Further, Stafford's allegation that her ex-husband lied to the court, if those statements were made in pleadings or in the course of a judicial proceeding and were relevant to the issue, are absolutely privileged. Moore v. Sater, 215 Or. 41, 335 P.2d 843 (1959); Durr v. Kelleher, 54 Or. App. 965, 636 P.2d 1015 (1981). Although she does not identify what specific statements she takes issue with, the context of the dispute suggests Stafford challenges testimony central to the subject matter of the dissolution and custody proceeding, namely her ability to parent.
However, statements made in pleadings or in the course of a judicial proceeding, if relevant to the issue, are absolutely privileged. Moore v. Sater, 215 Or. 417, 335 P.2d 843 (1959); Durr v. Kelleher, 54 Or. App. 965, 636 P.2d 1015 (1981). The statements plaintiff Stafford takes issue with were central to the subject matter of the dissolution and custody proceeding, namely Stafford's ability to parent.
However, statements made in pleadings or in the course of a judicial proceeding, if relevant to the issue, are absolutely privileged. Moore v. Sater, 215 Or. 41, 335 P.2d 843 (1959); Durr v. Kelleher, 54 Or. App. 965, 636 P.2d 1015 (1981). The statements plaintiff Stafford takes issue with were central to the subject matter of the dissolution and custody proceeding, namely plaintiff Stafford's ability to parent.
In addition, a factfinder could find that defendant's statement that Neumann is “crooked,” apart from implying that she is not a wedding vendor who can be trusted, alleges that she is dishonest, and would be defamatory for that reason. See Mannex Corp. v. Bruns, 250 Or.App. 50, 52, 57–61, 279 P.3d 278 (2012) (recognizing that statements that the plaintiff “was a ‘crook[ ],’ that [a third party] should ‘never want to do business with [the plaintiff],’ and that [the third party] should ‘remember that name’ “ were defamatory, although concluding that the plaintiff's claim for defamation failed because the statements were protected by qualified privilege); Durr v. Kelleher, 54 Or.App. 965, 967–68, 636 P.2d 1015 (1981) (affirming trial court verdict awarding damages on defamation claim where “[t]he court found that [the] defendant had maliciously slandered [the] plaintiff by calling him a ‘crook’ and a ‘dishonest’ police officer”). Finally, because a factfinder could find that defendant's statements attacked Neumann's professional or business reputation, and, for that reason, would be defamatory per se, plaintiffs were not required to present evidence of special harm to establish a prima facie case of defamation.
In addition, he alleges that the statements were not pertinent to the issues pending before the court.See Durr v. Kelleher, 54 Or. App. 965, 967, 636 P.2d 1015 (1981) (holding that although statements made in a judicial proceeding are privileged, such "privilege may be overcome by demonstrating that the defamatory statement is irrelevant to the subject matter of the proceeding in connection with which the communication was made"). Thus, the issue is whether the trial court exceeded its authority in dismissing the complaint for want of prosecution after an order of default was entered on the complaint.