Opinion
1:01CV00804
January 7, 2003
MEMORANDUM ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, AND ORDER APPOINTING PRISONER LEGAL SERVICES
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Lance Cole, Timothy Caviness and Eric Woods. (Pleading No. 25.) Plaintiff Eugene Dunston has responded in opposition to Defendants' motion. The motion is ready for a ruling.
In his response in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff included a request in his prayer for relief that the Court grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. (Pleading No. 30.) However, Plaintiff did not make any argument that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial. In that regard, the Court notes that nearly every aspect of the incident in question is disputed by the parties. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Plaintiff's motion.
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff Dunston, a prisoner at the Albemarle Correctional Institution ("ACI") in Badin, North Carolina, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 23, 2001 alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants Cole, Caviness and Woods, correctional officers at ACI, used excessive force against him. Plaintiff also appended state law claims for assault and battery. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and pre- and post-judgment interest. Defendants filed answers denying the material allegations in the Complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses.
During the discovery period, this Court granted Defendants' motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 to require Plaintiff to submit to an eye examination. On July 19, 2002, this Court granted the motion of attorney Amiel J. Rossabi to withdraw from the case as counsel for Plaintiff. Since that time, Plaintiff has proceeded pro se. Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment, along with a supporting memorandum and affidavits.
II. Statement of Facts
In his unverified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on February 4, 2001, while confined at ACI, Defendant Cole approached Plaintiff's cell and handcuffed him in such a manner as to make his wrists bleed. Cole then entered Plaintiff's cell and sprayed mace in Plaintiff's face and mouth, threw him into the wall and beat him about the head. (Compl. ¶ 7.) At some point during Cole's attack, Defendant Caviness allegedly joined in, choking Plaintiff and holding Plaintiff's arms and hands away from his face so that Cole could spray more mace in Plaintiff's face. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Cole and Caviness then threw Plaintiff into the shower, and that when Plaintiff asked for medical attention, Cole entered the shower and began to beat and kick Plaintiff about his body while making racial slurs. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Woods was present for the entire attack but did nothing to deter Cole or to assist Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the attack, he suffered bruises, swelling, lacerations, permanent nerve damage, head and eye pain, and emotional suffering. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that his injuries required treatment at the Stanly Memorial Hospital emergency room immediately following the attack and continue to require medical treatment. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.)
In his affidavit filed in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff avers that he was maliciously and intentionally beaten, maced and kicked by Cole and Caviness. (Pl.'s Mem. at 1-2.) Plaintiff avers that as a result of the attack, he has suffered injuries to his left eye and painful headaches. Id. at 3.
III. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
The summary judgment standard of review under Rule 56 is well established. A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon a showing that "there is no genuine issue of material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The material facts are those identified by controlling law as essential elements of claims asserted by the parties. A genuine issue as to such facts exists if the evidence forecast is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). No genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case as to which it would have the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In evaluating a forecast of evidence on summary judgment review, the court must view the facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
When the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence showing more than some "metaphysical doubt" that genuine and material factual issues exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to circumvent summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Instead, the nonmoving party must convince the court that, upon the record taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49. Trial is unnecessary if "the facts are undisputed, or if disputed, the dispute is of no consequence to the dispositive question." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993).
IV. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff cannot show that his blurred vision and headaches were caused by Defendants; and (2) Plaintiff cannot show more than de minimis injury. For the reasons that follow, the Court does not find merit in either of these arguments.
1. Causation of Plaintiff's Blurred Vision and Headaches
To demonstrate standing in a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Furthermore, a court may rely on medical affidavits and prison medical records in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Stanley v. Hejirika, 134 F.3d 629, 637-38 (4th Cir. 1998); Marshall v. Odom, 156 F. Supp.2d 525, 530 (D. Md. 2001); Bennett v. Reed, 534 F. Supp. 83, 86 (E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1982).
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's prison medical records show that he was involved in many incidents and altercations with fellow inmates in 1994, 1999, 2001 and 2002 which resulted in eye injuries or complaints of blurred vision or headaches. Defendants also emphasize that an examining physician in 1994 opined that Plaintiff's blurred vision likely resulted from a chronic condition. Defendants contend that because of this objective evidence of other causes of Plaintiff's blurred vision and headaches, he will not be able to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants' alleged conduct on February 4, 2001 in fact caused him to experience blurred vision and headaches.
These records are attached to the affidavit of Janice R. Brown, Manager of the Medical Records Section of the Division of Prisons Health Services Division. (Pleading No. 28, Brown Aff., Ex. A.)
Defendants' argument fails for two reasons. First, the fact that Plaintiff was involved in incidents which resulted in complaints of blurred vision and headaches both prior to and after the incident in question does not disprove that this incident caused Plaintiff to suffer blurred vision and headaches. While pre-existing incidents may make the question of causation more difficult, the Court finds that the evidence of record raises a "reasonable probability" that Defendants' conduct caused Plaintiff's alleged injuries. Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 242 (4th Cir. 1982) ("This emphasis, where causation is dispositive, upon `probability,' . . . rather than mere `possibility' as the proper test simply bespeaks the special danger that in a matter so generally incapable of certain proof jury decision will be on the basis of sheer speculation . . . .") Having met this threshold, the question of causation of Plaintiff's injuries must be resolved by the fact-finder. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, Inc., 6 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1993) (whether evidence is sufficient to create a jury issue on causation is a question of law for a court, but issues of causation are to be decided by a jury).
The Court notes that even if Plaintiff's blurred vision and headaches were demonstrably pre-existing conditions, a showing that Defendants' conduct aggravated those conditions would be enough to show actionable injury. See Hogan v. Oklahoma Dep't of Corr., No. 01-7091, 2002 WL 12272, * 1-2 (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2002) (unpublished opinion) (state prisoner's allegations that prison officials required him to lift heavy objects and that such lifting aggravated his pre-existing medical conditions stated Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment).
Second, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's blurred vision and headaches were pre-existing conditions does not negate the fact that there is evidence that Plaintiff also suffered bruises, swelling and lacerations, injuries which are "fairly traceable" to Defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. The Court finds no basis for granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground.
2. De Minimis Injury
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[t]he Eighth Amendment's prohibition of `cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992). In Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Fourth Circuit interpreted Hudson broadly to mean that de minimis injury can serve as conclusive evidence that de minimis force was used, and thus, that "absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injury is de minimis."
Since Norman, the Fourth Circuit has further delineated the meaning of "de minimis injury." In Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997), a pretrial detainee alleged pain from being handcuffed for approximately six hours, a welt from a slap in the face, and emotional trauma from a pen that was inserted in his nose by an officer accompanied by a threat to "rip it open." The Court of Appeals held that these injuries were de minimis primarily due to the fact that despite over 60 trips to the medical department, the detainee never once sought treatment for any of these injuries. Id. at 1167-68. In Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1998), a pretrial detainee's medical records revealed that he suffered abrasions on his wrists and ankles, slight swelling in the jaw area, tenderness over some ribs, and some excoriation of the mucous membranes of the mouth during a scuffle with officers. In holding that the detainee's injuries were de minimis, the Court of Appeals focused on the fact that the detainee did not seek medical treatment for at least twelve hours after the incident in question, and that no medical treatment was required or prescribed for any of his injuries. Id. at 485.
The Riley court held that the Hudson/Norman analysis applied with equal force to claims of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment brought by pretrial detainees. Id. at 1166.
In light of the foregoing authorities, it is clear that Plaintiff's injuries in this case rise above the threshold for de minimis injury in the Fourth Circuit. Unlike the plaintiff in Taylor, Plaintiff was treated at the emergency room immediately following the incident with Defendants. (Brown Aff., Ex. A at 91-100, 102-03.) Similarly, unlike the plaintiff in Taylor, Plaintiff sustained an 8 millimeter laceration above his left eye deep enough to require stitches. Id. at 95-96. Further, in contrast to the plaintiff in Riley, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment of his injuries with the prison medical staff and outside medical providers on repeated occasions. Id. at 101, 104-186, 212-13. The physicians who examined Plaintiff apparently considered his complaints of eye pain, blurred vision and headaches to be serious enough to warrant x-rays of the face, chest, lumbar spine and pelvis, two CT scans of the head and MRIs of the cervical spine and the brain. Id. at 101-04, 135, 170. The Court notes further that one of his examining physicians could not rule out the possibility that the small vessel arterial disease revealed on the MRI was caused by the trauma from the incident with Defendants. Id. at 135, 143. The Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiff's injuries in this case are not de minimis. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claims for Assault and Battery
Defendants contend that, because they have shown they are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims for assault and battery. However, in light of the Court's denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim, the Court will retain its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
V. Conclusion
For reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Pleading No. 25) is DENIED. The Court will retain its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims for assault and battery.
Plaintiff Dunston has requested a trial by jury, so IT IS ORDERED that this case be set upon a jury calendar for trial in mid-2003, the date to be established after consultation with counsel for the parties. In preparation for that trial, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. is APPOINTED to represent the Plaintiff in final pretrial preparations and at trial. Prisoner Legal Services shall forthwith enter a notice of appearance pursuant to this order so that the Court and opposing counsel may be on notice that the case may proceed on schedule with final pretrial preparation.
The Clerk shall forthwith file this Memorandum Order and mail it to the parties and to North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. at P.O. Box 25397, Raleigh, North Carolina 27611.