the necessary element of AVIS' active and personal participation in Plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff alleges that AVIS reported the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement and that AVIS' employee, Ms. Stubbs, executed and submitted a stolen vehicle affidavit which law enforcement relied upon in issuing an arrest warrant. However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing that AVIS "instigated" the arrest or imprisonment of Duval or that AVIS persuaded the police to arrest or detain Duval. While it might be argued that AVIS accused Duval of stealing a rental car, there are no factual allegations in the Amended Complaint that demonstrate that the police had no discretion in pursuing an investigation of the stolen vehicle and/or that the police were not left with the decision as to whether or not to arrest Duval. See Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 682.

Plaintiff cites Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378, 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), which is distinguishable from this case. The court in Harris determined that a jury may find false imprisonment because the defendant bank's security guard detained plaintiff against her will, not merely because the defendant accused the plaintiff of grand theft. See Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 436 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In contrast, Plaintiff Duval does not allege that AVIS physically detained him at any point.

IV. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [DE 20] is GRANTED. Count I is dismissed with prejudice.

2. The case will proceed as to Counts II and III.

3. The Joint Scheduling Report, see [DE 5], shall be filed on or before October 26, 2023.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 21st day of September, 2023.


Summaries of

Duval v. AVIS Budget Grp.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Sep 21, 2023
693 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2023)
Case details for

Duval v. AVIS Budget Grp.

Case Details

Full title:Giovanni DUVAL, Plaintiff, v. AVIS BUDGET GROUP, Defendant.

Court:United States District Court, S.D. Florida

Date published: Sep 21, 2023

Citations

693 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2023)