(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Manchester, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003), quoting Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn.App. 594, 597-98, 575 A.2d 249 (1990). "To prevail on the basis of a hardship, an applicant for a variance must show that because of some peculiar characteristic of its property, the strict application of the zoning regulation produces an unusual hardship as opposed to the general import which the regulations has on other properties in the zone."
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 80 Conn. App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003); see also Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 208; Hyatt v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 379, 382-83, 311 A.2d 77 (1972) (neither maximum possible enrichment of particular landowner nor highest and best use of land are controlling purpose of zoning); Cowles v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 116, 117-18, 214 A.2d 361 (1965); Stancuna v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 66 Conn. App. 565, 570, 785 A.2d 601 (2001); Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 43 Conn. App. 545, 548, 684 A.2d 735 (1996) (disappointment in use of property does not meet standard of exceptional difficulty); Spencer v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 15 Conn. App. 387, 392, 544 A.2d 676 (1988). Although financial considerations are not always immaterial or extraneous to the question of whether a variance should be granted, "[f]inancial considerations are relevant only in those exceptional situations where a board could reasonably find that the application of the regulations to the property greatly decreases or
In Campion v. Board of Aldermen, 85 Conn.App. 820, 841-42 (2004) (rev'd on other grounds) the court said: "A zoning board of appeals should grant a variance only in exceptional or unusual circumstances." It quoted from Kalimian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330 (2003) to the effect that "Proof of exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship is absolutely necessary as a condition precedent to the granting of a zoning variance . . . A mere economic hardship or a hardship that was self-created, however, is insufficient to justify a variance . . . and neither financial loss nor the potential for financial gain is the proper basis for granting a variance," see also Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 657, 662 (1965), also see Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 207-08 (1995). Two use variance cases are of interest.
The plaintiffs, further, argue that any existing hardship is self-created, and, therefore, insufficient for purposes of granting a variance, citing for support to Eagan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 20 Conn.App. 561, 568 A.2d 811 (1990), and Polland v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 186 Conn. 32, 438 A.2d 1186 (1982). The present case can, however, be differentiated from the factual scenarios in these cases, and particularly Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 80 Conn.App. 327, which is factually similar to the present case, as it addresses a variance for the purpose of a subdivision. In all three cases, the issues as to self-created hardship related to the actual acreage of the property, specifically insufficient square footage.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Manchester, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003) quoting Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn.App. 594, 597-98, 575 A.2d 249 (1990). See also Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 362, 368, 537 A.2d 1030 (1988).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Manchester, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003), quoting Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn.App. 594, 597-98, 575 A.2d 249 (1990). See also Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 362, 368, 537 A.2d 1030 (1988).
" (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003). The facts of the current case are analogous to Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 80 Conn.App. 327.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Manchester, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003) quoting Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn.App. 594, 597-98, 575 A.2d 249 (1990). See also Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 362, 368 (1988).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board Of Appeals of Manchester, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003) quoting Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn.App. 594, 597-98, 575 A.2d 249 (1990). See also Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals 206 Conn. 362, 368 (1988).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupont v. Zoning Board Of Appeals of Manchester, 80 Conn.App. 327, 330, 834 A.2d 801 (2003) quoting Kelly v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 21 Conn.App. 594, 597-98, 575 A.2d 249 (1990). See also Grillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 362, 368 (1988).