Durst v. United States

8 Citing cases

  1. First Nat. Bank of Denver v. United States

    648 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1981)   Cited 4 times
    Finding handcuffing reasonable during a Terry stop where one officer was left with two men suspected of fleeing a bank robbery, but stating that once a second officer arrived it "present[ed] a much closer question"

    These powers include the right to appoint a successor. However, as explained above, an individual trustee would not have the power to appoint his or her successor, and thus would not have "all the powers" of the Trust Company. See Durst v. United States, 559 F.2d 910, 912-13 (3rd Cir.) (holding that after examining the trust instrument as a whole, interpreting it to permit the settlor to appoint herself as trustee would lead to inconsistencies in the successorship provision by requiring her to take action after her death). Other provisions cited by the plaintiff taxpayer and the trial court as indicating that it would be inconsistent to allow appointment of an individual trustee are of less significance.

  2. Estate of Gilchrist v. C. I. R

    630 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1980)   Cited 9 times

    Whether the settlor of a trust has in fact reserved any of the powers enumerated in § 2036 is determined by the law governing the trust. Durst v. United States, 559 F.2d 910, 911 (3d Cir. 1977). Under Texas law, extrinsic evidence is admissible to construe an ambiguous trust instrument by ascertaining the settlor's true intent.

  3. Estate of Sulovich v. C. I. R

    587 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1978)   Cited 4 times

    Nor is it relevant whether decedent had the intent to exercise any of the retained powers enumerated in §§ 2036 and 2038; the determining question is whether the settlor reserved any of those powers. Durst v. United States, 559 F.2d 910, 911 (3rd Cir. 1977). In Estate of Curry v. United States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1969), we held that for federal estate tax purposes an estate created in United States Series E bonds was a matter of contract. To like effect see United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257, 93 S.Ct. 880, 35 L.Ed.2d 247 (1973).

  4. James v. United States

    448 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1978)   Cited 1 times

    The existence and scope of a power to appoint a trustee must be determined in accordance with the state laws governing the trust. Durst v. United States, 559 F.2d 910, 911 (3d Cir. 1977). Each side in its respective brief indicates that while Nebraska law is controlling, there are no Nebraska cases regarding the question of survival of a power to appoint a trustee.

  5. In re Wernerstruck, Inc.

    122 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1991)   Cited 1 times

    The reservation of any significant powers over the transfer of property retains an interest in the transferor. Sulovich's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 587 F.2d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1978); Durst v. U.S., 559 F.2d 910, 911 (3d Cir. 1977). Substantial economic benefit, rather than technical vesting of title, is the focus of whether a transfer is complete.

  6. Bank of New York v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Edmonds)

    72 T.C. 970 (U.S.T.C. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    However, whether a decedent intended to exercise the power is not determinative of whether he retained the power to do so. Mathey v. United States, 32 AFTR 2d 73-6213, 73-2 USTC par. 12,936 (3d Cir. 1973), affd. en banc on rearg. 491 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1974); see Durst v. United States, 409 F.Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1976), affd. 559 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1977). Furthermore, decedent may have thought it unnecessary to specifically retain the power to fill a vacancy on the theory that it was encompassed by his power “to change” the trustee.

  7. Estate of McTighe v. Commissioner

    1977 T.C.M. 410 (U.S.T.C. 1977)

    See United States v. O'Malley 66-1 USTC ¶ 12,388, 383 U.S. 627 (1966). Petitioner, however, argues that decedent did not have the power to substitute himself [36 TCM (CCH) 1660] as trustee under article V, relying on Durst v. United States, — F. 2d — (3d Cir. 1977). In the Durst case, the trustees of a trust established by a decedent were conceded to have held powers that could cause inclusion of the trust property in the decedent's gross estate if they were held by him. Also, the settlor retained the right during his life to appoint an additional trustee.

  8. Coffey v. Coffey

    286 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1995)   Cited 7 times

    In his capacity as trustee [the parent-settlor] was bound by the trust provisions."); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331 (1959); 4 Scott on Trusts, supra, § 331, at 2618; cf. Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 502, 170 A.2d 39 (1961); In re Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 263, 426 A.2d 88 (Ch.Div. 1980). The irrevocability of the trust is clearly established by defendant's expressed desire in the trust instrument to avoid taxation to the greatest extent possible, see 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2036(a), 2038; Durst v. United States, 559 F.2d 910, 913 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821, 825-26 (10th Cir. 1962); Stockstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 148 F.2d 491, 494-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 719, 66 S.Ct. 23, 90 L.Ed. 425 (1945); cf. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 144-45, 92 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-95, 33 L.Ed.2d 238, 251-52 (1972); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334-38, 60 S.Ct. 554, 556-58, 84 L.Ed. 788, 791-93 (1940); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Goodan, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952); Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951); Carman v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 717 (Ct.Cl. 1948), as well as by the terms of the parties' incorporated agreement. Furthermore, defendant has failed to comply with the provision of the trust instrument requiring him to distribute to the children or deposit in their accounts (not the trust's accounts) the proceeds of any bonds maturing or called in prior to maturity dates after the children