5 In Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 33 S.Ct. 76, 77, 57 L.Ed. 156, the court denounced as 'an unreasonable exercise of the police power' a municipal ordinance which required the Committee on Streets to establish a building line at a prescribed location when requested by two thirds of the abutting property owners. 6 In Dupont v. Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 71 A.2d 84, the court held an ordinance violated the constitution in that it required as a condition precedent to the issuance of a permit the consent of 50 per cent of the owners. This was tantamount to no privilege at all since 51 per cent of such owners could defeat the permit.
3 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 21.15, at 700 (3d ed. 1986). See, e.g., Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Commission, 377 Mass. 83, 88-89, 384 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1979); State Theatre Co. v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 259, 263 (S.D. 1979); Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608 (Del. 1968); Robwood Advertising Associates, Inc. v. City of Nashua, 102 N.H. 215, 217-18, 153 A.2d 787, 789 (1959); Cross v. Bilett, 122 Colo. 278, 221 P.2d 923 (1950); DuPont v. Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 71 A.2d 84 (1949). Assuming that the limitations on condominium conversions can accurately be characterized as a prohibition, with a waiver provision, we conclude in any event that this distinction is not controlling.
[5] "If the existence of the law depends upon the vote or act of the people it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, but if the law is complete in and of itself the fact that it provides for the removal or modification of its prohibition by the act of those most affected thereby, does not make it a delegation of legislative power." See Du Pont v. Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 71 A.2d 84, and cases cited therein. There is a sharp conflict in the authorities applying this rule, see note, 79 L. Ed., page 533; 21 A.L.R.2d, page 553; Bassett on Zoning, page 43; Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning, pages 275 to 277.
Where the delegation is simply of the power to waive the provisions of the statute, the constitution does not require that standards to guide the granting of the waiver be set forth in the statute. Dupont v. Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 290, 71 A.2d 84; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531, 37 S.Ct. 190, 61 L.Ed. 472. The act in question is not unconstitutional by reason of any delegation of legislative powers.
Sonn. v. Planning Commission of City of Bristol, 172 Conn. 156, 162 (1976); R.K. Development Corp. v. Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369 (1968). This is not to demand standards which are too inflexible to be practical. It is simply to avoid giving unlimited discretion to commissions acting on applications such as the instant one. Ghent v. Planning Commission, 219 Conn. 511, 517-518 (1991); DuPont v. Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 289 (1949). The regulations must be "reasonably precise" and "reasonably adequate . . . to guide the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations."
What is aesthetically pleasing to view and its significance to the viewer is a matter of personal opinion, and allowing decisions to be made on that basis amounts to no standard at all and an open invitation to inconsistent results, arbitrary action and preferential treatment. Regulations giving virtually unlimited discretion to an administrative agency on whether or not to grant permission or a license for an activity or to use property are illegal. DuPont v. Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 289; State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 470. The Commissioner contends that other statutes allow consideration of aesthetic factors when regulating waters and wetlands.