Although defense counsel objected at trial to the admission of the videotaped interview, he did not raise the specific ground now asserted on appeal. Under such circumstances, there remains nothing for appellate review. Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 (1) (a) ( 424 S.E.2d 316). Nonetheless, our review of the victim's trial testimony and her video taped interview (which was transcribed but not available for inclusion in the record on appeal) persuades us that the indicia of reliability outlined in Gregg v. State, 201 Ga. App. 238, 240 (3) (b), supra, were present in the case sub judice. "Moreover, as in Gregg, supra at 241 (3) (c), the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination, thereby providing an additional safeguard of [defendant's] rights."
While not mentioning H.C.'s age specifically, the motion in limine did state that the videotaped forensic interview was inadmissible hearsay not subject to the child hearsay exception. But see Watts v. State, 246 Ga.App. 367(3)(a), 541 S.E.2d 41 (2000), reversed on other grounds by 274 Ga. 373, 552 S.E.2d 823 (2001) (defendant's general objection to hearsay statements was insufficient to preserve his assertion on appeal that statements admitted under the child hearsay statute lacked sufficient indicia of reliability); Dupree v. State, 206 Ga.App. 4(1), 424 S.E.2d 316 (1992). For the purposes of this appeal only, we assume without deciding that trial counsel's filing of the motion in limine preserved for appellate review the admissibility of H.C.'s forensic interview based on her age.
This condemnation of Drake is not based on some exercise in hypothetical reasoning but rather on the actual status of criminal law in Georgia today: only the holding in Drake can explain the numerous "statutory" rape convictions received by defendants who had sexual intercourse with children under the age of ten. See, e.g., Peinado v. State, 223 Ga. App. 271 ( 477 S.E.2d 408) (1996) (victims were four and five years old); Walker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 777 ( 449 S.E.2d 322) (1994) (victim was six); Gordon v. State, 210 Ga. App. 224 ( 435 S.E.2d 742) (1993) (victim was seven); Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992) (victim was eight); Andrews v. State, 200 Ga. App. 47 ( 406 S.E.2d 801) (1991) (victim was five); Neese v. State, 183 Ga. App. 773 ( 360 S.E.2d 1) (1987) (victim was four). It is true that Drake has been on the books since 1977 and the Legislature has taken no action in regard to its holding.
However, Fisher failed to show by the record that he raised these issues to the trial court. It is well-settled that errors not raised at trial will not be considered and ruled upon on appeal. Brown v. Thomas, 257 Ga. 68, 69 (1) ( 354 S.E.2d 830) (1987); Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 (1) (a) ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992). Accordingly, we decline to address them.
Marion, 206 Ga. App. at 159 (1); Chastain, 257 Ga. at 55.Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137 (1) ( 377 S.E.2d 158) (1989); see Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4, 5 (2) ( 424 S.E.2d 316 (1992). But the common law rule of relevancy generally applies to show false accusations made by the victim, not the victim's mother.
At no time prior to or during the trial, did Boone argue that he suffered from any disability or mental problems. Under these circumstances, the issued was not preserved for review. Brown v. Thomas, 257 Ga. 68, 69 (1) ( 354 S.E.2d 830) (1987) (error not raised in trial court not subject to appeal); Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 (1) (a) ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992). 3. The trial court did not err in denying Boone's motions for directed verdict as to the offenses of robbery by sudden snatching and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The parties agreed to stipulate that McDaniel had a life estate and owned the property. Because McDaniel failed to raise below the issue that Hensons failed to sue the proper party, we will not consider that issue on appeal. Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992). 2.
Accordingly, this issue was not preserved for appellate review. Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 (1) (a) ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992). 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial based on the State's closing argument.
See Division 1. We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, because the trial court has not had opportunity to consider them. Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4, 5 (2) ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992). 5. Nationwide claims it was entitled to a directed verdict for the amount of its advance payments to Wiley ($2,000) and to a $2,000 reduction in the jury verdict for the loss of use payments previously made.
Furthermore, "the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination, thereby providing an additional safeguard of appellant's rights." Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4 (1) ( 424 S.E.2d 316) (1992). 3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of a child sexual abuse expert which went to the ultimate issue in the case.