Opinion
Criminal No. 03-2190
November 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Rosita Dussan ("Dussan" or "Petitioner"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241-43. Dussan is currently incarcerated at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Petitioner protests her transfer from a medium-to a maximum-security prison. United States Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa has issued a Report and Recommendation ("RR"), recommending that the petition be dismissed. Petitioner has filed a timely objection to the RR.
For the reasons which follow, Petitioner's Objection will be overruled, the Magistrate's RR will be approved and adopted, and the Petition will be denied.
I. Discussion
A. Factual Background
On charges not immediately apparent to this Court, Dussan was originally convicted and sentenced by the Southern District of Florida. Petitioner had been incarcerated at the Danbury Federal Correctional Institute in Danbury, Connecticut since October 17, 1994; she was transferred to the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center on March 7, 2003. Petitioner argues that this transfer was an "arbitrary, capricious an [sic] illegal act" on the part of the Danbury Administrative Staff. (Pet. ¶ 1.) According to Dussan's writ of habeas corpus, she has filed her petition because "[her] transferred [sic] is unlawful in that it is in violation of her rights thus the best interest to be consider as a reduction on her sentence." (Id. ¶ 5.)
The facts from this case were compiled from the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Order from the Southern District of Florida which transferred this case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Magistrate's RR, and Petitioner's Objection.
B. Legal Standard
In ruling on objections to the Report and Recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge, this Court reviews de novo only "those portions" of the RR "to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 72. Petitioner raises one objection to Magistrate Judge Caracappa's RR. To wit, the Magistrate recommended that this Court dismiss the habeas corpus petition because her remedy lies in a civil rights suit, not a habeas corpus action; Dussan objects to this classification and interpretation of her petition.
Petitioner's Objection posits several questions to this Court, some of which, for instance, inquire about eligibility for certain prison programs. However, as review is limited only to those portions to which Dussan specifically objects, this Court declines to answer any question unrelated to the Magistrate's opinion.
C. Analysis
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed.2d439 (1973), the Supreme Court discussed the two remedies available to prisoners who allege violations of their constitutional rights. Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for prisoners seeking to challenge the underlying conviction and sentence on federal constitutional grounds. 411 U.S. at 489. Where an inmate challenges the conditions of her confinement, rather than the fact or duration of confinement, her remedy lies in a civil rights suit, not a habeas corpus action. Id. at 499; see, e.g., Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1993). The Court inPreiser did not decide whether inmates could utilize a habeas corpus petition as an alternative to a civil rights suit. 411 U.S. at 499: see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (leaving "to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the confinement itself).
Where an inmate challenges the conditions of her confinement, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the applicable federal statute, and it provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner's allegations fit squarely within this statute. As the Magistrate interpreted Dussan's allegations, Petitioner claimed that federal employees-particularly the Danbury Administrative Staff-deliberately violated her confinement conditions by relocating her from the medium-security facilities in Danbury, Connecticut to the maximum-security prison in Philadelphia. This Court reaches an identical conclusion, and it will uphold the Magistrate's RR.
Dussan responds that since the relief sought is a reduction in sentence, the habeas corpus action is most appropriate to the instant case. (Pet. ¶¶ 3 5; Obj. at 2.) "[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of [her] physical imprisonment, and the relief [she] seeks is a determination that [she] is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, [her] sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus."Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. Petitioner appears only to satisfy the second component of the Preiser model: the relief she seeks is a determination that she is entitled to speedier release. The crux of Dussan's petition is the allegedly improper transfer between prisons, for which reduction in sentence is her suggested remedy, and Dussan does not independently challenge the validity of her sentence outside the context of this underlying harm allegedly perpetrated by the Danbury Administrative Staff. See id., at 490 ("[H]abeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the . . . length of their confinement. . . .") (emphasis added). This rule as to state prisoners applies equally to federal prisoners. See id., at 520-21. Therefore, this Court determines that Dussan's claim is not actionable as habeas corpus relief since her petition does not challenge the very fact or duration of her physical imprisonment, excluding the fact that she would prefer the Court to shorten her sentence as compensation for a change in security conditions.
Petitioner's Objection itself emphasizes that Dussan solely challenges the conditions of her imprisonment. Dussan does not allege that she is wrongfully imprisoned or that she was sentenced to a term disproportionate to the crime of which she was convicted. Her Objection provides, in pertinent part:
The question here is whether the Due Precess [sic] Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles a federal prisoner to a hearing when she is trnasferred [sic] to a prison (FEDERAL DETENTION CENTER). In which the conditions are substantially less favorable to a prisoner who has done thirteen years in general population, at medium security institution.
(Obj. at 7) (emphasis added). Precedent establishes that prisoners whose claims relate to alleged unconstitutional custodial treatment are more appropriately presented as § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Bronson v. Demming, No. 00-2461, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25240, at *7 (3d Cir. Nov. 22, 2002).
Despite her requests for a subsequently reduced sentence, Dussan's claim ultimately only challenges the procedures by which she was transferred to a higher-security prison. Because this transfer did not alter the length of her incarceration, and Petitioner makes no contrary allegation, the success of her claim will not necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of her confinement. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); see also Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002). A claim, if successful, that would not entitle the prisoner to immediate or speedier release sounds not in habeas corpus, but in civil rights. See, e.g., Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 1996).
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's objections will be overruled, the Magistrate's RR will be approved and adopted, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied and dismissed with prejudice, and, because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of any constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of November, 2003, it is hereby ORDERED that:1. Petitioner's objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is overruled;
2. The Magistrate's Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted;
3. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
4. Because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of any constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue.