Henriquez, 413 Md. at 302, 992 A.2d at 456. Similarly, in Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), we held that, although the Petitioner did not personally pay his medical bill, he was still entitled to reimbursement by his automobile insurer for his medical bills resulting from an automobile accident. In Dutta, the petitioner carried both automobile and health insurance.
The terms "automobile insurer" and "motor vehicle insurer" are used interchangeably within this Opinion. Wu asserts that the legislative design and purpose of § 19-507, as well as this Court's interpretation of the statute in Dutta v. State Farm, 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), support the opposite conclusion. Wu posits that these authorities clearly establish that "PIP benefits cannot be coordinated by an auto insurer or health insurer unless the insured has given clear and unequivocal permission to do so in accordance with the provisions of § 19-507."
Although we have not addressed the exact question before us previously, this Court has considered what it means for a party to “incur” a cost. In Dutta v. State Farm Insurance Company, 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), the Maryland Code (1996, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 19–505 of the Insurance Article was at issue. Section 19–505(b)(2)(i) of that Article requires personal injury protection (PIP) coverage to include “payment of all reasonable and necessary expenses that arise from a motor vehicle accident and that are incurred within 3 years after the accident.”
Although we have not addressed the exact question before us previously, this Court has considered what it means for a party to "incur" a cost. In Dutta v. State Farm Insurance Company, 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), the Maryland Code (1996, 2006 Repl. Vol.) §19-505 of the Insurance Article was at issue. Section 19-505 (b) (2) (i) of that Article requires personal injury protection (PIP) coverage to include "payment of all reasonable and necessary expenses that arise from a motor vehicle accident and that are incurred within 3 years after the accident."
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage aims to provide expeditious no-fault compensation for medical bills and lost wages to victims of motor vehicle accidents. Dutta v. State Farm, 363 Md. 540, 547-48, 769 A.2d 948, 952 (2001). Creveling filed a class action complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on April 19, 2001, to recover PIP benefits she previously had been denied.
Although Maryland does not follow the rule that insurance contracts should be construed against the insurer as a matter of course, any ambiguity will be "construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer as drafter of the instrument." Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 556-57 (2001) (citation omitted).Md.
We note that the contract employs the possessive, but this indicates only whom the claims must be brought for or against, not who must incur the fees, in order for them to be awarded. This case is governed by the Court of Appeals' decision in Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), where the Court held that an insured was entitled to reimbursement under his automobile insurance policy, even though his health maintenance organization ("HMO") had initially paid his medical bill and had already been reimbursed by the third-party tortfeasor. In order to decide that case, the Court had to interpret the meaning of "incurred" as it appeared in the parties' insurance agreement and in Maryland Code (1995, 1997 Repl.Vol.), Title 19, subtitle 5 of the Insurance Article ("IA").
Accordingly, "'ordinary principles of contract interpretation apply.'" Megonnell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 368 Md. 633, 655, 796 A.2d 758, 772 (2002) (citation omitted); see Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 556, 769 A.2d 948, 957 (2001). In interpreting an insurance policy, Maryland courts "construe the instrument as a whole to determine the intention of the parties."
A.2d 758, 772 (2002) (citation omitted); see Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 556, 769 A.2d 948, 957 (2001); Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1998).
Accordingly, " ‘ordinary principles of contract interpretation apply.’ " Megonnell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n , 368 Md. 633, 655, 796 A.2d 758, 772 (2002) (citation omitted); seeDutta v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 363 Md. 540, 556, 769 A.2d 948, 957 (2001) ; Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 315 Md. 761, 766, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1989). Principles of contract law govern the Policy at issue.