Dunson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision

5 Citing cases

  1. Morales v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr.

    2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 1459 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)

    Civil Service Law § 71 provides, in pertinent part, that "where an employee has been separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from an assault sustained in the course of his or her employment, he or she shall be entitled to a leave of absence for at least two years." The term assault is not defined under this statute, but we have recently held that the definition employed by respondent is rational, to wit, "an intentional physical act of violence directed towardan employee by an inmate or parolee" (Matter of Froehlich v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 179 AD3d 1408, 1410 [2020] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted; emphasis added], appeal dismissed 35 NY3d 1031 [2020]; see Matter of Maloy v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 AD3d 1428, 1429 [2020]; Matter of Dunson v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 AD3d 1390, 1391-1392 [2020]). These three cited cases also found that, under the particular facts of each case, an assault, as defined by respondent, did not occur and, as such, the denial by respondent of extended leave was neither arbitrary nor capricious (see Matter of Maloy v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 AD3d at 1429; Matter of Dunson v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 AD3d at 1392; Matter of Froehlich v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 179 AD3d at 1411).

  2. Morales v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision

    192 A.D.3d 1292 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Civil Service Law § 71 provides, in pertinent part, that "where an employee has been separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from an assault sustained in the course of his or her employment, he or she shall be entitled to a leave of absence for at least two years." The term assault is not defined under this statute, but we have recently held that the definition employed by respondent is rational, to wit, "an intentional physical act of violence directed toward an employee by an inmate or parolee" ( Matter of Froehlich v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 179 A.D.3d 1408, 1410, 118 N.Y.S.3d 765 [2020] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted; emphasis added], appeal dismissed 35 N.Y.3d 1031, 126 N.Y.S.3d 690, 150 N.E.3d 356 [2020] ; seeMatter of Maloy v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1428, 1429, 137 N.Y.S.3d 158 [2020] ; Matter of Dunson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision , 188 A.D.3d 1390, 1391–1392, 136 N.Y.S.3d 175 [2020] ). These three cited cases also found that, under the particular facts of each case, an assault, as defined by respondent, did not occur and, as such, the denial by respondent of extended leave was neither arbitrary nor capricious (seeMatter of Maloy v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d at 1429, 137 N.Y.S.3d 158 ; Matter of Dunson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d at 1392, 136 N.Y.S.3d 175 ; Matter of Froehlich v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 179 A.D.3d at 1411, 118 N.Y.S.3d 765 ).

  3. Jennings v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision

    192 A.D.3d 1426 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)

    Petitioner argues that respondent's interpretation of the term assault is irrational, as too restrictive, and instead seeks to apply the definitions of assault set forth in Penal Law §§ 120.00(1) and 120.05(1), (3) and (7). This Court has previously held that respondent's definition of assault is rational, and has declined to apply the definition of assault found in the Penal Law to these matters as it "would too broadly expand the scope of employees entitled to the enhanced benefit" ( Matter of Dunson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1390, 1392, 136 N.Y.S.3d 175 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; seeMatter of Maloy v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1428, 1429, 137 N.Y.S.3d 158 [2020] ; Matter of Froehlich v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 179 A.D.3d 1408, 1410, 118 N.Y.S.3d 765 [2020], appeal dismissed 35 N.Y.3d 1031, 126 N.Y.S.3d 690, 150 N.E.3d 356 [2020] ). As Supreme Court's determination was made without a hearing, this Court's review is limited to whether respondent's determination was "arbitrary and capricious, irrational, affected by an error of law or an abuse of discretion" ( Matter of Buffalo Teachers Fedn., Inc. v. Elia, 162 A.D.3d 1169, 1172, 79 N.Y.S.3d 309 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 915, 2019 WL 690302 [2019] ; seeMatter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO v. Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 163 A.D.3d 1110, 1112, 81 N.Y.S.3d 275 [2018] ). As always, determinations of this sor

  4. In re Dalotto

    No. 2021-03637 (N.Y. App. Div. Jun. 10, 2021)

    Based on the record, petitioner never asserted that she was medically fit to perform her duties prior to her termination, and, in fact, the only medical documentation consistently presented to the Department for over one year was statements from her own physician attesting that she was unable to return to work. Therefore, we find that the Department's determination was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational (see Matter of Maloy v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1428, 1429 [2020]; Matter of Dunson v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1390, 1392 [2020]). The record contains written correspondence by Edward Bradley, a field representative for petitioner's union, requesting a pretermination meeting on behalf of petitioner that includes a conditional statement that petitioner is able to perform her duties at a location other than her workplace.

  5. Dalotto v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor

    195 A.D.3d 1180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    Based on the record, petitioner never asserted that she was medically fit to perform her duties prior to her termination, and, in fact, the only medical documentation consistently presented to the Department for over one year was statements from her own physician attesting that she was unable to return to work. Therefore, we find that the Department's determination was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational (seeMatter of Maloy v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1428, 1429, 137 N.Y.S.3d 158 [2020] ; Matter of Dunson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 188 A.D.3d 1390, 1392, 136 N.Y.S.3d 175 [2020] ). The record contains written correspondence by Edward Bradley, a field representative for petitioner's union, requesting a pretermination meeting on behalf of petitioner that includes a conditional statement that petitioner is able to perform her duties at a location other than her workplace.